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Chapter 1 : I attempt a detailed literature review on the passage from the proba-
bilistic versions of the Condorcet Jury Theorem to models augmented by the con-
cept of strategic agents, including both theoretical and relevant empirical work.
In the first part, I explore the most influential relevant game theoretic models
and their main predictions. In the second part, I review what voting experiments
have to say about these predictions, with a brief mention of the experiments’ key
methodological aspects. In the final part, I provide with an attempt to map the
recent strategic voting literature in terms of structure and scope. I close with
a philosophical question on the exogeneity of a “correct” choice of a voting out-
come, which is inherent in the current strategic voting literature.
Chapter 2 : I develop a two stage game with individually costly political action
and costless voting on a binary agenda where, in equilibrium, agents rationally
cast honest votes in the voting stage. I show that a positive but sufficiently low
individual cost of political action can lead to a loss in aggregate welfare for any
electorate size. When the individual cost of political action is lower than the
signalling gain, agents will engage in informative political action. In the voting
stage, since everyone’s signal is revealed, agents will unanimously vote for the
same policy. Therefore, the result of the ballot will be exactly the same as the
one without prior communication, but with the additional aggregate cost of po-
litical action. However, when agents have heterogeneous prior beliefs, society is
large and the state of the world is sufficiently uncertain, a moderate individual
cost of political action can induce informative collective action of only a subset
of the members of society, which increases ex ante aggregate welfare relative to
no political action. The size of the subset of agents engaging in collective action
depends on the dispersion of prior opinions.
Chapter 3 : This chapter shows theoretically that hearing expert opinions can
be a double-edged sword for decision making committees. We study a majori-
tarian voting game of common interest where committee members receive not
only private information, but also expert information that is more accurate than
private information and observed by all members. We identify three types of
equilibria of interest, namely i) the symmetric mixed strategy equilibrium where
each member randomizes between following the private and public signals should
they disagree; ii) the asymmetric pure strategy equilibrium where a certain num-
ber of members always follow the public signal while the others always follow the
private signal; and iii) a class of equilibria where a supermajority and hence the
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committee decision always follow the expert signal. We find that in the first two
equilibria, the expert signal is collectively taken into account in such a way that
it enhances the efficiency (accuracy) of the committee decision, and a fortiori the
CJT holds. However, in the third type of equilibria, private information is not
reflected in the committee decision and the efficiency of committee decision is
identical to that of public information, which may well be lower than the effi-
ciency the committee could achieve without expert information. In other words,
the introduction of expert information might reduce efficiency in equilibrium.
Chapter 4 : In this chapter we present experimental results on the theory of
the previous chapter. In the laboratory, too many subjects voted according to
expert information compared to the predictions from the efficient equilibria. The
majority decisions followed the expert signal most of the time, which is consistent
with the class of obedient equilibria mentioned in the previous chapter. Another
interesting finding is the marked heterogeneity in voting behaviour. We argue
that the voters’ behaviour in our data can be best described as that in an obe-
dient equilibrium where a supermajority (and hence the decision) always follow
the expert signal so that no voter is pivotal. A large efficiency loss manifests
due to the presence of expert information when the committee size was large.
We suggest that it may be desirable for expert information to be revealed only
to a subset of committee members. Finally, in the Appendix we describe a new
alternative method for producing the signal matrix of the game.
Chapter 5 : There is a significant gap between the theoretical predictions and
the empirical evidence about the efficiency of policies in reducing crime rates.
This chapter argues that one important reason for this is that the current liter-
ature of economics of crime overlooks an important hysteresis effect in criminal
behaviour. One important consequence of hysteresis is that the effect on an out-
come variable from positive exogenous variations in the determining variables has
a different magnitude from negative variations. We present a simple model that
characterises hysteresis in both the micro and macro levels. When the probability
of punishment decreases, some law abiding agents will find it more beneficial to
enter a criminal career. If the probability of punishment returns to its original
level, a subset of these agents will continue with their career in crime. We show
that, when crime choice exhibits weak hysteresis at the individual level, crime rate
in a society consisted from a continuum of agents that follows any non-uniform
distribution will exhibit strong hysteresis. Only when punishment is extremely
severe the effect of hysteresis ceases to exist. The theoretical predictions corrobo-
rate the argument that policy makers should be more inclined to set pre-emptive




1 The Strategic Revival of the Condorcet Jury Theorem 13
1.1 Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13
1.2 Theory . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14
1.2.1 Statistical Voting . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14
1.2.2 Strategic Voting . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14
1.3 Experiments . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16
1.3.1 Core and Information . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16
1.3.2 Pivotal Voter Calculus . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 19
1.3.3 Abstention and Political Influence . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 24
1.4 The More the Merrier? . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 27
1.4.1 A logical map of the literature . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 27
1.4.2 Is good exogenous? . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 28
2 Costly Political Action and Majority Decisions 31
2.1 Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 31
2.2 Model . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 34
2.2.1 The game . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 34
2.2.2 Equilibrium of the game . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 36
2.3 Homogeneous Priors . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 37
2.4 Heterogeneous Priors . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 41
2.4.1 Uninformative and Fully Informative Equilibria . . . . . . 42
2.4.2 Partially Informative Equilibria . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 45
2.5 Aggregate Welfare of Equilibria . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 47
2.6 Concluding Remarks . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 49
Appendix 51
2.A Proof of Lemma 1 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 51
2.B Proof of Lemma 2 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 52
2.C Proof of Proposition 1 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 55
2.D Proof of Lemma 3 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 55
2.E Proof of Lemma 4 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 55
2.F Proof of Proposition 2 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 57
2.G Proof of Proposition 3 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 57
2.H Proof of Proposition 4 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 60
2.I Note on equivalence of results with Lohmann (1994) . . . . . . . . 60
9
3 Expert Information and Majority Decisions: Theory1 63
3.1 Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 63
3.2 Model . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 66
3.3 Equilibrium Predictions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 68
3.3.1 Symmetric strategies . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 68
3.3.2 Asymmetric strategies . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 72
3.3.3 Quantal Response Equilibria . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 75
3.4 Equilibrium Selection . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 78
3.4.1 Elimination of Weakly Dominated Strategies . . . . . . . . 79
3.4.2 Trembling Hand . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 79
3.5 Conclusion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 80
Appendix 83
3.A Proof of Proposition 1 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 83
3.B Proof of Lemma 1 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 83
3.C Proof of Proposition 3 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 85
3.D Proof of Proposition 4 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 86
3.E Proof of Proposition 6 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 88
3.F Proof of Proposition 7 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 89
3.G Deriving the asymmetric pure equilibrium . . . . . . . . . . . . . 90
3.G.1 Obedient Voters . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 90
3.G.2 Informative Voters . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 91
3.G.3 Upper bound on q . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 92
4 Expert Information and Majority Decisions: Experiment2 95
4.1 Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 95
4.2 Experimental Design . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 97
4.3 Experimental Results . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 99
4.3.1 Voter choices with expert information . . . . . . . . . . . . 100
4.3.2 Committee decisions with expert information . . . . . . . 103
4.3.3 Relation to equilibrium predictions . . . . . . . . . . . . . 104
4.3.4 Efficiency comparison . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 109
4.4 Conclusion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 110
Appendix 113
4.A Treatments without Expert Information . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 113
4.B Experimental Instructions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 113
4.C Random Ranking Version . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 117
4.C.1 Creating the Signal Matrix using RRV . . . . . . . . . . . 118
4.C.2 RRV results . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 119
1This chapter was based on results from the 2013 working paper “Expert Information and
Majority Decisions”, co-authored by Dr. Kohei Kawamura.
2This chapter was based on results from the 2013 working paper “Expert Information and
Majority Decisions”, co-authored by Dr. Kohei Kawamura.
10
5 Hysteresis in Crime3 123
5.1 Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 123
5.2 Hysteresis . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 124
5.2.1 Weak versus Strong Hysteresis . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 125
5.2.2 Extrinsic versus Intrinsic Hysteresis . . . . . . . . . . . . . 126
5.3 Baseline Model . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 127
5.3.1 Homogeneous Agents . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 127
5.3.2 Crime Rates with Heterogeneous Agents . . . . . . . . . . 129
5.4 Weak Hysteresis in Crime Decision . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 131
5.4.1 Weak Hysteresis versus Unit Root Process . . . . . . . . . 134
5.5 Heterogeneous Agents and Strong Hysteresis . . . . . . . . . . . . 136
5.6 Conclusion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 139





The Strategic Revival of the
Condorcet Jury Theorem
“But it is asked how a man can be both free and forced to conform to wills that
are not his own?” (J.J.Rousseau)
1.1 Introduction
In order to evaluate collective decision making mechanisms, the literature of mod-
ern political economy and philosophy has leaped over an enormous boulder of
introspection, mainly due to the work of John Stuart Mill. Whereas previous
political philosophers like Rousseau, Kant and Hegel attempted to answer primal
questions on decision making through human interaction, lingering unavoidably
within the realms of philosophy to underline universal ideas as the existence of
common good, Mill went on to evaluate the conditions under which the prin-
ciple of individual autonomy can be integrated into shaping Liberalism of his
time (Van Dyke (1960)). The more recent literature that copes with the subject,
seems to feel Rousseau s platonic perception of common good as a satisfactory,
usually through Condorcets Jury Theorem, and initiates to undergo a series of
evaluations on collective decision making mechanisms. In fact, Rousseaus theory
of General Will and Condorcet’s views about group judgement competence are
complementary, as far as common good, majority competence, effective size of
the assembly, closeness to unanimity with respect to the dominance of the gen-
eral will and the importance both of deliberations and closeness to unanimity
are concerned (Grofman and Feld (1988)). However, in the conceptualization of
Condorcet Jury Theorem (CJT), the intuition that majority will approximate the
common good more than any individual is seeing the latter idea as axiomatic.
Of course, the scope of this strand of literature is not to endogenize the con-
cept of a General Will, but merely to define it externally, and evaluate different




After Arrows Impossibility result, concerning the amalgam of individual prefer-
ences in a robust ordinal social welfare function, the comparability of utilities
was the only exit strategy of the relevant literature (Sen (1995)). Within this
framework, an initial attempt to restate and browse through the validity of the
Condorcet Jury Theorem can be found in Nitzan and Paroush (1985). In their
work, the weighted majority rule by each players log odds of decisional compe-
tence is found to be the optimal rule for two a priori equally likely alternatives.
Moreover, the concept of a cost for optimal rules is introduced, and, by simula-
tion, it is shown that even the most competent of the group is less likely to choose
better than the class majority.
Until the end of the nineteen eighties, the validity of the CJT was checked
only as a problem of statistical nature, where individual voters choose as they
would if the result of the voting procedure was not interlinked with other voters
choices. In this trajectory, in Young (1988) the CJT can be seen as a maximum
likelihood estimate that would indicate the most probable combination of opin-
ions. Whereas both Condorcet and Borda’s method satisfy anonymity, neutrality
and reinforcement1, the latter fails to be locally stable2, a property inherent in
Condorcet’s method. In an attempt to introduce private information and in-
formation distribution, Miller (1986) showed that collective voting competence
increases the more equally information is distributed amongst voters. Within the
introduction of correlation amongst the voters preferences, Ladha (1992) showed
that in big groups Condorcet’s result holds under fairly general conditions. In
smaller groups, the condition on average correlation is rather strong. The prob-
ability that the majority selects the superior outcome is inversely related to the
average of the coefficients of correlation. Finally, in Berg (1993), when the proba-
bility of an individual voter choosing correctly is greater than half, a small amount
of negative intra voter correlation raises the competence of the jury.
1.2.2 Strategic Voting
Upon the introduction of strategic thinking in modelling voters’ behaviour in Or-
deshook and Palfrey (1988), the importance of the ballot structure is underlined,
as it is shown to influence the results profoundly. Under incomplete information,
Condorcet winners need not necessarily prevail, and under imperfect information
about other’s preferences, there exist multiple equilibria. And, while both ratio-
nal ignorance and informational efficiency are a Nash Equilibrium, both can be
socially undesirable (Gersbach (1995)). Informational efficiency can constitute a
Nash Equilibrium if the expected utilities fulfil the reversed ordering property.
Information, cost and strategic thinking was introduced separately in the liter-
ature, but the first robust way to combine these results with informative voting
(according to one’s honest opinion) was done by Austen-Smith and Banks (1996).
1Divided in two groups, the initial population of voters insists on its social outcome.
2The change on a pair of choices affects only those choices alone, and not any other pair.
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In the first part of their model, it was proved that sincere voting can both be
informative and rational only if the choice rule used is the majority rule. In their
second and third part of their model, Austen-Smith and Banks (1996) showed
that sincere voting cannot both be informative and rational. Moreover in Wit
(1998), while the model suffers from multiple equilibria, under mixed strategies
the CJT is again confirmed in the general case. The possibility of a valid CJT
under rational voters was restored in McLennan (1998), where it was confirmed
that, whenever sincere voting leads to the conclusion of the CJT, there exist Nash
equilibria with these properties. In symmetric (anonymous) environments, the
equilibria may be taken to be symmetric as well.
In 1998, Feddersen and Pesendorfer (1998), proved yet another impossibility
theorem: when voters choose strategically, the unanimity rule results in a strictly
positive probability of both acquitting the guilty and convicting the innocent.
Increasing jury size does not help, but only when the unanimity rule is dropped.
On the other hand, by introducing majority rule in Ben-Yashar and Paroush
(2000), the likelihood of implementing the correct choice is greater than that of a
correct choice done by a member of the team that is sampled at random. Under
any voting rule, the symmetric equilibrium was proved to have a cut-off structure
of the form 0 < a < b < 1 (Gerardi (2000)). Moreover in Duggan and Martinelli
(2001), under unanimity rule, Bayesian Nash Equilibrium exists for any jury size,
but the probability of convicting the innocent (acquitting the guilty) tends to
zero (one) as jury size grows. Again in Duggan and Martinelli (2001) under non-
unanimity, a symmetric Bayesian Nash Equilibrium exists for any jury size. Under
fixed jury size, there are cases where requiring more votes to convict raises the
probability of conviction and others where probability to convict under unanimity
exceeds the one under majority. Finally, under continuous signals, existence and
uniqueness of symmetric equilibria, as well as the asymptotic efficiency of non-
unanimous voting rules hold in general . Added to that, when the signal space is
the unit interval, the unique Bayesian Nash equilibrium in responsive strategies
is to vote informatively (Meirowitz (2002)). The unanimity rule here is efficient,
as there are at least nearly perfect informative signals.
In the last fifteen years, the literature that copes with CJT has focused mainly
on committee design in terms of best rule, number of jurors, sequence of voting
and information asymmetries. Although all of the research surrounding the CJT
has focused on these subjects, we can discern a pattern of separation, as far as
the perception of the nature of the problem is concerned.
Henceforth, and after focusing just on the technical and game theoretic as-
pects of introducing strategic voting in the CJT, we observe that the main stream
of literature has focused mainly on mechanism design, and more specifically dis-
covering the best method to aggregate information in a small or larger electorate.
Optimal conservatism in mechanism design increases private incentives to gather
evidence and improves the quality of group decision: a standard higher than the
optimal can lead to a greater private marginal value of evidence (Li (2001)). As
far as sequence of voting is concerned, under unanimity games, the whole set of
equilibria is the same in all sequential structures, and there are cases under which
sequential equilibria do no better at aggregating information that simultaneous
ones (Dekel and Piccione (2000)).
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When effort costs are sufficiently high, preference heterogeneity can provide
members additional incentives to gather information (Cai (2009)). Consequently,
the optimal committee size and the principals expected payoff can increase in the
heterogeneity of preferences. With the free rider problem under consideration,
Mukhopadhaya (2003) proved that with perfect signals, probability of paying
attention and making a correct decision decrease with jury size. With imper-
fect signals, the probability of paying attention still decreases, but not always
the probability of making a correct decision. When voters can abstain (Persico
(2004)), the sets of sequential and simultaneous voting equilibria are disjoint once
we introduce arbitrarily small costs of voting. If an appropriate q-rule is intro-
duced, simultaneous voting mechanism dominates all equilibria of the sequential
mechanism. Under non-anonymous voting (first best) it is rational to vote infor-
matively. Under anonymous voting, members have an incentive to vote strategi-
cally (Ben-Yashar and Milchtaich (2007)). Abstentions may be used strategically
to improve the quality of the collective decision.
There exists a range of values around zero for the correlation amongst voters
for which augmentation of the subcommittee is always beneficial, but this result
does not hold generally (Berend and Sapir (2007)). If there is at least one person
biased enough in every direction, the supermajority penalty procedure (maximis-
ing the utility of the unbiased person) is non-monotonic with respect to the size
of the committee (Chwe (2008)).
In Gerardi and Yariv (2008), optimal incentive is shown to induce a trade-off
between inducing players to acquire information and extracting information from
them. Optimal extortions of the ex-post efficient rule depend on the accuracy of
the signal, while the expected social choice value is non monotone on the cost of
information. Accuracy of the private information and jury size are non-monotone
in the signal accuracy. Gershkov and Szentes (2009) model an environment where
a social planner chooses randomly in sequence and asks voters on a binary choice
and allows for a decision to stop asking a report to be made by the social planer
when the precision of the posterior exceeds a cut-off that decreases with each
additional report. Gershkov and Szentes (2009) show that the restriction to ex-
post efficiency is without loss, even for sufficiently imprecise signals. On the other
hand, with sufficiently small costs, ex-post mechanisms can be shown to be sub-
optimal. Finally, the optimal committee size is bounded, which means that the
Condorcet Jury Theorem fails to hold (Szentes and Koriyama (2009)). However,
the welfare loss of an oversized committee is surprisingly small: in an arbitrarily
large committee, even the worst equilibrium generates higher welfare than that
with two members less than the optimal.
1.3 Experiments
1.3.1 Core and Information
In the first decade of experimental voting design, as McKelvey and Ordeshook
(1990) assert, the main questions posed were mostly directed at the robustness
of the core as a predictor of outcomes in committee processes, the convergence to
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Condorcet winners when the information set of committee members varies and
effects of different voting procedures.
Fiorina and Plott (1978) is the first laboratory experiment comparing the
validity the predictions of several voting models of the time compared to exper-
imental results. In their experiment, 65 committees of five members cast a vote
for a series of rounds until a majoritarian outcome is reached. The speed of con-
vergence of the result to a majoritarian outcome is tested with respect to whether
subjects are allowed to communicate and whether the payoffs from the session
are high or low. Interestingly, no model performs significantly better than others.
However, models are ranked with respect to validity according to the different
voting settings. In high payoff settings, equilibrium models seem to outperform
all the rest. In low payoff settings, if no communication is allowed, all models
seem to perform poorly. If communication is indeed allowed, “fairness models
seem to give slightly better predictions than the rest. Two important results can
be drawn from the experimental general results. Firstly, large sample size can-
not substitute for lower payoffs. Secondly, contrary to what theory suggested, in
models with no equilibrium the process did not explode.
McKelvey and Ordeshook (1980) experimentally test the effect of vote trading
with respect to the efficiency of the voting outcome. Indeed, the results indicate
that the vote trading structure fundamentally alters the negotiation process and
directly affects the likelihood the Condorcet winner is chosen. The two different
setups of the game involve 15 minute negotiations and either unrestricted or
irreversible choices after ballots are traded under various payoff structure. 194
undergraduate and masters students where combined in three and five member
committees, with an algorithm that minimized the number of meetings of subjects
in the same committee. Experienced and inexperienced members never met in the
same committee. In terms of results, vote trading resulting in non-optimal results
only in committees with inexperienced subjects. Moreover, given they are located
in the game setup that allows it, subjects very often reversed Pareto inferior
outcomes. Finally, the authors acknowledge the importance of a non-empty core
for an increased speed of convergence to an efficient outcome. However, McKelvey
and Ordeshook (1981) casts doubt on the belief that the game core is a robust
prediction of majoritarian voting outcomes with vote trading.
Eckel and Holt (1989) designed an experiment on committee voting in which
a fixed agenda specified a sequence of binary decisions. The purpose of the
experiment was to discern whether voting is myopic or strategic. The treatment
variables used were private of public information (own versus all agents payoff
structure) and the frequency of payment preference profile change. A total of
eight different treatments with ten meetings each took place, and each committee
consisted of nine voting members. All treatments were conducted with initially
inexperienced subjects. The results reveal that even with a very simple agenda
with only three possible voter types, the acquisition of sufficient information that
induces strategic voting can take a considerable amount of time. Treatments
with private information exhibited strategic behaviour only after the third or
fourth meeting. However, strategic voting patterns always emerged within four
repetitions with the same preference profile. Moreover, the probability of the
emergence of strategic behaviour increased with less stationary preference profiles.
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In Collier, Ordeshook, and Williams (1989), an experiment with 120 inexpe-
rienced subjects in five member committees was conducted in order to test the
proneness of voters to purchase information regarding the candidate challenging
the incumbent. Voters received information on vote totals and individual payoffs,
but not who voted for whom or how many voters purchased information. In six
sessions, a promise did not necessarily have a relationship with the policy selected
by the incumbent. In the other six, challengers always kept their promises. The
results showed that agents rely more on retrospective knowledge and buy less
information when the candidates strategies are stable. However, in periods of
instability the likelihood of being pivotal, the reliability of information for sale
and the extent of the outcome swing between the two candidates increased the
probability of purchasing information on the incumbent. Interestingly, beyond
the aforementioned correlations, individual decisions appear highly idiosyncratic.
In an initial attempt to test the theory of expressive voting, Carter and
Guerette (1992) find weak support for the theory but admit that their results
are not robust to alternative parameter settings. 96 economics and accounting
undergraduate students participated in the experiment. The probability of be-
ing pivotal was the main treatment variable, over the values 0%, 1%, 10%, 20%
and 100%, the other variable being the payoff structure. With the probability
of being pivotal increasing, they noticed an increase in the likelihood of voting
according to a moral sentiment, and attributed this increase to the decrease of
the opportunity cost of expressing one’s charitable sentiment.
Forsythe, Myerson, Rietz, and Weber (1993) showed that the presence of
polls and voting histories leads to a significant decrease of the frequency with
which a Condorcet loser wins. Shared histories enable coordination on favourite
candidates in a sequence of identical elections. The experiment consisted of two
sessions of 48 elections, with 28 different voters, 14 in each group, from a subject
pool of 450 MBA and undergraduate students in Business Administration and
the Liberal Arts. To examine the effects of election histories, the results were
contrasted with Forsythe, Myerson, Rietz, and Weber (1991). In one group there
were non-binding polls, while the other was conducted in the absence of polls and
there was the option of abstention. In all cases, there was a significant amount
of strategic votes. Finally, in the presence of opinion polls and voting histories
outcomes generally resulted in satisfying Duverger’s Law.
Gth and Weck-Hannemann (1997) in an attempt to explain the value of voting
rights and the reasons why people vote, conducted an experiment where 175 non-
economics students, without deliberation, were given the option to sell their right
to vote in the election of the German Bundestag on 16 October 1994, in an
auction where the bids varied from 0 to 200 DM. In the view of the authors, any
legal violations of this experiment were avoided by asking the sellers themselves
to destroy their voting cards (!). Interestingly, only a very small minority of
the participants (2.8%) would sell their right to vote for any positive price. In
this experiment, the post experimental questionnaires uncovered that the sense of
moral duty surpassed the small probability of being pivotal in the aforementioned
elections. Amongst 162 participants that answered the relevant question, 92
provided the fact that voting is a civil duty to preserve democracy as a reason
for not selling their votes for any cost.
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Blais and Young (1999) in another attempt to explain why people vote, con-
ducted an experiment where they exposed a control group to a 10 minute pre-
sentation about the rational model of voting and the “paradox that so many
people vote when it is apparently irrational on a cost benefit analysis. The total
number of respondents was 1459. Subsets of the control group, along with all
students were given a questionnaire to fill, varying from three weeks prior to one
week after the elections, providing information about their voting intentions and
attitude towards voting, as well as real voting behaviour. The overall turnout
of the respondents was 68% (close to the national rate of 70%). Attendance
to the presentation resulted in a 7% decrease in the probability to vote for the
control group. Also, groups exposed to questionnaires without attending the pre-
sentation exhibited higher turnout amongst other groups. Also political interest,
party identification and previous voting were variables highly correlated with the
propensity to vote.
1.3.2 Pivotal Voter Calculus
In the second decade of experimental voting design, as Palfrey (2009) suggests,
under very different voting settings, what is predominant is the evidence confirm-
ing highly strategic voting behaviour, determined to a large extent by “pivotal
voter calculus”.
Guarnaschelli, McKelvey, and Palfrey (2000) is the first compact experimen-
tal study on decision rules using three treatment variables: group size (3 or 6),
number of votes needed for conviction (majority or unanimity) and pre-vote de-
liberation. 4 experiments were run, with 12 plus 1 (used as a monitor) subjects.
Each experiment had 4 sessions. Between sessions, 2 treatment variables were al-
tered, the decision rule (majority or unanimity) and the straw poll (taken or not).
Subjects were matched randomly in a sequence of 15 matches. In the data, they
find clear evidence of strategic voting and the inferiority of unanimous decisions,
increasing with group size. However, at the group level, unlike Nash predictions
there were fewer incorrect convictions under unanimity than majority. The au-
thors also tested the predictive power of the Nave Nash Model (NNM) versus
the Quantal Response Equilibrium (QRE) and found that without a straw poll
QRE explained most of the discrepancies. Finally, there were strong evidence
of heterogeneity in subjects choices while the frequency of strategic voting was
overall higher in the last five rounds.
Frchette, Kagel, and Lehrer (2003) present the first experimental investigation
of open versus closed amendment rules. Committees of five randomly assigned
subjects voted in either closed (no information) or open (information on alloca-
tions for all members) amendment sessions using a discount factor (0.8) in case
the proposed allocation were not to be voted upon by the majority of members.
Delays were less frequent under the closed rule; however they were less than
predicted in the open rule. In the closed amendment treatment and with experi-
ence, play converged towards minimal winning coalitions. In the open amendment
treatment, supermajorities remained the norm throughout all sessions. Proposers
take started the same in both treatments, but ended significantly higher under
the closed amendment rule, but well below equilibrium predictions in both cases.
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Regressions revealed that subjects voted primarily on their own self-interest with
minimal concerns on the least well-off.
In Casella, Gelman, and Palfrey (2003), authors experimentally explore the
storable votes mechanism in terms of realism with respect to its complexity.
Voters have a finite number of votes to be cast across a finite superset of binary
agendas. They are called to play a complicated dynamic game where the marginal
effect of a vote today has to be compared to its effect of being pivotal sometime in
the future. Subjects participated in committees of 2, 3 or 6 and played a total of
30 rounds each and were randomly re-allocated in a committee after 2 or 3 rounds.
No subject participated in more than one session. Several models (Aggregate Best
Fit, Noisy Cooperative Behaviour, Noisy Nash Equilibrium) are contrasted with
respect to perturbations of the QRE models, with the latter being found superior
in terms of best fit. In terms of aggregate welfare, the efficiency calculations
based on the perfect Bayesian equilibrium model of behaviour predicts almost
perfectly the aggregate surplus for all treatments. Monotone but off equilibrium
cut-off point strategies were prevalent. Finally, authors conclude that concerns
about the complexity of the game may have limited practical relevance.
Aragones and Palfrey (2004) conducted an experiment to determine the effect
of a difference in quality of candidates competing in a one policy space. The
game consisted of 200 rounds, where agents participated in the first and the latter
100 as either the better or the worst candidate with random blind re-matching.
The better candidates adopted on average more centrist policies than the worst.
Secondly, the equilibrium predicted the distribution of outcomes, rather than
single outcomes. Finally, the equilibrium varied systematically over the level of
uncertainty about the location of the median voter. Finally, QRE seemed to
explain some of the observed biases.
Grober and Schram (2006) conduct an experiment in which they distinguish
between early voters and late voters. The latter are informed of the early voters’
turnout decision. 168 subjects participated in electorates of 12 voters, divided
in 2 groups with six subjects each, with each subject having a fixed role of a
sender or receiver throughout the game (3 senders and 3 receivers). In the first
treatment, the constitution of each electorate was either fixed from the begin-
ning of the experiment (partners) or randomized after each round (strangers).
The second variable was information: no information, same (allies) and different
interest groups (adversaries). They show that information increased turnout by
50%. However, the stability of group composition did not affect turnout. When
information was indeed exchanged, turnout was highest amongst allies and lowest
when voters did not know each others preferences. The fact that senders partici-
pated more than receivers of information under no information was attributed to
the fact that the structure of the game allowed for a delayed vote by senders.
Battaglini, Morton, and Palfrey (2007) is an experimental study comparing
the behaviour of voters under simultaneous and sequential voting rules when
voting is costly and information is incomplete. They present 2 game forms, the
simultaneous voting game and the sequential voting game. Six sessions with either
9 or 12 subjects were conducted. Each subject participated in only one treatment.
Each session had two parts, with a total of 40 rounds. Subjects were randomly
divided in groups of three. In the simultaneous game, there was little support for
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the Nash equilibrium of the game: low cost voters abstained significantly more
and high cost voters significantly abstained significantly less than predicted. On
the other hand, the QRE model did fairly well, as both high and low cost models
could be explained by a single value for the unique parameter λ of the model. In
the sequential voting game, whereas cost increased abstention, first voters were
significantly less likely to abstain than voters of the simultaneous game with the
same cost and again, QRE provided a good fit for the results. Generally, their
results suggest that sequential voting is more efficient, both informationally and
economically. However, in terms of equity the results are reversed: later voters
make significantly more than early ones.
Patty and Weber (2007) conduct a model on how citizens evaluate politicians
using two types of sessions. In one kind one subject was a leader and 7 were voters.
In the other session, again there was one leader but 45 voters, amongst which 7
would be randomly selected to receive payoffs in the end of the game. Leaders
can observe and costly augment the state of the world in favour of voters. On the
other hand, voters can only imperfectly observe the (possibly augmented) state
of the world and re-elect leaders or change them. Authors compare the predicting
ability of the perfect Bayesian Nash model (PBE), QRE model and a model of
strategic naivete (SN), were agents understand the leader’s choice but not the
feedback effect of their own actions to the leaders choice. PBE was rejected in
almost all (98.5% cases). QRE and SN did fairly well, and authors conclude that
distinguishing between these two models would require further work.
Levine and Palfrey (2007) designed an experiment to shed more light into the
paradox of voting. A total of 342 subjects participated over 19 separate sessions.
Treatments consisted of committees 3,9, 27 and 51 voters and each treatment
lasted for 100 (50 toss-up and 50 landslide) rounds, apart from the 3 member
committees, where the game lasted for 50 rounds. Each voter was one of two
possible preference types. For each sub-treatment, the sum of voting members
of one type was either twice the sum of the voting members of the other type
or the difference in sums was one single voter. QRE provided a good fit for
the model. The experimental results showed that turnout decreased in larger
electorates. What is more, turnout was higher in elections that are expected to
be close. Also, voters supporting the less popular alternative had higher turnout
rates. Finally, they found that voters mostly used approximate (and not exact)
cut-point strategies.
Duffy and Tavits (2008) experimentally tested whether there exists a direct
correlation between the subjective probability of being pivotal with the likeli-
hood that a voter casts a costly vote using a total of 140 subjects. In four beliefs
treatment, 20 rounds of voting took place with an intermediate stage where sub-
jects were asked to state their beliefs with respect to the probability of being
pivotal, whereas in three control treatments the question was not posed. In the
beliefs treatment, there were given two different versions of instructions, a simple
(one treatment) and a more complicated one (three treatments). The difference
between the simple and the complicated version was that in the latter subjects
systematically overestimated the probability of being pivotal. Aggregate results
showed that subjects who believed they were highly likely to be pivotal were more
likely to participate. In general, all subjects systematically overestimated the
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probability of being pivotal. Also, beliefs were better estimates of participation
than actual probability of being pivotal. Finally, beliefs became gradually closer
to the actual probabilities, a fact that implies a learning effect in the turnout
decision.
Ali, Goeree, Kartik, and Palfrey (2008) is an experimental study comparing
decision making under unanimity rule in ad hoc committees, like juries or expert
panels, versus standing committees, like boards of directors, judicial panels, or
town councils. The data were collected in 1997, 2000 and 2007 under different ex-
perimental protocols and procedures. Each committee contained 3 or 6 members,
under either simultaneous or sequential voting with a total of 222 subjects partic-
ipating. The results clearly show that there is no difference in voting behaviour
between ad hoc and standing committees under unanimity with simultaneous
voting. In terms of information aggregation, there is limited support for the no-
tion that standing committees allow for a greater degree of coordination amongst
members. With sequential voting, there are either small or no differences, apart
from the 6 person committees under innocent signals. In terms of information,
the hypothesis that standing committees aggregate information better than ad
hoc committees can only be supported for the smaller committee size.
Kube and Puppe (2009) is a study on strategic voting using a Borda mech-
anism. 144 subjects were randomly allocated and matched in committees of
three members and were only allowed to participate to a single treatment. Two
treatment variables were used: information and inequality. They found that ma-
nipulation rates were surprisingly low, but increase significantly if subjects receive
information on others preferences and votes. On the other hand, distributional
concerns do not play a significant role. Moreover, under uncertainty agents tried
to secure themselves in their second best alternative instead of voting according
to first best. However, the fact that some uninformed subjects reported their
preferences untruthfully was attributed to a “supply effect” 3.
An experiment testing the behaviour of subjects in a three party setting voting
over three policies, with the outcome exhibiting a voting cycle was presented in
Smirnov (2009). 86 subjects familiar with the concept of strategic voting were
divided in three groups, consisting of 31, 27 and 28 members respectively and
participated given an augmented semester mark instead of payment. They all
voted over the agendas, saw the outcome, members of the same party where
allowed to deliberate and then subjects were allowed to change their vote if they
wished. In between the stages, questionnaires were filled to indicate the level of
understanding of each subject. The sincere voting model could explain 26% of the
voters choices, the strategic model 47%, risk aversion up to 56% and the expected
utility sophisticated voting model (EUS4) could explain 73% of the votes.
An experimental study that tests the impact of opinion polls on aggregate
welfare in costly voting can be found in Grober and Schram (2010). 288 sub-
jects participated on 12 sessions consisting of 24 subjects each. In each session,
consisting of 100 rounds, subjects were divided in two electorates of 12 voters
3Subjects invest time in participating in the experiment and showing up, and find it hard
to do the equivalent of nothing, in this case to report their true preferences
4The same as the strategic model but without the assumption of consistently assigned beliefs.
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and experimenters employed a 2x2 between subject treatment design with three
sessions per cell. Treatments were different with respect to the following vari-
ables: they either contained uninformed or informed voters with respect to polls
and either floating or mixed (floating and allied) voters. QRE provided relatively
good predictions for the results of the experiment with respect to the Bayesian
Nash Equilibrium. The results of the game showed that polls increased aggregate
turnout by 22% − 28%. As the level of disagreement increased, polls increased
turnout, but the result is stronger for the minority than the majority. Whenever
there were committees with allied voters, turnout increased in the later rounds.
However, the increase in turnout is entirely due to floating voters. Finally, ma-
jorities win elections more than minorities, and polls augment the vote difference
in close elections.
Battaglini, Morton, and Palfrey (2010) is the the first swing voters curse lab-
oratory experiment. In all treatments they used 7 voters with accuracy equal to
0.75. Two different treatments were used for a balanced (1/2) and skewed (5/9)
state of the world: and three different treatments for the number of partisan
voters (0, 2 and 4). The experiment was conducted in seven sessions. In five ses-
sions 14 subjects participated; in two sessions 7 subjects participated for a total
of 84 distinct subjects. In sessions with 14 participants, subjects were randomly
divided into groups of 7 for each period. In sessions with 7 participants, subjects
comprised a single voting group for all periods. Majority voting was repeated for
30 periods, with variations in sequence and with the group membership shuffled
randomly after each round for sessions with 14 subjects. The results of the ex-
periment give strong support for the theory both at the aggregate and individual
level. Uninformed voters delegated the vote to more informed ones by strategi-
cally abstaining. The existence of partisans increased participation to even out
the result and this effect was strengthened as partisan bias increased. Finally,
turnout and margin of victory both increased with the number of informed voters.
Bassi, Morton, and Williams (2011) is a majority voting experiments where
subjects were randomly assigned identities in common with a candidate and some-
times received financial incentive to vote against their identity. Subjects were
influenced by their assigned identities and the effect is stronger when voters have
less information. Subjects were divided in 12 groups of 5. Each group played a
total of 8, 16 or 24 periods. Labels were randomly assigned. However, in reality a
pseudorandom method was used so that at least one label was represented in each
group. Three payoff treatments were conducted (no pay, low pay and high pay)
and two information treatments (complete and incomplete). In the complete in-
formation session, the trembling hand equilibrium prediction was supported when
voters were in the majority and voters voted sincerely disregarding financial pay-
offs. However, when voters were in the minority only 3% (5%) of voters in the
high (low) payment treatment voted sincerely and 52% in the no pay treatment.
In the incomplete information treatments, voters with no financial incentives vote
sincerely 73−79% of the time. Authors also find evidence that financial incentives
do have an effect on voter behaviour but increasing financial incentives strongly
effect voting behaviour, unlike the complete information case. In the no payment
treatment there is a significant difference between the complete and incomplete
information that vanishes in the high and low pay treatments. In general, they
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find that identities can be a strong and significant influence on voters’ choices but
the effect quickly vanishes with financial incentives under complete information,
whereas it remains under incomplete information, with less at stake.
1.3.3 Abstention and Political Influence
The last five years of voting experiments in economics have mainly followed the
experimental methodology of the previous decade, shedding light on the effects
abstention, social and political influence on voting choices.
Goeree and Yariv (2011a) conducted an experimental study on the effect of
deliberation on collective decisions. A 3 × 3 × 2 design was implemented: the
distribution of preferences varied among subjects (one distribution entailing com-
mon interests and two allowing for different formats of heterogeneity), the insti-
tution or voting rule by which the group decision was made (simple majority, 2/3
super-majority, and unanimity) and the availability (or unavailability) of free-
form communication. Groups of 9 subjects were randomly allocated at the start
of each period: 15 periods without communication followed by 15 periods with
communication (with one practice round preceding each). Three of the sessions
were repeated with the chat periods proceeding the no-chat periods to check for
order effects but led to qualitatively identical insights as the baseline treatments.
Without the ability to communicate, subjects behaved in a rather sophisticated
strategic manner. Costless free form deliberation seemed to aid in improving
efficiency and diminishing institutional differences. Finally, authors report that
the form of communication was public, truthful and a strong predictor of group
choice.
Morton and Tyran (2011) is an experiment on abstention when voters in stand-
ing committees are asymmetrically informed and there are multiple pure-strategy
equilibria. In the beginning of the experiment 207 subjects were randomly divided
into groups of three and remained in the same groups throughout the experiment
(fixed matching procedure). The groupings were anonymous, that is, the sub-
jects did not know which of the other subjects were in their groups. 12 sessions
for 60 periods each with a total of 207 subjects using both between and within
subject design. Results show that experts almost always vote according to their
signal and non-experts with a vast accuracy difference abstain, thus in that case
groups often coordinate to the swing voter’s curse equilibrium. If the difference
in accuracy is less predominant, outcomes varied in either resembling the swing
voters curse equilibrium or the all vote equilibrium. This was mainly attributed
by authors to a lack of coordination between the two equilibria. Mixed strategy
equilibrium predictions were not validated.
Ryan (2011) is providing experimental evidence on the influence of social net-
works on the ability to vote for the correct candidate in terms of valence and
position. 135 subjects in the information treatment group received private infor-
mation about the candidate and shared it (in sub-treatments) between supporters
of the same candidate, the opposing candidate or both. 81 subjects participated
in the control group where no such information was transmitted. The results
show that social information is useful in the case of uninformed voters, but not
for informed ones. Subjects were clearly not evaluating messages as theory would
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predict: informed candidates based their voted on social information even if that
information came from informants with conflicting preferences. However, on av-
erage there was no negative effect on correct voting since extra information was
as equally likely to be helpful or harmful. In the case of independents, unin-
formed agents vote correctly more often after having received this extra piece of
information. Authors suggest that subjects are prone to be persuaded to vote as
their social network compels.
Blais, Labb-St-Vincent, Laslier, Sauger, and Straeten (2011) experimentally
tested strategic considerations of voters in multi-party elections, when the deci-
sion to support a candidate is the private benefit of supporting one party versus
her perceived viability in one and two round elections. In groups of 21 voters,
eight elections were held successively: 4 one-round and 4 two round-elections and
in the end one elections was randomly selected as the decisive one in terms of
payoffs. In every election, each subject selected one of five candidates. The latter
were located in five distinct points of the one dimensional spectrum. Strategic
considerations on viability of candidates increase over time. Vote shares of various
candidates were strikingly similar in one-round and two-round elections: whereas
the propensity to vote strategically is slightly weaker in two-round elections, it
does exist.
Casella, Llorente-Saguer, and Palfrey (2012) develop and test a competitive
equilibrium theory of a market for votes. They do so in order to empirically test
the weakness of the majoritarian rule to capture variability in the intensity of
preferences. Each experimental session consisted of a series of 20 rounds, where
subjects, equally likely to be biased towards one of two agendas, participated in
5 or 9 member voting committees. Each voter was assigned a uniformly random
valuation for each agenda. Before each ballot, bids and offers for votes were
allowed. The results exhibit overpricing relative to the risk neutral equilibrium
that can be explained by risk aversion. In larger committees dictatorship still
arose, but less often. Predicted welfare ranking was confirmed: average payoff was
significantly lower with respect to no market for votes when valuation discrepancy
was low, and higher but insignificantly low otherwise.
Woon (2012) conducts an experiment to discern between the choice of vot-
ers for a retrospective or a forward looking voting rule, when presented with a
candidate whose choice they cannot directly control. 88 subjects participated in
five sessions, consisting of between 14 and 20 subjects. Each session lasted for
36 rounds, and each subject acted half the time as a politician and half the time
as a voter. When subjects played the role of policy motivated politicians they
were consistent with equilibrium behaviour in choosing their preferred policies.
Office seeking politicians followed their signal very frequently (86% of the time),
possibly as a response to retrospective voters. In terms of voting behaviour, sub-
jects are mostly retrospective in their choices and there is little or no sign of
learning or behaviour change. Authors give several explanations for voters’ be-
haviour: bounded rationality, preference for accountability, cognitive complexity
and inability to ignore strategically irrelevant information. They conclude that
boundedly rational individuals prefer to use a simple retrospective rule and they
find difficulty in making strategic inferences, even in simple settings.
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Coronel, Duff, Warren, Federmeier, Gonsalves, Tranel, and Cohen (2012) con-
ducted a methodologically unique experiment with respect to the relevant voting
literature. Six severely impaired amnesiac patients were matched in terms of
age, sex and education to six normal comparison participants. Participants were
given a voting choice between two amongst five fictitious characters they had
individually ranked as equal in the beginning of the experiment. Using interme-
diate math solving intervals as memory distraction, they asked subjects to vote
again/recall and rationalise their voting. All subjects chose again/recollected the
correct candidate in terms of individual alignment to the candidate’s political
beliefs. However, when asked on the reasons of their choice, no amnesiac was
able to recollect the reasons for his or her choice.
Morton and Tyran (2013) is an experimental study on the effects of corrupt
experts on information aggregation in committees. The experimental design was
similar to Morton and Tyran (2011). Their results show that in the presence of
corrupt experts, decreased abstention leads to increased information aggregation
efficiency in group decision-making. As the accuracy varies, the abstention rate
of non-experts varies significantly and controlled for experience, the accuracy
is decreasing in the corruption likelihood of the expert. All in all, when the
likelihood of a corrupt expert is low, the added participation increases information
efficiency. However when the likelihood is high, the increase fails to offset the
information loss due to the corrupt experts.
In Kittel, Luhan, and Morton (2014), authors conduct an experimental study
on the costly voting in multiparty committees with varying degrees of communi-
cation. In each committee they allocate subjects with varying preference orders,
and a computerized automaton always casting the same vote (common knowl-
edge) divided in electorates of varying sizes. 4 treatments: Baseline, Party Label,
Party Chat and All Chat. In total, two sessions were run with 24 subjects, three
sessions with 22 subjects and one with 20 subjects. Of the total 19 periods in
every sequence (for example: baseline-label-party chat), 4 were randomly chosen
for payment, which was common knowledge. Both within and between subjects
design was used to evaluate the data. The coordination capacity in the communi-
cations treatments resulted in generating higher payoffs. Payoffs from the baseline
and no communications gradually converged to the communications treatments.
Communication also had an enormous positive effect in turnout by reducing the
number of abstentions by a half and in strategic voting, which was most likely
amongst swing voters assigned to their second party preference. Voting intentions
reporting under all communications conditions is predominantly sincere. Finally,
voters tend to stick to their initial intentions more in the party chat than in the
all chat treatment.
Bhattacharya, Duffy, and Kim (2014) provide the results of an experiment
on compulsory and voluntary voting in a game of common preferences. They
consider two treatment variables: voting mechanism (voluntary versus compul-
sory) and cost of voting (zero versus positive). The three treatments conducted
were: compulsory(C), voluntary and costless (VN) and voluntary and costly (VC)
voting. In each session a group of 18 subjects was divided in two groups of 9 sub-
jects and played for 20 rounds. Under the compulsory voting mechanism there
is strong evidence of insincere voting, unlike the other treatments where voters
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cast predominantly honest votes. In the voluntary voting, the difference of par-
ticipation between voting types is in accordance to the prediction of that of the
symmetric voting equilibrium. However, in both voluntary treatments subjects
over-participate relative to the predictions. All data exhibited convergence to
equilibrium predictions, with the slowest being that by subjects in the voluntary
costly treatment.
1.4 The More the Merrier?
1.4.1 A logical map of the literature
The main axis of the implementation of strategic voting in the CJT is the rela-
tionship between:
1. the size of a voting committee and
2. the accuracy of the ballot outcome.
As discussed in the previous two parts, the general parameters that have been
used as levers to understand the underlying mechanisms behind voting procedures
are:




















5. sequence of voting.





1.4.2 Is good exogenous?
Within this framework, as shown in the previous paragraphs, the interconnections
between these parameters and the trade-off between jury size and voting result
accuracy are combined to end up with interesting results concerning the CJT.
Although these results are robust, they seem to fail to capture a main aspect of
collective decision making.
When a committee of doctors is expected to give a combined opinion concern-
ing a dying patient, they are to discern whether the disease that is leading the
patient to his end is of a specific type. The type of disease is already there and
their expert opinions are to be combined to approximate the true nature of the
disease. Of course, neither the answer to this problem is simple, nor is simple the
answer of a committee of judges on whether an accused person has or has not
committed a crime. However, the main difference between these situations and
a collective of individuals deciding on their common future is that the result of
the latter is not something external to be approximated, but something rather
endogenous and bound to the likes and dislikes of the individuals concerned with
the choice.
Of course, the concept of strategic thinking is common in both situations. In
the first, let us take the example of set of judges deciding to convict or acquit
someone with respect to a crime he has allegedly committed. Moreover, let us take
the case where a unanimous “guilty” vote is necessary to result in a conviction.
The essence of the result of Feddersen and Pesendorfer (1998) is that, each judge
will consider the case where she is pivotal. If the signal she gets is not conclusive,
she may reside in the fact that it only takes one “not guilty” vote to acquit, and
depend on the signals of other judges, voting guilty even if the signal she got is
almost innocent. Thus he could vote “guilty” based on the fact that the others
will have a better signal and decide on his behalf. On the other hand, when one
is concerned with the result of a collective decision making mechanism, the result
of the ballot is endogenous in this case. There is no ex-post right and wrong.
We can say that in a democratic ballot there is a status quo, but the result of
the procedure is seeking social stability, not a universal pre-existing right. After
the ballot, we cannot expect that there will be an enforcement mechanism to
implement any result. Hence, any participant in this ballot shall vote taking
this fact in consideration. And, as in Rousseau’s social compact, voters will not
vote only according to their preferences alone, but also according to their desire to
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participate in the compact, and this is how their preferences will be amalgamated
robustly.
Following this train of thought, the CJT seems not to have a clear cut answer.
At first sight, the more people involved in a collective decision, the harder it
seems to agree upon common ground. But there are examples where this basic
intuition is clearly violated. Imagine a couple trying to paint their house with a
single colour, having only three options for that: blue, red and white. Also, let as
assume blue and red are each ones favourite colour. It seems to be harder to chose
a colour in that situation with respect to the situation where one hundred people
try to paint a building and live together in a commonwealth. There, white could
seem to be a more neutral but also stable option for all. The more the merrier?
It could seem so in the case of house painting.
Of course, the main trade-off in this case is not size of committee and re-
sult accuracy, but size of committee and result robustness. This is probably as
Condorcet intended it (Young (1988)), as in his method of voting counting, the
minority on pair wise votes reverses to attempt a final coherent social agreement.
Any of the five elements that were taken into consideration in the literature of
strategic voting, the CJT and mechanism design, every one of them is important
in any attempt to endogenize the result of a ballot outcome. The only difference
is now that information diffused within the decision makers is no longer on the
validity of a specific binary variable exogenously defined, but on each others




Costly Political Action and
Majority Decisions
“The lady doth protest too much, methinks.” (Shakespeare)
2.1 Introduction
After the Second World War, the western world has considered the right to protest
as one with unbreakable axiomatic bonds to democracy. In Rome, on the 4th of
November 1950, during the “European Convention of Human Rights” 1, the mem-
ber states of the Council of Europe affirmed the importance of the right to protest
within democracy. This importance was concretized into the western democratic
edifice in the 16th of December 1966, during the International Covenant on Civil
and Political Rights. Then, the members of the United Nations confirmed, by
common law, the right of their citizens to engage in protest.2 Since, numerous
protests in both sides of the Atlantic have marked the pages of post war history:
from Martin Luther King’s 1960 “Dream” speech in the 28th of August in front
of 200,000 protesters, during the March on Washington for Jobs and Freedom, to
London’s 27th of March 2011 protests, where 250,000 people attended a march
against public spending cuts, the influence of these protests to policy making and
the evolution of democratic processes is un-debatable. Of course, this influence is
not always direct, neither its implications easily tractable. Often even, protests
have resulted in riots, destruction of public and private property, and even the
death of protesters and bystanders. Among the more recent European examples
are the riots of October and November 2005 in Paris and other French cities, the
riots of December 2008 in Athens and the recent August 2011 riots in London.3
1Signed, considering the “Universal Declaration of Human Rights”, proclaimed by the Gen-
eral Assembly of the United Nations on 10 December 1948. The combination of Articles 9
(freedom of thought, conscience and religion, freedom to manifest one’s religion and beliefs),
10 (freedom of expression) and 11 (freedom of peaceful assembly and association) confirm the
right to protest.
2The relevant articles are A18, A19, A21 and A22.
3Of course, in all three of the aforementioned examples, the protests themselves can only be
considered to be indirectly related to the following riots: in all three cases, the fatal injury of
one or more civilians by members of the local police forces has triggered the events.
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On the other hand, the wide use of the Internet, as well as other advancements
in communications, has decreased the individual cost of political action to an
almost minuscular lever. Just in a matter of seconds and with small individual
cost, people can use their personal computers or hand held devices to engage in
political action.4 I argue that this significant reduction in the individual cost of
political action can end up being harmful with respect to aggregate welfare.
I model costly political action as individually costly communication: agents
engage in political action to signal their individual opinion to others. This chap-
ter’s main result is based on the unique symmetric sequential equilibria in pure
strategies of a simple two stage game, with agents sharing identical preferences
but imperfectly informed about the state of the world. Firstly, agents decide
whether to engage in a costly political action in order to strategically signal their
private information on the state of the world and, afterwards, they costlessly cast
a vote on a binary agenda, having observed the number of agents who shared
their private information. In this model, the concept of costly political action is
used more broadly: any specific form of costly communication in order to send
a public signal for (or against) any agenda to be voted upon, fits the model’s
description. Under different values for the cost variable, this could depict differ-
ent forms of information sharing from sending an email and signing a petition to
participating in a peaceful march or even a riot.
I argue that if the cost of political action is sufficiently small but positive, then
the expected welfare result of elections with prior communication will always be
inferior to elections without prior communication. If the individual cost of politi-
cal action was equal to zero, agents sharing their individual information and then
unanimously voting would result in information being aggregated. Voting without
prior communication would bring about the same result in terms of voting out-
come and aggregate welfare. However, a sufficiently small cost of political action
will result in a situation similar to a prisoner’s dilemma, where individuals always
prefer participating in informative costly political action to abstaining from it,
conditional on others doing so. In other words, rational agents are “forced” to
participate in political action in the first stage to avoid wrong updating to the
second stage. Since all agents will informatively disclose their signal, the result
will be that all of them unanimously voting for the same outcome the majority
would vote in elections without information sharing. Note that a similar result
holds even if agents use a mixed strategy in the political action stage, the voting
stage or both.
Furthermore, I examine the case where agents have heterogeneous prior beliefs
about the state of the world and interpret the latter bias as a difference in prior
political opinions, following Che and Kartik (2009). In this case, costly communi-
cation prior to elections can be welfare improving. Note that if the agent’s priors
are sufficiently dispersed, the outcome of elections could be random. However,
costly political action in this case provides a mechanism that, through bayesian
updating, can “draw” agent’s beliefs back to the “correct” priors. I find an up-
per and a lower bound for the cost of information sharing. If the cost is below
4For example, see Yoder (2012), for the online 18 January protests of the Stop Online Piracy
Act (SOPA)
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the lower bound, an equilibrium where all agents engage in informative politi-
cal action can be sustained. If the cost is between these bounds, there exists an
asymmetric equilibrium in pure strategies under which only a subset of the agents
engage in costly political action. This equilibrium can be welfare improving un-
der certain conditions that depend on the trade-off between signal accuracy and
aggregate cost of political action. More specifically, if the state of nature is suffi-
ciently uncertain,5 there exists a range for the cost of political action that induces
a small subset of the agents to share their signal informatively and improve all
others’ signal before elections, while the expected aggregate cost of information
sharing remains lower than the expected benefit, which is improving all voters’
signal accuracy.
The model in this chapter builds on Lohmann (1994). In the first part, I
examine the case when agents have the same preferences (a common good) and
then I extend by allowing for bias in agent’s prior beliefs.6 In Lohmann (1994),
agents have different preferences but share the same prior beliefs about the state
of the world. Because of their extremely biased interests, Lohmann suggests that
some individuals can be “rationally trapped” in protest, and this may result in
information not aggregating. I show that even in situations where agents have
identical interests, costly political action will lead to an inferior outcome in terms
aggregate welfare, relative to the uninformative case where no agent participates
in political action. The second part of my model also incorporates the strategic
element that is inherent in Lohmann’s model in a model where heterogeneous pri-
ors represent dispersion in political beliefs. Since in the second stage all agents
vote honestly, this allows for comparative statics, empirical testing and welfare
comparisons between different protesting group sizes, as it simplifies the equi-
librium representation, while it maintains the ability to reproduce Lohmann’s
results as well.
My results can be contrasted with Persico (2004), where agents have to pay
a cost to acquire information. I assume that all agents are informed costlessly
but information sharing is costly. Persico’s shows that, when information acqui-
sition is costly, information is under-provided. I show that, when information
transmission is costly, information is over-provided. The behaviour of voters in
the present model is similar to Piketty (2000), in the sense that they act both
strategically in the political action stage, but also honesty in the voting stage.
However, in Piketty’s model, voters’ behaviour is intermediate between “strate-
gic” and “sincere”, whereas in this model, strategic behaviour only occurs in the
political action stage, whereas in the voting stage all agents vote “honestly” in
equilibrium. In Krishna and Morgan (2008) strategic abstention from costly vot-
ing is such that, in the limit, the correct candidate is elected with probability
one. In the equilibrium of my model, any abstention from informative political
action occurs for a sufficiently low cost only under heterogeneous prior beliefs.
Therefore, under homogeneous prior beliefs with sufficiently low cost, informative
political action is not welfare improving.
5Aggregate welfare analysis under this framework depends on the choice of what the “real”
prior is and thus we can only talk firmly about welfare results after the state of the world is
revealed.
6See Appendix for an extended comparison of the two models
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Moreover, the implications of this model can also be contrasted with those
of Osborne, Rosenthal, and Turner (2000) and Osborne, Rosenthal, and Turner
(2005) . Their adherence of the median as a rule of compromise results in an
outcome likely to be random. In my model, the result is not random at all.
Moreover, I can specify the set of individuals that will participate in costly polit-
ical action in equilibrium. Finally, as in Banerjee and Somanathan (2001), where
information sharing takes place in order to influence the opinion of a leader of a
group, in my model information sharing is taking place to directly influence the
beliefs of voters before elections.
Finally, there is a wide strand of empirical literature on costly protest that
suggests strategic behaviour of protesters. For example, Finkel, Muller, and Opp
(1989) have highlighted the importance of a cost benefit analysis by agents, con-
ditional on the protest group’s success and Muller, Dietz, and Finkel (1991) show
that discontent is not significant as a reason for political action, unless it is
weighted by the expectancy of the action’s success and the perceived importance
of personal participation. Also, Finkel and Muller (1998), focusing on the costs of
protest, again validated that cost variables influence political action in a negative
direction. Moreover, they showed that “soft selective incentives”, as entertain-
ment through protesting, utility gains for standing up to one’s views or learning
by protesting are not significant in explaining protest behaviour.
The rest of the chapter is structured as follows. Section 2 describes the general
setup, the timeline and the equilibrium concept of the game. Section 3 presents
and analyses the equilibria under the assumption of homogeneous priors. Section
4 presents and analyses the equilibria under the assumption of heterogeneous pri-
ors. Section 5 compares the aggregate welfare of all the equilibria of the previous
sections. Finally, Section 6 discusses the results of the model and provides some
ideas for possible extensions. All proofs are relegated to the Appendix. For com-
pleteness, in the end of Appendix I present a note on the strategic equivalence
between heterogeneity through preference divergence and through distinct priors.
All propositions hold for finite electorates electorates, unless otherwise stated.
2.2 Model
2.2.1 The game
Society consists of a large but finite odd number (n) of agents. Each agent
(indexed by k) has prior beliefs about the distribution of the state of nature
s ∈ [0, 1] , which will be described with a probability distribution function βk(s),
while the true distribution of the state of nature is uniform on the [0, 1] interval.7
Each agent initially receives a binary signal σk(s), correlated with the true
state of the world: σk(s) = 1 with probability s and σk(s) = 0 with probability
1− s . Agents who received σk(s) = 1 simultaneously choose to engage in costly
political action (πk = 1) or not (πk = 0): the agents who chose (πk = 1) incur a
7The results can be generalised to any symmetric distribution with positive support on the
[0, 1] interval
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strictly positive cost that is the same for all agents (ck = c > 0).
8
After the political action stage, all agents observe the number of agents en-
gaged in political action m ∈ N : 0 ≤ m ≤ n and then all simultaneously vote
on a binary agenda, either for the status quo (νk = Q) or for the alternative
(νk = A), where 0 < Q < A < 1 and the two policies are symmetrically placed




. The latter means that neither of the policies
has an ex-ante advantage.9 Voting is costless.
Finally, majority rule M determines the outcome of the ballot (M = A if
|{k : νk = A}| > |{k : νk = Q}|, else M = Q) and agents receive their payoffs
according to the utility function U(M) = −(M − s)2 − πk · c . All the payoffs
involve two elements. The first element −(M−s)2 represents a common good for
everyone that depends negatively on the distance the majority’s choice has from
the true state of the world.10 The second element −πk · c is the cost of informing
others, which only weighs on the agents who did.
The timeline of events of the game is summarised as follows:
1. nature decides the true state of the world,
2. each agent gets a binary signal correlated with the true state of the world,
3. each agent decides to engage in costly political action, which will induce a
personal positive cost, or to abstain and not incur the cost,
4. all agents observe the number of signals revealed,
5. agents vote for the status quo or for the alternative,
6. majority wins,
7. payoffs are realised.
8As in Lohmann (1994), this restriction is made for simplification purposes and does not
harm the generality of the results: equivalent results hold for restricting signal sharing to
σk(s) = 0 types, or posing no restriction whatsoever. The trivial equilibria created by indif-
ference in the voting stage do not survive the concept of the sequential equilibrium, as will be
explained below.
9See proof of Lemma 1 for more details on what would happen if this assumption was to be
dropped.
10The concept of a common good for all agents is a theoretic simplification that can be
interpreted in several distinct ways. The first that would come to mind is the platonic concept
of the common good. Moreover, this conceptualization describes very well any smaller subset of
individuals with almost the same interest from a referendum, or a larger society of individuals,
who will be affected by a referendum in “almost” the same way. For example, various protests
for or against participation in the European Union can be seen happening due to a common
factor: a shift in a country’s decision into or out of the European Union would have so big
an impact on citizens’ lives, that any outcome could seen as almost equivalent to all. Another
example would be a decision upon the constitution itself, which will affect the structure of the
polity every citizen participates in, hence everyone, in the same way. Finally, the combination of
a common good and costless voting induces “honest” (according to agents’ updated preference)
voting in the equilibrium solution, structurally avoiding the no voting paradox (see Feddersen
(2004)). Also, while agents are strategic and calculate the expected signal conditional on the
probability they are pivotal (as in Austen-Smith and Banks (1996)) the existence of a common
good is inducing them to vote honestly, thus simplifying the equilibrium solution.
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Finally, note that the restriction of only agents who received σk(s) = 1 is
signifying that agents can only engage in costly political action for the alternative
agenda. Of course, due to the symmetric structure of the game, the results would
be exactly the same if political action was for the status quo, or equivalently if
people could engage in political action for both. The difference in the latter case
is that the aggregate welfare loss would be larger.
Example 1. As a simple example to understand the basic structure of the game,
it is useful to consider the issue of nuclear power. The state of the world could
be thought of belonging to a [0, 1] continuum that represents the probability of
a nuclear disaster. Initially, the members of society receive a binary signal with
respect to whether it is dangerous or not to use nuclear power. Then, depending
on the personal cost of political action, the signal they have received and their
prior beliefs about the danger of nuclear power, each one decides to engage in
costly political action against (or for, depending on the societal norms) nuclear
power. After, everyone observes the number of citizens engaging in costly political
action and they vote on whether more or less nuclear plants will be used. Had
they known correct state of the world, all agents would agree on the choice, since
the effects of the policy implemented will equally affect them.11
2.2.2 Equilibrium of the game
As an equilibrium concept I will use Kreps and Wilson (1982). Being a subset of
subgame perfect Nash equilibria, sequential equilibria are stronger in the sense
that they impose a structure on the off-equilibrium-path beliefs of the agents with
possibly interesting intuitive interpretations in the pooling equilibria of the game.
This difference, of course, vanishes in the separating equilibria, where there are
no beliefs off-the-equilibrium path.
Thus, agents update their beliefs about the true state of the world using
the Bayes rule according to any information they acquire springing from others’
strategy choice.12
An equilibrium of the game is a subset of the agents’ assessments of the
game.13 The set of the agents’ assessments contains all combinations of the
agents’ information sharing strategies πk(s); their beliefs at the political action
11For example, more nuclear power would signify cheaper energy for all, but also radioactive
contamination for all in case there is an explosion of a nuclear reactor. On the other hand, less
nuclear power would signify more expensive energy for all, but also smaller or no chance for
a possible radioactive contamination. One and only one of the two scenarios, the correct one,
will be preferred by all.
12The use of the Bayes rule from agents deciding in protesting has even been used in relative
empirical works as well. For example, in Francisco (1996), Bayesian updating is used in their
econometric model in order to capture the ability of the economic agents engaging in costly
protesting to think and adapt.
13In order for an assessment to be a sequential equilibrium, the strategy profile has to be
sequentially rational given the system of beliefs. The additional restriction that makes a se-
quential equilibrium a subset of subset of subgame perfect Nash equilibrium is that there has
to exist a sequence of totally mixed strategies that converges to the equilibrium strategy under
which the sequence of the induced beliefs converges to the beliefs of the assessment itself (see
Mas-Colell, Whinston, and Green (1995) for details).
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stage βk(s), their voting strategies νk(s); and their beliefs at the voting stage
βk(s|m). Each agent uses Bayes rule to update her beliefs about the state of the
world, once after the private signal is received and once again after he observes
the number of signals revealed. All agents try to maximise their utility function
or, equivalently, minimize their utility loss. I only focus on equilibria in pure
strategies. Under any indifference whatsoever between the status quo and the
alternative, without loss of generality I assume that agents will prefer the latter.14
The aforementioned model is examined under two frameworks. In the first,
agents have identical prior beliefs about the state of the world. In the second,
agents have different prior beliefs about the state of the world.
2.3 Homogeneous Priors
Assumption 1. Under Homogeneous Priors, all agents have the same prior
beliefs about s, which follow the uniform distribution.15
Under Assumption 1, all agents have the same prior beliefs about the prob-
ability of each state of the world occurring. This framework is a simplification
of Lohmann (1994) in that agents’ utility functions are identical. In this case, if
the cost is low enough, there exists a unique symmetric informative equilibrium
where everyone participates informatively in political action. Participation in
costly political action is informative, in the sense that all agents that received
σ = 1 will participate in costly political action.16 This cost is decreasing with
respect to the total number of agents.
Lemma 1 below suggests that, similarly to Lohmann (1994), under any posi-
tive cost, an uninformative equilibrium, where no-one engages in costly political
action, can be supported. However, Lemma 2 shows that, conditional on the
individual cost of political action being low enough, if an agent expects others to
participate in costly political action, she will participate as well.
Definition 1 (USE). Uninformative Sequential Equilibrium under Homogeneous
Priors consists of the following assessment of the game:
{
π(σ) = 0; β(s|σ) =
{
2(1− s), σ = 0
2s, σ = 1
; ν(s) =
{
A, E(s|σ) ≥ 1
2




In this assessment of the game, regardless of their initial signal, agents choose
not to engage in political action and share their information. Since nobody com-
municates, agents use only their individual signal, conditional the probability of
being pivotal, to update their initial expectations. They finally vote for the status
quo or the alternative, depending on whether they received a signal that favoured
one policy, or the other.
14As the state of the world is continuous, this event would happen with zero probability.
15Therefore all k-subscripts that denote individual agents in this framework can be dropped
without any informational loss for the reader.
16Of course, all results still hold for the symmetric case where all agents that received σ = 0
will participate in costly political action whereas agents that received σ = 1 will not.
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Lemma 1. Under Homogeneous Priors, for any strictly positive individual cost
of political action c > 0 and for any number of agents n, USE is a sequential
equilibrium in pure strategies.17
The intuition behind the proof of this lemma is that no agent has an incentive
to engage in costly political action given all others’ reluctance to do so. This
is true as a revelation of one’s signal will never be beneficial when blurred by
all other’s political inaction, in the case of symmetric policies. Assume that
an agent is considering the costs and benefits of bearing the individual cost of
political action in order to disclose her signal to all others. All agents who have
received the same signal as her would have still voted for the same policy as her.
But, after her revelation, so will all the others: since agents who have received a
different signal will return to being indifferent, they will vote for the alternative
as well.18 Therefore, by “cancelling” everyone’s signal, her expected utility would
decrease. This result does not hold if the policies are not symmetrically located
around the midpoint µ = 1
2
. For example, if µ < 1
2
, since the alternative would be
ex ante more beneficial, she could in fact deviate and engage in political action
to disclose her information for a sufficiently low cost.19
Definition 2 (ISE). Informative Sequential Equilibrium under Homogeneous
Priors consists of the following assessment of the game:
{
π(σ) = σ; β(s|σ) =
{
2(1− s), σ = 0
2s, σ = 1
; ν(s) =
{
A, E(s|σ,m) ≥ µ
Q, E(s|σ,m) < µ ;








In this assessment, all agents participate in informative political action. In
other words, if she receives σ = 1, an agent will choose to inform others. After
the political action stage, all agents observe the number of revealed signals and
update their expectation on the true state of the world. Their updated signal in
this case is definitely more precise than their initial one. This can be viewed as
giving every agent the access to a number of trials for the true state of the world
equal to the total number of agents. However, all agents in the voting stage will
have access to the same information and will cast the same vote. The result of
the voting in this assessment will be unanimous. The following lemma states that
when the cost of political action is sufficiently low, then sincere signal sharing
will also be supported as equilibrium.20
Lemma 2. Under Homogeneous Priors, there exists a cost tolerance function
C∗(n, µ) such that, if c ≤ C∗, ISE is a sequential equilibrium in pure strategies.
17All proofs lie in the Appendix
18We have assumed that any indifference will be broken in favour of the alternative. Assuming
that in case of indifference agents would randomize, this result would still hold.
19For more details on this, see proof of Lemma 1
20According to one’s view about the state of the world, non strategic, informative
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C∗ is the maximum cost under which an agent would engage in costly political
action in the informative sequential equilibrium. It can be viewed as a cost
tolerance function of the values of A, Q and the number of participants in the
society (n). The cost tolerance function is given by the following equation:
C∗(n, µ,Q,A) = (A−Q)
{(n+ 1)(m∗(µ, n) + 3)
(n+ 2)(n+ 3)
− µ(m
∗(µ, n) + 1)
2(n+ 2)
}
where m∗(µ, n) = inf{k ≤ n : k ≥ µn+ 2µ− 2}
Note that the cost tolerance function is positive and decreasing in n (for
different values of µ), as seen in the diagram on the next page. This result has
an intuitive justification: the more agents, the less the informational impact of
an additional revealed signal. Moreover, one can observe that agents’ choices
do not depend on the cost per se, but on C
∗
(A−Q) , which represents the cost of
political action normalized by the two policies’ relative distance. This of course
is straightforward, as the choice of bearing the individual cost of participating in
signal sharing will be made relative to the distance of the two policies. Therefore,
the smaller the distance of the two policies, the smaller the cost one is willing to
pay in order to inform others of her signal.








I summarise Lemmas 1 and 2 in the following proposition:
Proposition 1. Under Homogeneous Priors, for any individual cost of political
action c > 0, there exists a unique symmetric Uninformative Sequential Equilib-
rium in pure strategies. Moreover, there exists a symmetric Informative Sequen-
tial Equilibrium in pure strategies if and only if the individual cost of political
action c is lower than or equal to a threshold C∗(n, µ), c ≤ C∗ .
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Consider the decision of a rational voter to participate in informative political
action, conditional on others doing so. She would only consider the situations
where her participation is pivotal for the outcome of the voting stage. In these
situations, she wants to participate in costly political action, since she knows
that, if she does not, other agents will vote for the opposite agenta as her signal
indicates. Given that the cost is low enough, she would always engage in costly
protest, independent of the total number of voters.
However, since she will update her signal according to the total number of
agents, conditional on being pivotal, her expectation of the state of the world
will converge to 1
2
as the number of agents in society grows. But then, she starts
growing indifferent to the actual result of the ballot and does not want to bear
the cost of signal sharing. The last argument is the reason that the cost tolerance
function is decreasing in the number of voters.
The fully informative equilibrium and the uninformative equilibrium are the
only symmetric sequential equilibria of the game. There exist trivial Nash equi-
libria due to indifference, where there is no communication in the political action
stage and everyone casts a vote in the voting stage regardless of her private signal,
but they do not constitute a sequential equilibrium. In that case, even though no
agent would be pivotal, Bayes rule would be necessary to update any sequence of
totally mixed strategies of the agents. Since the only information an agent has
in this case is her own signal, even if others cast a random vote, she would still
have to vote informatively.
In terms of aggregate welfare, it is straightforward to see that costly political
action in this situation is always welfare reducing. The voting result under the
informative and the uninformative sequential equilibria will be identical. How-
ever, since political action is individually costly, the uninformative equilibrium
is always going to be superior to the informative one, due to the sum of the
individual costs of political action.
Interestingly, if agents expect others’ political inaction, information could be
aggregated through the Condorcet Jury Theorem. However, a sufficiently low cost
and others participation in costly political action constitutes a situation where
one has to participate as well, in order to ensure that her opinion is taken into
account in the voting stage. In other words, if the cost of communication is very
high, voters aggregate information at the electoral stage. However, if everyone
expects protests and demonstrations, people do use this information to update
beliefs and make their decision in the second stage. So, one is “trapped” into
demonstrating in the first stage to avoid wrong updating to the second stage.
Finally, note that sincere voting is not responsible for the outcome equiva-
lence between the informative and the uninformative equilibrium. The aggregate
welfare of all the mixed strategy equilibria of the game remain inferior to the
uninformative equilibrium. There exist mixed strategy equilibria where a sub-
set of agents participate in costly signal revelation and agents mix in the voting
stage. The subset of agents participating in costly political action can be seen
as an “expert”, with increased accuracy with respect to each individual agent .
However, even if agents mix in the voting stage between their signal and that of
the “experts’”, the result would only be as accurate as that of sincere voting .
This happens since in sincere voting the “experts’” opinion would be optimally
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aggregated in the voting outcome anyway through the majority rule. By mixing
in the voting stage, agents can escape the trap of blindly following the “experts’”
opinion.21 However, the aggregate cost of political action still remains, making
any mixed strategy equilibrium inferior to the uninformative equilibrium. In the
mixed strategy equilibrium where agents mix in the political action stage and
follow the “experts’” opinion in the voting stage, the result is catastrophic since
besides the aggregate cost of political action, the voting result’s accuracy is also
reduced, as the number of “experts” will be less than the total number of agents.
2.4 Heterogeneous Priors
In this part, the assumption of common prior beliefs is dropped. Henceforth,
some of the agents believe that a high occurrence for s is more probable than
a low one and vice versa. This heterogeneity can be interpreted as a bias in
political beliefs. Henceforth, the terms heterogeneous and biased beliefs will be
used interchangeably. As will be shown below, under specific conditions for the
individual cost of political action and the imprecision of the state of the world,
this bias can result in a superior outcome in terms of aggregate welfare, compared
to the unbiased prior beliefs framework.
Assumption 2. Under Heterogeneous Priors, every agent k ∈ {3, 4, . . . , n} has
prior beliefs about the state of the world given by βα(k)(s) = α(k) + 2(1− α(k))s,
where α(k) : {3, 4, . . . , n} → (0, 2), is a strictly decreasing and continuous func-
tion.22
Example 2. A specific example of uniformly biased individuals could be the one
where α(k) = 2n+1−k
n+1
. In the following graph I plot every agent’s α against his
expected value for the state of the world, for n = 11.
Figure 2.4.1: Expected value for state of the world for different values for bias α
21For more details on the effect of expert information in majority decisions for mixed strategy
equilibria see Kawamura and Vlaseros (2013).
22For α ∈ (0, 2) :
∫ 1
0





6 , so Q < Eα(s) < A.
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Note that the lowest point on the right represents the agent (k = 1) with the
most downward bias with respect to her expectation about the state of the world.
Also, the agent with α = 1 has no bias in her prior opinion about s.
2.4.1 Uninformative and Fully Informative Equilibria
Under the Heterogeneous Priors assumption I prove that, there exist two cost
tolerance bounds: over the upper one, only the uninformative equilibrium can
be supported; under the lower one, the fully informative equilibrium, where all
agents participate in informative political action, can be supported as well. These
two bounds depend on the number of participants and the agent’s individual bias.
A common property of these two equilibria is that the choice of strategy for
agents is the same, independent of their individual bias in priors. I formally state
this property in the definition below:
Definition 3. Under Heterogeneous Priors, an equilibrium is called symmetric if
agents’ equilibrium strategies do not depend on their bias in prior opinions (α).
Otherwise, the equilibrium is called non-symmetric.
Definition 4 (USE). Uninformative Sequential Equilibrium under Heteroge-
neous Priors consists of the following assessment of the game:
{




, σ = 0
6s(α+2(1−α)s)




A, Eα(s|σ) ≥ µ
Q, Eα(s|σ) < µ
; βα(s|σ)
}
In this assessment of the game, regardless of their individual bias and their
initial signal, agents choose not to participate in political action, as in the case
with homogeneous prior beliefs. Since nobody communicates, agents use only
their individual signal to update their initial expectations through the lens of their
individual bias. They finally vote for the status quo or the alternative, depending
on whether they received a signal that favoured one policy, or the other. Once
again, we can assert the existence of such an uninformative equilibrium: under
any positive cost, everyone refraining from an informative protest constitutes an
equilibrium of the game.
Lemma 3. Under Heterogeneous Priors, for any individual cost of political action
c > 0 and for any n, USE is a sequential equilibrium in pure strategies.
Later I show the existence of a lower cost tolerance bound, under which the
fully informative equilibrium can be supported as an equilibrium as well.
Definition 5 (ISE). Informative Sequential Equilibrium under Heterogeneous
Priors consists of the following assessment of the game:
{




, σ = 0
6s(α+2(1−α)s)
4−α , σ = 1
; να(s) =
{
A, Eα(s|σ,m) ≥ µ




(n+ 2)!(α + 2(1− α)s)sm+σ(1− s)n−m−σ





Here, as in the homogeneous prior beliefs framework, all agents will participate
in informative political action. In other words, if one receives σ = 1, she will
choose to inform others. After the political action stage, all agents will observe
the extent of revealed signals and update their expectation on the true state of
the world.
Lemma 4. Under Heterogeneous Priors, there exists a cost tolerance function
K(n, 2) such that, if the individual cost of political action c is lower than or equal
to K, c ≤ K, ISE is a sequential equilibrium in pure strategies.












2|σ = 1, n− 3
2





Eα(s|σ = 1, n) =
(m+ 2)(−2αm+ 2m+ αn− 3α + 6)
(n+ 3)(−2αm+ 2m+ αn− 2α + 4)
and
Eα(s
2|σ = 1, n) = (m+ 2)(m+ 3)(−2αm+ 2m+ αn− 4α + 8)
(n+ 3)(n+ 4)(−2αm+ 2m+ αn− 2α + 4)
.
Note that K(n, α) is a function of the updated expectations for the true state
of the world Eα(s|σ, n) when an agent is pivotal in the voting stage. The cost
tolerance in this framework ultimately depends on the number of agents n, but
also on each agents’ individual bias α. K(n, α) is strictly decreasing both in n
and α, as can be seen from the following graph. So if c ≤ K(n, 2) < K(n, α) ,
then all agents who have received σ = 1, independent of their initial bias α, will
have an incentive to participate in collective action. Also note that K(n, αk) is
the cost tolerance function of any agent k with type αk facing n− 1 agents with
heterogeneous prior beliefs.
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Figure 2.4.2: K(n, α) for different values of the number of agents n and individual
bias α
Note that, if c > K(n, 0) , independently of the bias of agents and the signal
they would receive, all would prefer to abstain from the political action stage,
as K(n, 0) is the cost tolerance of the agent who is more biased towards the
alternative and therefore the reason for protesting.
In the following graph, I plot the upper and lower cost tolerance bound for
an increasing number of agents.
Figure 2.4.3: Upper and lower cost tolerance bound for an increasing number of
agents n
I summarize the lemmas for symmetric equilibria in pure strategies of this
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section in the following proposition.
Proposition 2. Under Heterogeneous Priors, for any individual cost of political
action c > 0, there exists a unique symmetric Uninformative Sequential equilib-
rium in pure strategies. Moreover, there exists a cost tolerance function K(n, a)
such that, if and only if the individual cost of political action c is lower than or
equal to K(n, 2), c ≤ K(n, 2), there also exists a symmetric Informative Sequen-
tial Equilibrium in pure strategies.23
Note that, it is easy to discern a symmetry between the results on the homo-
geneous prior beliefs with that of the heterogeneous prior beliefs framework. Due
to the dispersion in political beliefs, the unique cost tolerance bound separating
the informative and uninformative equilibria in the homogeneous prior beliefs
framework turns into an upper and a lower bound in the heterogeneous prior
beliefs framework. The intuition behind this result is that, in order for a fully
informative equilibrium to be sustained, it has to contain even the most biased
agent against the proposed agenda. Hence, the latter’s tolerance for the cost of
participating in informative political action will be lower than that of an unbiased
agent. On the other hand, in order to support the uninformative equilibrium, the
cost of political action has to be too costly even for the most biased agent for the
proposed agenda, and this cost will definitely be higher than that of the unbiased
agent.
What happens between these bounds is explained thoroughly in the next and
final part of this section.
2.4.2 Partially Informative Equilibria
Finally, I will show that, if the cost is between the two extremes of the cost
tolerance function, there exists a unique non-symmetric equilibrium, where only
a subset of the agents engage in informative protest, and all the rest do not. This
subset depends on the individual bias of agents. This equilibrium has a very
simple intuition: there will be agents who, even though their individual signal
suggests that they should protest, their initial bias on what is the true state of
the world will prevent them from doing so. In other words, for every cost of
information sharing between the two extreme cases, there will be a single agent
α∗ that will ignore her private signal because of her individual bias. All agents
who are more biased than her will do the same. Under specific conditions, this
bias can be actually a good thing in terms of ex ante aggregate welfare, since it
will eventually decrease the number of informative protests in equilibrium while
improving the accuracy of the signal.24
I will call this a biased beliefs sequential equilibrium (BBSE). The formal
definition of BBSE lies below:
Definition 6. BBSE is the following assessment of the game.
23Again, these are the only symmetric sequential equilibria of the game.
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α∗ = inf{ak : K(k, ak) ≥ c, k ∈ {3, 4, . . . n}}
and
M = |{ak : ak ≤ a∗}|.
Proposition 3. Under Heterogeneous Priors, if c ∈ (K(n, 2), K(n, 0)], Biased
Beliefs Sequential Equilibrium is the unique non-symmetric sequential equilib-
rium.25
Remark 1. In combination with Proposition 2, the last result provides us with
a strong sampling tool: if the distribution of the initial bias in the population is
known, we can determine the outcome of the voting procedure before the agents
actually vote. In other words, we can infer all the private signals of the agents who
received a σ = 1, but they do not protest themselves because of their individual
bias. If the types of the agents are uniformly distributed, as in Example 1, and we
know the actual cost of political action, we can determine the number of received
σ = 1 signals using the cost tolerance function. The total number of agents who
should be disclosing is M , from the solution of K(M, 2(n+1−M)
n+1
) = c . So if we
observe m signal revelation, we can induce that m
M
% of M agents received σ = 1.
The graph that follows depicts the upper and lower threshold cost tolerance
for an increasing number of agents, as well as the threshold cost that corresponds




25Note that this equilibrium does not survive outside (K(n, 2),K(n, 0)].
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Figure 2.4.4: Cost tolerance bound for an increasing number of agents n and
α ∈ {0, a∗, 2}
2.5 Aggregate Welfare of Equilibria
After having calculated the three types of different equilibria of the game under
heterogeneous prior beliefs (uninformative, partly informative and fully informa-
tive), it is straightforward to calculate the difference in aggregate welfare amongst
them. These results are formally summarized in the following proposition, and
thoroughly explained below:
Proposition 4. If the individual cost of political action is too large (c > K(n, 0)),
there is no communication prior to elections. If the individual cost of political
action is small enough (c < K(n, 0)), a fully informative equilibrium is harmful
in terms of aggregate welfare. However, for a sufficiently large society (for n large
enough) and sufficiently imprecise signal (s close to 1
2
), there exists a moderate
value for the cost of political action c∗ ∈ (K(n, 2), K(n, 0)) for which the re-
spective Biased Beliefs Sequential Equilibrium is superior in terms of aggregate
welfare with respect to the Uninformative Sequential Equilibrium.
In other words, if the cost of participating in collective action is large enough
(c > K(n, 0)), there will be no information sharing. On the other hand, a low
individual cost of political action (c < K(n, 2)) can also be harmful in democracy:
this constitutes a situation where agents will participate in order to improve their
personal signal paying a positive cost, but they will eventually vote what the
median voter would anyway. Given everyone follows this strategy, this remains
best response individually.
As it turns out, the fully informative equilibrium is the same in terms of
individual signal accuracy before the voting stage, but always inferior in terms
of aggregate welfare with respect to the uninformative one. This is the case as,
in the fully informative equilibrium, all agents who have received the appropriate
signal will communicate their individual signal. Of course, after updating about
the state of the world, each agent’s individual signal will always be improved by
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taking into account all the remaining signals. While this is true, when agents
finally decide to vote, they will all vote what the majority would vote in the first
place. Thus, the two outcomes will be exactly the same, and so will the two
probabilities of error.
This result underlines the strength of majoritarian democratic outcomes: even
with full signal disclosure, society can never do better than the majoritarian
outcome with individual signals. In this case the aggregate welfare loss of a fully
informative signal sharing is the sum of the personal costs of political action.
Naturally, under the assumption of heterogeneous priors it would be important
to talk about any aggregate welfare improvements before the state of the world is
known. However, since every agent has a distinct prior, it is hard to choose what
the “real” prior should be. Thus in this case we compare welfare results given
the state of the word.
After the state of the world is revealed, when society is large enough, there
are cases when a partially informative protest induces an improvement in both
individual signal accuracy and aggregate welfare. This happens when the state
of nature (s) is close (but not exactly equal) to 1
2
. In other words, when the
signal of nature is imprecise and society is large enough, there exists a partially
revealing equilibrium that produces an increase in aggregate welfare with respect
to uninformative one. The intuition behind this result is simple: when the signal
is very accurate, the Condorcet Jury Theorem insures that, the larger the society,
the smaller the probability of error of the majoritarian outcome. But, this holds
for both equilibria. Hence, the error difference, with a large n, will be very
close to zero, and will not be able to compensate for the sum of individual costs
of information sharing. On the other hand, when s = 1
2
, then agents will be
indifferent between the two agendas, Q and A, in terms of utility and again the
only difference between the two equilibria is the cost of collective action. Even
so, in large societies and when the signal is sufficiently (but not completely)
imprecise, there exists a number of revealed signals, so that the corresponding
partially informative equilibrium is superior that the uninformative one.
Of course, these welfare improving equilibria would only arise if the state of
the world is close to 1
2
. Since the state of the world is a random variable, and I
have assumed for simplicity that the state of the world is uniform, there is a very
small probability that this happens. Were I to calculate the ex ante expected
utility, they would fail. But it is easy to infer that, for a symmetric distribution
more condensed around 1
2
, they would be welfare improving in ex ante expected
utility as well.
Example 3. The following graph provides some useful intuition with respect to
Proposition 4. Here, the ex ante aggregate utility increase between the unin-
formative equilibrium and a partially informative equilibrium is plotted against
an increasing population. The partially informative set of citizens contains 425
agents, while the signal is very imprecise, s = 50.075%.
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Figure 2.5.1: Aggregate welfare for an increasing number of agents n, a protesting
group containing a fixed number of 425 agents and s = 50.075%
It is straightforward to see that, when the population of society is small,
the number of the disclosing group poses a greater relative weight due to the
small size of society. However, as the size of society increases, the partially
informative equilibrium becomes superior in terms of ex ante aggregate welfare.
Of course, when n tends to infinity, the Condorcet Jury Theorem again makes
the uninformative equilibrium more attractive in terms of aggregate welfare, as
the probability of error in both equilibria tends to zero, and the only difference
is the cost of collective action, which, in this case, is just the sum of individual
costs of political action.
2.6 Concluding Remarks
Protests are a growing channel of political expression and one of the major chan-
nels of public voice: 14% of citizens attended demonstrations in Belgium during
1981, 23% in 1990 and 39% in 2000 (Norris, Walgrave, and Aelst (2005)). How-
ever, as my analysis suggests, if the cost of political action is sufficiently small
but positive, then the expected welfare result of majoritarian decisions will be
always inferior to that without prior communication. This happens since, a suffi-
ciently small cost of political action will result in a situation similar to a prisoner’s
dilemma where individuals will always find participating in informative costly po-
litical action individually superior than abstaining from it, conditional on others
doing so. Given that the cost of protesting is sufficiently low, as in the cases of
internet protests, since all agents will informatively participate, this will result in
strengthening the vote difference in votes between the two proposed agendas into
a unanimous decision in the case of agents with the same preferences, but not
necessary improve the accuracy of the majoritarian result. The only difference in
welfare will be that of the aggregate cost of political action. In the case of biased
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agents, as Lohmann (1994) suggests, can even lead to a failure in information
aggregation.
However, if prior beliefs exhibit political bias, only a subset of individuals
will participate in informative protest. Given that this subset is small enough
and the state of the world is sufficiently imprecise, then collective action will be
welfare improving: this will happen when the improvement in majoritarian signal
accuracy will outweigh the aggregate cost of collective action.
Including a social planner in the present model would be straightforward.
Her reaction against the fully informative welfare reducing equilibrium is either
to propose more mediocre policies or increase the individual cost of political
action, relative to the distance of the proposed agendas.26 If political opinions
are dispersed and she knows that the signal agents receive is highly imprecise, she
should adjust the cost of individual political action to induce a (relatively small
or null) subset of the citizens to engage in informative political action, while
maintaining most (or all) in political inaction before the elections.
Finally, there are several ways this model’s results could be expanded. First of
all, there could be a “blur” in the number of participants in the protest that other
agents are able to observe after the political action stage. Technically, this can be
achieved by introducing a stochastic shock that the agents can only imperfectly
observe; the latter would depict how the number of political actors changes in
equilibrium under some bias or general form of censorship in the mass media of
society. Secondly, the platforms voted upon could be expanded from this model’s
binary setup in taking more than two values or even a continuum of values,
to study any possible trade-off between protesting and exaggeration of voter’s
choices. Moreover, there could be more protesting choices with strictly increasing
costs: this could give a rationalistic interpretation of protests turning in riots.27
More importanly, as in Groseclose and Milyo (2013), it is important and realistic
to see what would happen in the case where agents choose to engage in political
action sequentially and not simultaneously. Finally, due to the extreme simplicity
of the mechanics, this model can be incorporated in the study of majoritarian
decision making of more complex economic structures.
26i.e. decrease the relative distance of the two platforms
27As far as the relationship between political action and violence, the present model’s results
are not there to capture any agent’s non-rational behavioural characteristics. In a relative
analysis, Ross (1986) claims that what determines society’s overall conflict from protest to
political violence is psycho-cultural dispositions that root in socialization patterns, low warmth
and affection directed at children and high protest masculinity. In this model, agents are
rational: they do not despair when noticing that the informational group is too thin, or that
the result of the referendum is of too grave importance.
50
Appendix
2.A Proof of Lemma 1
After Natures move, agents receive a signal σ = 1 with probability s or σ = 0
with probability 1− s. The agents will update their expectation according to the
Bayes rule:















= E(s|σ = 1).
Since nobody will share their signal under USE, agents will choose to vote for
the alternative if their expected loss from the voting the alternative is smaller or





U(Q)β(s|σ)ds⇔ E(s|σ) ≥ µ.
Hence agents will vote for the alternative if their updated expectation of s is
greater or equal the midpoint between A and Q.
In the voting stage, type σ = 0 agents will vote for the status quo and type
σ = 1 agents will vote for the alternative, since E(s|σ = 0) ≤ E(s|σ = 1).
Any deviation from this strategy is not profitable for type σ = 0 agents : at the
costly political action stage, the agent would only incur the positive cost of politi-
cal action. In the voting stage, the agent would not maximise her expected utility.
As far as agent σ = 1 is concerned, if she discloses her signal, then all agents
will update their expectations using her signal. Therefore, type σ = 1 agents will
still vote for A, while type σ = 0 agents will return to their prior beliefs. By
being indifferent, they will vote for the alternative. In any case, all will vote for
the alternative. However, σ = 1 agents will not have an incentive to deviate if
the cost of disclosing her signal is higher than the expected gain for choosing her
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preferred policy. In other words, she will abstain from political action if∫ 1
0
{P [N ≥ n+ 1
2
|m = 1, piv]− P [N ≥ n+ 1
2
|m = 0, piv]}{U(A)− U(Q)}β(s|σ = 1, piv)ds ≤ c
or, finally, if
c ≥ (A−Q)(1− 2µ)O(n),
where O(n) is a function of the number of players. Since µ = 1
2
, for any c > 0,
she will always prefer not to engage in costly political action. Note that for µ < 1
2
,
this is not the case.
In order to conclude the proof, it suffices to show that there exists a series of
totally mixed strategies converging to π(σ) = 0 under which the belief stricture
converges to β(s|σ = 0). Indeed, mixing {π(σ) = 0, π(σ) = σ, π(σ) = 1 −









t→∞−−−→ (1, 0, 0, 0) , the players will update
their expectation according to the part of signals that they consider informative
with respect to the state of the world. Hence, if they observe m agents engaging
in costly political action, they will induce that 2[m
3t
] are informative actions, and

































where [k] = {l : l ≥ k, l ∈ N}.
2.B Proof of Lemma 2
After Natures move, agents will update their prior beliefs is exactly the same way
as described in Lemma 1. After observing any number of signal revelations m





U(Q)β(s|σ,m)ds⇔ E(s|σ,m) ≥ µ.
Therefore, according to their beliefs at the voting stage, agents will always
vote informatively. Again there will be no profitable deviation on this stage of
the game, given the beliefs of the agents in this stage.
In order to update their beliefs about the state of the world, everyone will
take into consideration that m agents participated in costly political action (apart
from themselves, if they did so) after receiving a σ = 1 and abstained otherwise.
Agents will infer that there were exactly m σ = 1 signals received by the n − 1
agents. The distribution of signals follows Bernoulli distribution. Hence, depen-
dent on the signal they initially had about the state of the world, there agents
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will update their beliefs about the state of the world accordingly:
If σ = 0 then


























If σ = 1 then


























As far as agents who have received σ = 0 are concerned, they have no incentive
to deviate from their strategies. There are two cases, depending on the value of µ
relative to their expectation versus the state of the world: If E(s|σ = 0,m) ≥ µ,
the agent will prefer not to engage in costly political action, as everyones expec-
tation in an increasing function of m. Hence, she would bear a cost and having no
benefit from her involvement in costly political action. If E(s|σ = 0,m) < µ, the
agent will have an incentive not to share their signal, as everyones expectation is
an increasing function of m. Otherwise, she would bear a cost and in the same
time while pivoting the majority result towards a less preferable outcome.
Types σ = 1 on the other hand have the choice of either to disclose their signal
(engage in costly political action) and bear a cost equal to c, or refrain themselves.
Since they are initially biased towards the alternative (µ ≤ E(s|σ = 1)), they will
consider the effect their costly political action will have in pivoting the outcome
towards the alternative. Let m be the total number of σ = 1 signals. If all decide
to disclose, there will be m revealed signals. If one of the σ = 1 agents decides to
deviate and refrain themselves from political action, then the number of revealed
signals will be m− 1. Note that for the expectation of s, as calculated above, we
have that E(s|σ = 0,m) = m+1
n+2
and E(s|σ = 1,m) = m+1
n+2
.
Hence, any agent considering to deviate and refrain from political action, will
consider the benefit relative to the cost of her action. The choice of deviating or
not from participating in costly political action can be depicted in the diagram
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below.
If µ ≤ m
n+2
, the agents extra revealed signal will be worthless, while if µ > m+2
n+2
,
the agent will have an incentive not to participate in collective action. Hence,
the agent will only consider the cases where m
n+2
< µ ≤ m+2
n+2
. These correspond
to the three following cases:
m > µn+ 2m− 2
m > µn+ 2m− 1




m > m∗ + 1
m > m∗ + 2

where m∗ = m∗(µ, n) = inf{k ≤ n|k ≥ µn+2m−2}, which is a non an empty
set, since n ∈ {k ≤ n|k ≥ µn+ 2m− 2}.
Since
P [N ≥ n+ 1
2
|m] = P [N ≥ n+ 1
2
|m,σ = 0]P [σ = 0]+P [N ≥ n+ 1
2
|m,σ = 1]P [σ = 1]
where where N is the number of votes for the alternative, we have that
P [N ≥ n+1
2
|m∗ + 2] = 1(1− s) + 1s = 1
P [N ≥ n+1
2
|m∗ + 1] = 0(1− s) + 1s = s
P [N ≥ n
2
|m∗] = 0(1− s) + 0s = 0.
The agents will therefore consider only the cases where any additional costly
political action will result in them having any benefit whatsoever, conditional on
being pivotal. Their decision will depend on the indifference condition between
the cost and the sum of any incremental probabilistic signalling effects their
acceding to the body of agents revealing their signal could induce. Any terms of
this summation must weigh the effect an additional revealed signal would mean
to the probability of the alternative winning and the incremental utility benefit
of the alternative against the status quo, or∫ 1
0
{P [N ≥ n+ 1
2






{P [N ≥ n+ 1
2
|m∗+1]−P [N ≥ n+ 1
2
|m∗]}{U(A)−U(Q)}β(s|σ = 1,m∗+1)ds = c,
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From the last equation, the threshold cost tolerance for which agents who
received σ = 1 will chose to engage in costly political action is:
c∗(µ, n,Q,A) = (A−Q)((n+ 1)(m
∗(µ, n) + 3)
(n+ 2)(n+ 3)
− µ(m
∗(µ, n) + 1)
2(n+ 2)
) (2.B.1)
If c∗ ≥ c , type σ = 1 players will prefer to or be indifferent in protesting. When
c∗ < c, they would have an incentive to refrain from political action.
2.C Proof of Proposition 1
Immediate result of Lemmas 1-2. The “only if” statement is a straightforward
result of the proof of Lemma 2. Note that equation (1) is an indifference condition
for participating in informative political action or not. Therefore, if the cost is
lower, then the equilibrium holds. Also, if the equilibrium to holds, then it must
be that the cost is lower than the threshold cost, otherwise agents would have an
incentive to deviate.
2.D Proof of Lemma 3
The same as the proof of Lemma 1 since, for any α ∈ (0, 2), we have that
Eα(s|σ = 0) < 12 < Eα(s|σ = 1).
2.E Proof of Lemma 4
After Natures move, agents will update their prior beliefs is exactly the same way
as in the homogeneous prior beliefs framework. After observing any number of









Therefore, according to their beliefs, agents will vote informatively in the vot-
ing stage. Again there will be no profitable deviation on this stage of the game,
given the beliefs of the agents in this stage. In order to update for their be-
liefs about the state of the world, everyone will take into consideration that m
agents participated in costly political action (apart from themselves, if they did
so) after receiving a σ = 1. Agents will infer that there were exactly m σ = 1
signals received by the n− 1 agents. The distribution of signals follows Bernoulli
distribution. Hence, dependent on the signal they initially had about the state
of the world, there agents will update their beliefs about the state of the world
accordingly:
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If σ = 0 then











sm(1− s)n−m−1βα(s|σ = 0)ds
=
(n+ 2)!(α + 2(1− s)α)sm(1− s)n−m
m!(n−m)!(−2αm+ 2m+ αn+ 2)
,
while
Eα(s|σ = 0,m) =
m+ 1
n+ 3
· −2αm+ 2m+ αn− α + 4
−2αm+ 2m+ αn+ 2
.
If σ = 1 then
βα(s|σ = 1,m) =
(n+ 2)!(α + 2(1− s)α)sm+1(1− s)n−m−1
(m+ 1)!(n−m− 1)!(−2αm+ 2m+ αn− 2α + 4)
,
while
Eα(s|σ = 1,m) =
m+ 2
n+ 3
· −2αm+ 2m+ αn− 3α + 6
−2αm+ 2m+ αn− 2α + 4
and





· −2αm+ 2m+ αn− 4α + 8
−2αm+ 2m+ αn− 2α + 4
.
It is straightforward to prove the following properties of Eα(s|σ,m):
1. Eα(s|σ = 0) ≤ 12 ≤ Eα(s|σ = 1)
2. E0(s|σ = 0) = 12 = E2(s|σ = 1)
3. Eα(s|σ = 0,m+ 1) = Eα(s|σ = 1,m)
4. ∂Eα(s|σ=1,m)
∂α
≤ 0, for α ∈ [0, 2]
5. Eα(s|σ,m) is increasing in m
6. E0(s|σ = 1, n−32 ) =
1
2





8. E0(s|σ = 0, n+12 ) =
1
2
Type σ = 1 has to consider the signalling effects of an additional signal




P [N ≥ n+ 1
2
|m] = P [N ≥ n+ 1
2
|m,σ = 0]P [σ = 0]+P [N ≥ n+ 1
2
|m,σ = 1]P [σ = 1]
we have that 




] = 1(1− s) + 1s = 1




] = 0(1− s) + 1s = s




] = 0(1− s) + 0s = 0.
Therefore, we can show that the threshold cost for agents who received σ = 1

















Finally, as far as agents σ = 0 are concerned, there are two cases, , depending
on their expectation of the state of the world: If Eα(s|σ = 0,m) ≥ 12 , the agent
will prefer not to engage in costly political action, as everyones expectation in
an increasing function of m. Hence, she would bear a cost and having no benefit
from her involvement in collective. If Eα(s|σ = 0,m) < 12 , the agent will have an
incentive not to share their signal, because everyones expectation is an increasing
function of m. Otherwise, she would bear a cost and in the same time while
pivoting the majority result towards a less preferable outcome than her own.
2.F Proof of Proposition 2
Immediate result of Lemmas 3-4 and Properties 1-3 of K(n, α). The “only if”
statement is again a straightforward result of the proof of Lemma 4.
2.G Proof of Proposition 3
After Natures move, agents will update their prior beliefs is exactly the same way
as in Lemma 6. After observing any number of revealed signals m will vote for
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Therefore, according to their beliefs, agents will vote informatively in the
voting stage. Again there will be no profitable deviation on this stage of the
game, given the beliefs of the agents in this stage.
Since c ∈ (K(n, 2), K(n, 0)), agents know that it is not optimal for all agents
to engage in costly political action: if {αk : K(k, αk) ≥ c} = Ø, then we have
the zero information equilibrium, else if {αk : K(k, αk) ≥ c} = {3, 5, . . . , n}, then
we have the full informative equilibrium. Last of all, if the agents types are dis-
persed enough and since K(n, α) is decreasing in both n and α, we can calculate
α∗ = infk{αk : K(k, αk) ≥ c} . Agents with α ≤ α∗ will engage in information
sharing, if they receive a signal σ = 1 and abstain if they receive a signal equal
to σ = 0, whereas agents with α > α∗ will refrain from political action. Note
that {k|αk ≤ α∗} and {k|αk > α∗} can be directly calculated from functions a(k)
and K(n, α). Denote M = |{k|αk ≤ α∗}| and T = {k|αk > α∗}, M + T = n . I
assume without loss of generality that M is an odd number (because, if not, then
we can prove the equivalent proposition for TBBSE).
In order to update for their beliefs about the state of the world, taking into
consideration that M agents would participate in costly political action (apart
from themselves, if they did so) after receiving a σ = 1. Agents will infer that
there were exactly m σ = 0 signals received by the M agents. The distribution
of signals follows the Bernoulli distribution. Hence, dependent on the signal they
initially had about the state of the world, agents will update their beliefs about
the state of the world accordingly. The calculations will be exactly equivalent to
the one in the equivalent stage of the game in Lemma 6, but for M = n−1. Also,
it is straightforward to prove some useful properties of the new expected value
EMα (s|σ,m):
1. EMα (s|σ = 0,m) = m+1M+4 ·
−2αm+2m+αM+4
−2αm+2m+αM+α+2














≤ 0, for α ∈ [0, 2]
6. EMα (s|σ,m) is increasing in m
7. EM0 (s|σ = 1, M−32 ) = E
M
2 (s|σ = 1, M−12 ) <
1
2
8. EM0 (s|σ = 1, M−12 ) = E
M
2 (s|σ = 1, M+12 ) >
1
2
Type σ = 1 has to consider the signalling effects of an additional revealed




P [N ≥ n+ 1
2
|m] = P [N ≥ n+ 1
2
|m,σ = 0]P [σ = 0]+P [N ≥ n+ 1
2
|m,σ = 1]P [σ = 1]
we have that 




] = 1(1− s) + 1s = 1




] = 0(1− s) + 1s = s




] = 0(1− s) + 0s = 0.
Therefore, we can show that the threshold cost for agents who received σ = 1
in order to engage in costly political action is K(M,α) (the same function as in
Lemma 6, but for n = M).
As far as agents σ = 0 are concerned, there are two cases, depending on their
expectation of the state of the world: If EMα (s|σ = 0,m) ≥ 12 , the agent will
prefer not to engage in costly political action, as everyones expectation in an in-
creasing function of m. Hence, she would bear a cost and having no benefit from
her involvement in costly political action. If EMα (s|σ = 0,m) < 12 , the agent will
have an incentive not to reveal, as everyones expectation is an increasing function
of m. Hence, she would bear a cost and in the same time pivoting the majority
result towards a less preferable outcome than her own.
What remains to be proved is that any other different non empty partition
of the set of agents does not constitute a sequential equilibrium. Without loss of
generality, assume b∗ > α∗ such that Mb∗ = |{k|αk ≤ b∗}| and Tb∗ = {k|αk > b∗},
Mb∗ + Tb∗ = n. Also assume that Mb∗ ∩M c 6= Ø . So let kb∗ ∈Mb∗ and kb∗ /∈M .
Since b∗ > α∗ ⇒Mb∗ > M , we have that K(Mb∗ , b∗) < K(M,α∗) = c, as K(n, α)
is strictly decreasing both in n and α. Thus, agent kb∗ does not has an incentive
to reveal, as her cost tolerance for costly political action is less than the actual
cost, yet she belongs to the set of agents participating in costly political action
(contradiction).
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Finally, note that since n is finite, any number of agents revealing information
can occur with positive probability, so there exist no beliefs off-the-equilibrium
path .
2.H Proof of Proposition 4
It suffices to show that the informative equilibrium with 2 revelation is better
than the uninformative one, with n large and s close to 1
2
, or that the following
inequality holds:
n · {PrAn (error, no revelations)− PrBn error, 2 revelations)} · 2(A−Q)(
1
2
− s) > s
(2.H.1)
where A ∼ B(n, s) and B ∼ B(n, s∗), binomial distributions with s∗ = s2(3 −
2s) > s. Let s∗ − s = ε > 0. We know that for a large n and s sufficiently close
to 1
2
, we can approximate the difference of the two binomial distributions by the
normal distribution with a mean of ns∗ − ns = nε and a standard deviation of√




for s sufficiently close to 1
2
. Normalizing using














where 0 < δ < 1. From the lower bound for the error of the standard normal



























which holds for sufficiently large population n.
2.I Note on equivalence of results with Lohmann
(1994)
In Lohmann (1994), the agents of the game retain uniform and homogeneous prior
beliefs, but different political bias. This is interpreted as a utility function that
depends on x ∈ [−x̄, x̄], different for each agent.28 There is always a functional
28However, the complexity of Lohmanns solutions makes the equilibrium sets intractable,
and any comparative statics on the equilibrium solution extremely inflexible. Moreover, the
complexity of the equilibrium almost excludes the calibration of the latter in any testable
econometric hypothesis. On the contrary, in the present model, comparative statics and em-
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equivalence between the ex-ante preferences of each agent between Lohmanns
model and the heterogeneous prior beliefs framework. In Lohmann, after agents
receive their signal, they update their beliefs with the following way:
β(s|σ) =
{
2(1− s), σ = 0
2s, σ = 1
The agent’s preferred choice before her decision to take share information or not





− s−x)β(s|σ)ds ≤ 0,











, σ = 0
6s(α+2(1−α)s)
4−α , σ = 1
Apart from the unbiased agents in the both games x = 0 and α = 1, for every
player of the BB setting we can find an player of Lohmanns setting having the
same ex-ante preference, through the function x(α) = 1
2(1−α) , α ∈ (0, 2). Also, for
one unbiased agent in Lohmanns setting x = 0 and sufficient dispersion for the




,∞), for every player of Lohmanns setting we can find
a player of the heterogeneous prior beliefs framework having the same ex-ante
preference, through the function α(x) = 2x−1
2x





pirical results would be straightforward. The technical reason for this is that, in her model,
the heterogeneity in utility functions leads in extremely biased agents on one hand, and on the
other interacts with the beliefs in an opaque way. Here, the belief bias is both straightforward
to calculate and leads into smoother equilibrium sets. Therefore, the present model manages





Expert Information and Majority
Decisions: Theory1
“Advice is a dangerous gift, even from the wise to the wise.” (J.R.Tolkien)
3.1 Introduction
When collective decisions are made through voting, typically each voter has not
only private information known solely to himself but also public information ob-
served by all voters. Examples of commonly held information in collective decision
making include “expert” opinions solicited by a committee, shared knowledge in a
board meeting that has emerged from pre-voting deliberation, and evidence pre-
sented to a jury. Such information may well be superior to the private information
each individual voter has, and if so, it would be natural to expect that voting
behaviour would incorporate the public information at least to some extent. In-
deed, in most instances the primary reason for bringing shared information to a
decision making body would be to improve the quality of its decision.
Meanwhile, such public information is rarely perfect, and in particular expert
opinions are often alleged to have excessive influence on decision making. For
example, recently the IMF’s advice to the governments of some highly indebted
countries have heavily influenced their parliamentary and cabinet decisions for
austerity. However, the IMF’s expertise has been questioned by specialists in
monetary policy, and it has been reported that the IMF itself has admitted that
they may have underestimated the impact of their austerity measure in Greece.2
Financial deregulations in the 1990s seem to have been prompted by experts
endorsing them, but some politicians reflect that in retrospect they may have
followed expert opinions too naively at the time.3 How would collective decision
1This chapter was based on results from the 2013 working paper “Expert Information and
Majority Decisions”, co-authored by Dr. Kohei Kawamura.
2“IMF ’to admit mistakes’ in handling Greek debt crisis and bailout”,
Guardian, 4 June 2013, http://www.guardian.co.uk/business/2013/jun/05/
imf-admit-mistakes-greek-crisis-austerity
3“Gordon Brown admits ’big mistake’ over banking crisis”, BBC News, 13 March 2013,
http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/business-13032013
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making through voting be influenced by shared information? If commonly ob-
served expert information is better than the information each voter has, would the
presence of such expert information improve the quality of the collective decision?
Can expert information have “too much” influence?
This chapter addresses these questions theoretically, by introducing a public
signal into an otherwise classical Condorcet jury setup with majority rule. The
public signal is observed by all voters and assumed to be superior to the private
signal each voter receives. We call such a public signal “expert information”.
In this chapter we present a majoritarian voting game with expert informa-
tion and identifies three types of equilibria of interest, namely i) the symmetric
mixed strategy equilibrium where each member randomizes between following the
private and public signals should they disagree; ii) the asymmetric pure strategy
equilibrium where a certain number of members always follow the public sig-
nal while the others always follow the private signal; and iii) a class of equilibria
where a supermajority and hence the committee decision always follow the expert
signal.4 We find that in the first two equilibria, the expert signal is collectively
taken into account in such a way that it enhances the efficiency (accuracy) of the
committee decision, and a fortiori the CJT holds. However, in the third type of
equilibria, private information is not reflected in the committee decision and the
efficiency of committee decision is identical to that of public information, which
may well be lower than the efficiency the committee could achieve without expert
information. In other words, the introduction of expert information might reduce
efficiency in equilibrium.
In their seminal paper Austen-Smith and Banks (1996) first introduced game-
theoretic equilibrium analysis to the Condorcet jury with independent private
signals. They demonstrated that sincere voting (in pure strategy) is not gen-
erally consistent with equilibrium behaviour. McLennan (1998) and Wit (1998)
studied mixed strategy equilibria in the model of Austen-Smith and Banks (1996)
and showed that the CJT holds in equilibrium for majority and super-majority
rules (except for unanimity rule). The experimental study on strategic voting
was pioneered by Guarnaschelli, McKelvey, and Palfrey (2000) who tested the
model of Austen-Smith and Banks (1996) and found that the subjects’ behaviour
was largely consistent with the theory. Focusing on unanimity rule, Ali, Goeree,
Kartik, and Palfrey (2008) found that the findings by Guarnaschelli, McKelvey,
and Palfrey (2000) are fairly robust to voting protocols such as the number of rep-
etitions and timing of voting (simultaneous or sequential). The present chapter
focuses on majority rule, but examines the effect of public information on voting
behaviour and outcomes. The literature on deliberation in voting has studied pub-
lic information endogenously generated by voters sharing their otherwise private
information through pre-voting deliberation (e.g., Coughlan, 2000; Austen-Smith
and Feddersen, 2005; and Gerardi and Yariv, 2007). In these models, once a voter
reveals his private information credibly, he has no private information. Goeree
4While the voters may ignore their private information completely, they cannot ignore the
expert information completely in equilibrium. That is, voting according only to their private
signal is never an equilibrium, since if a voter knows that all the others will follow their private
signals, he deviates and follows the expert signal, which is by assumption superior to his private
signal.
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and Yariv (2011b) found in a laboratory experiment that deliberation diminishes
differences in voting behaviour across different voting rules.
While we focus on simultaneous move voting games, the inclination to ignore
private information in favour of expert information is reminiscent of rational
herding in sequential decisions. In the original rational herding literature (e.g.,
Banerjee, 1992; Bikhchandani, Hirshleifer, and Welch, 1992) each player’s payoff
is assumed to be determined only by his decision but not by others. Dekel and
Piccione (2000) and Ali and Kartik (2012) are among the papers that theoretically
study sequential voting in collective decision making where payoffs are intrinsi-
cally interdependent. Unlike the expert signal in our setup, which is exogenously
given to all voters, public information in their models is generated endogenously
by the observed choices of earlier voters. Dekel and Piccione (2000) show that the
multiple equilibria include an equilibrium where all voters vote sincerely, which
is informationally efficient. Ali and Kartik (2012) identify equilibria that exhibit
herding whereby after observing some votes, the rest vote according to what the
earlier votes indicate, regardless of their private information. Hung and Plott
(2001) conducted a laboratory experiment on sequential voting with majority
rule, and found that herding occurred, resulting in inefficiency with respect to
sincere voting, while herding behaviour was not as pronounced as in the case
where, like the standard herding literature, each subject’s decision affected their
individual payoff only.
Our model and experimental design are based on the uniform prior with ex-
pert information. This structure is theoretically isomorphic to the case of the
canonical Condorcet jury model without public information but with a common
non-uniform prior belief. Thus while we incorporate expert information into
the voters’ Bayesian updating explicitly to gain relevant intuition, the symmetric
mixed strategy equilibrium we derive in this chapter can be thought of as a special
case of the one shown by Wit (1998) who solved for the equilibrium without as-
suming the uniform prior. However, we also explicitly derive an asymmetric pure
strategy equilibrium and its optimality, which has not been shown previously.
In doing so, we draw an important link between our fully strategic setup and
the optimal voting rule with heterogeneously informed but non-strategic voters
studied by Nitzan and Paroush (1982).5
The important advantage of adopting the uniform prior and expert informa-
tion, rather than a non-uniform prior without expert information, is that we are
able to ask a potentially useful policy question as to whether to, and how to
bring expert opinions into collective decision making. Our experiment is based
on this premise, and provides us with practical implications such as the possibil-
ity that the introduction of expert information can reduce efficiency, even though
theoretically it can enhance welfare if the voters coordinate to play an efficient
equilibrium. It would be impossible to address such an issue if we adopted a
non-uniform prior analogue without expert information, because in practice the
prior belief is seldom a choice variable in itself, while decision making bodies can
5While most theoretical studies on strategic voting focus on symmetric strategies, Persico
(2004) establishes the optimality of asymmetric strategy equilibrium in a voting game related
to ours. However, he does not give an explicit solution for such an equilibrium.
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usually choose whether to listen to expert opinions.
3.2 Model
Consider a committee that consists of an odd number of agents n ∈ N =
{1, 2, .., n}. Each agent simultaneously casts a costless binary vote, denoted by
xi = {A,B}, for a collective decision y ∈ Y = {A,B}. The committee decision is
determined by majority rule. The binary state of the world is denoted by s ∈ S =
{A,B}, where both events are ex ante equally likely Pr[s = A] = Pr[s = B] = 1
2
.
The members have identical preferences ui : Y × S → R and the payoffs are nor-
malized without loss of generality at 0 or 1. Specifically we denote the vNM payoff
by ui(y, s) and assume ui(A,A) = ui(B,B) = 1 and ui(A,B) = ui(B,A) = 0,
∀i ∈ N . This implies that the agents would like the decision to be “matched”
with the state.
Before voting, each agent receives two signals. One is a private signal about
the state σi ∈ K = {A,B}, for which the probability of the signal and the state
being matched is given by Pr[σi = A | s = A] = Pr[σi = B | s = B] = p, where
p ∈ (1/2, 1]. We also have Pr[σi = A | s = B] = Pr[σi = B | s = A] = 1− p.
In addition to the private signal, all agents in the committee observe a common
public signal σE ∈ L = {A,B}, which is assumed to be more accurate than each
agent’s individual signal. Specifically, we assume Pr[σE = A | s = A] = Pr[σE =
B | s = B] = q and Pr[σE = A | s = B] = Pr[σE = B | s = A] = 1 − q, where
q > p. The distributions of the two signals are independent.
The public signal in our model has natural interpretations. It can be thought
of as expert information given to the entire committee as in, e.g. congressional
hearings. Briefing materials presented to and shared in the committee would also
have the same feature. Alternatively, it may capture shared knowledge held by
all agents as a result of pre-voting deliberation. In that case, the private signal
represents any remaining uncommunicated information of each agent, which is
individually inferior to shared information. Throughout this chapter we often
refer to the public information as expert information.
The timing of our voting game is summarized as follows:
1. Nature determines the state of the world;
2. Each agent observes private and public signals about the state;
3. Each agent votes;
4. Majority decision is implemented and payoffs are realized.
In the absence of the public signal, there exists a sincere voting equilibrium such
that xi = σi for any i and the Condorcet Jury Theorem holds (Austen-Smith and
Banks, 1996). In what follows we study Bayesian Nash equilibria of the game
in which the agents also share expert information. Before doing so let us define
some key concepts.
Let vi : K ×L→ [0, 1] denote the probability of an agent voting for the state
her private signal σi ∈ K = {A,B} indicates, given the private signal and the
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public signal σE ∈ L = {A,B}. For example, vi(A,B) is the probability that
agent i votes for A given that his private signal is A and the public signal is B.
Definition 1. A voting strategy vi is symmetric if vi = v, ∀i ∈ N .
When we derive equilibria of the game later in Section 3.3, we first focus
on symmetric strategy equilibria (Section 3.3.1) and then consider asymmetric
strategy equilibria (Section 3.3.2).
We use the term responsive more widely than usual, to refer to any voting
behaviour vi that varies according to different combinations of the signals.
Definition 2. A voting strategy vi is responsive if vi(σi, σE) 6= 1− vi(σ′i, σE) for
σi 6= σ′i, σE ∈ L.
This rules out uninformative strategies where an agent votes for A or B with
a fixed probabilty regardless of the signals.
Since each agent in our model receives two signals, we formalize three classes
of strategies, namely i) one where vi depends only on the private signal; ii) one
where vi depends only on the public signal; and iii) the other where vi depends
on both the private and public signals.
Definition 3. A voting strategy vi is individually informative if vi(σi, σE) = 1,
∀σi ∈ K, σE ∈ L.
An individually informative strategy is a pure strategy analogous to informa-
tive (or “sincere”) voting in the standard voting literature with private informa-
tion, where an agent votes for what the private signal indicates.
Meanwhile there is another type of pure strategy where the agent reacts only
to the public signal.
Definition 4. A voting strategy vi is obedient if vi(A,B) = vi(B,A) = 0 and
vi(A,A) = vi(B,B) = 1.
An obedient strategy is the pure strategy where an agent votes for what the
public signal indicates with probability 1, regardless of his private signal.
Since each agent has signals (private and public) that are drawn indepen-
dently, they may disagree with each other. We formalize the notion of responding
to both signals under disagreement as follows:
Definition 5. A voting strategy vi is dually responsive if vi(A, σE) 6= vi(B, σE)
∀σE ∈ L, and at least vi(A,B) ∈ (0, 1) or vi(B,A) ∈ (0, 1).
When both signals disagree and a strategy is dually responsive, the agent
follows neither of them with probability 1.
As in the literature on strategic voting, each agent’s optimal action depends
on the comparison of his expected payoffs in the event where he is pivotal.
Definition 6. Piv(v−i) denotes the event where agent i is pivotal, given his
strategy vi and the others’ strategies v−i.
Throughout this chapter we study the equilibria of the voting game with fully
rational agents, and the solution concept we use is Bayesian Nash equilibrium:
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Definition 7. A Bayesian Nash equilibrium of the game is a strategy profile v∗,
such that
E[ui|v∗i , P iv(v∗−i), σi, σE] ≥ E[ui|vi, P iv(v∗−i), σi, σE], i ∈ N, vi ∈ X×S, σi ∈ K, σE ∈ L.
(3.2.1)
The efficiency of the committee decision making with expert information is
measured in comparison to the efficiency under sincere voting in the absence of
expert information.
Definition 8. Suppose each of n agents receives a private signal only (with
accuracy p > 1/2) and votes according to the signal. The probability that the










Needless to say the Condorcet Jury Theorem states that PC(p, n) → 1 as
n→∞. In the absence of a public signal, individually informative voting is also
the most efficient Bayesian Nash equilibrium (Austen-Smith and Banks, 1996).
In what follows efficiency is measured in terms of the ex ante probability that the
majority decision matches the state given a strategy profile.
3.3 Equilibrium Predictions
In this section we study implications of the coexistence of private and public
signals on equilibrium voting behaviour. But let us first note that, as in most
models in the voting literature, our model also has uninformative equilibria where
all agents vote for one of the alternatives regardless of the signals and the outcome
is deterministic. This holds true because no individual agent can be pivotal if
the others are known to vote for the option and hence no agent influences the
outcome individually.
In what follows we consider equilibria in which voting behaviour and the
outcome depend on the signals the agents observe. Specifically, we focus on how
agents vote depending on whether both signals agree or disagree, i.e., vi(A,B) =
vi(B,A) and vi(A,A) = vi(B,B). That is, the labelling of the state is assumed
irrelevant in line with the feature that the prior is uniform and the payoffs depend
only on whether the decision matches the state, but not on which state was
matched or mismatched.
3.3.1 Symmetric strategies
Let us focus our attention to symmetric strategy equilibria first, where vi(A,A) =
vi(B,B) = α and vi(B,A) = vi(A,B) = β, for any i. Note that because of the
symmetry of the model with respect to A and B, we can consider the case of σE =
A and that of σE = B as two independent and essentially identical games, where
only the labelling of the signal and decision differs. We start by observing that the
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presence of expert information upsets the individually informative equilibrium,
where every agent votes according to his own signal only.
Proposition 1. Individually informative voting is not a Bayesian Nash equilib-
rium.
Proof. See Appendix.
The proposition has a straightforward intuition. Suppose that an agent is
pivotal and the private and public signals disagree. In that event, the posterior
of the agent is such that the votes of the other agents, who vote individually
informatively, are collectively uninformative, since there are equal numbers of
the votes for both A and B. Given this, the agent compares the two signals
and chooses to follow the public one as it has higher accuracy (q > p), but such
voting behaviour breaks the individually informative equilibrium in symmetric
strategies.
On the other hand, it is easy to see that there exists an equilibrium where
every agent votes according the public signal and ignores their own:
Proposition 2. Obedient voting is a Bayesian Nash equilibrium.
Proof. Consider agent i. If all the other agents vote according to the public signal,
he is indifferent to which alternative to vote for, and thus every agent adopting
obedient voting is an equilibrium.
The reasoning is similar to the one for the uninformative equilibria where all
agents vote for the same alternative regardless of the signals and the probability of
the majority decision matching the correct state is 1/2. However, in the obedient
equilibrium the outcome does reflect one of the signals and thus is not completely
uninformative. The equilibrium clearly outperforms the uninformative equilibria
since q > 1/2. The same line of reasoning also leads to the following remark:
Remark 1. There exists an equilibrium where every agent votes against the public
signal.
This equilibrium however seems implausible, since from 1 − q < 1/2 it is
outperformed even by the uninformative equilibria. In what follows we rule out
this equilibrium.
Later we show that there exists a mixed strategy equilibrium where both
private and public signals are taken into account, and study its properties. Before
deriving the equilibrium, it is useful to show that the mixed strategy equilibrium
takes a “hybrid” form, where mixing occurs only when the private and public
signals disagree.
Lemma 1. Suppose there exists a symmetric Bayesian Nash equilibrium in mixed
strategies. In such an equilibrium, any agent whose private signal coincides with
the public signal votes according to the signals with probability 1.
Proof. See Appendix.
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Lemma 1 is not surprising, because when both signals coincide they would
jointly be very informative about the actual state. The non-trivial part of the
lemma is that this intuition holds regardless of the mixing probability when the
signals disagree. Thanks to the lemma we can focus on mixing when the private
and public signals disagree.















In the equilibrium, the agents whose private signal coincides with the public signal
vote according to them with probability 1. The agents whose private signal dis-
agrees with the public signal vote according to their private signal with probability
β∗ =
1− A(p, q, n)
p− A(p, q, n)(1− p)












If q > q̄ there is no dually responsive equilibrium.
Proof. See Appendix.
Note that in order for the mixed strategy equilibrium to exist, the accuracy
of the public signal has to be lower than a threshold q̄(p, n). If this is the case,
there are two symmetric responsive equilibria of interest, namely i) the obedient
equilibrium where all agents follow the public signal; and ii) the dually responsive
equilibrium in which the agents take into account both private and public signals
by mixing. Meanwhile, if the public signal is sufficiently accurate relative to the
private signals, then the only responsive equilibrium is obedient.
Later we will show that q̄ is strictly larger than PC , the accuracy of majority
decision in the absence of a public signal (Definition 8). In other words, if the
accuracy of expert information is the same as what the agents can collectively
achieve without such information, then they still incorporate both their private
signals and the public signal into their decision through randomization.
The equilibrium mixing probability β∗ captures the weight the agents put on
the private signal relative to the public signal when the two signals disagree.
Corollary 1. ∂β∗/∂p > 0 and ∂β∗/∂q < 0. That is, the more informative the
private signal becomes relative to the public signal, the more weight the agents put
on the private signal in the mixing probability.
This indicates that the equilibrium behaviour fine-tunes the weights on the
two signals according to their accuracy. How does the mixing probability change
according to the committee size? Interestingly, as the committee size becomes
larger, the weight on the private signal also decreases, and becomes zero as n
tends to infinity:
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Corollary 2. ∂β∗/∂n > 0, and β∗ → 1 as n → ∞. That is, the equilibrium
probability β∗ of voting against the public signal when the two signals disagree is
increasing in the committee size n. As the committee size tends to infinity the du-
ally responsive equilibrium converges to the individually informative equilibrium,
where the public signal is ignored.
Corollary 2 can be interpreted intuitively as follows. Given the accuracies of
the private and public signals, as the committee size becomes larger, the collective
accuracy of private signals increases through the logic of CJT. This implies that
the “value-added” of the public signal relative to each private signal (q > p)
decreases.
Corollary 3. ∂q̄/∂n > 0. That is, as the committee size becomes larger, the
dually responsive equilibrium exists for a wider range of q.
This corollary has a similar intuition to that of Corollary 2. Since the collective
accuracy of private signals increases as n becomes large, in order for the agents
to disregard completely, the public signal has to be much more accurate.
So far we have observed the properties of voting behaviour in the dually
responsive equilibrium identified in Proposition 3.
Let us consider the efficiency of the dually responsive equilibrium in relation
to that of the obedient equilibrium. This is a non-trivial question to ask, not least
because the public signal introduces a type of “correlation” to the information
the agents receives, and it is known that correlation of private signals leads to less
efficiency. As the following proposition states, however, in the dually responsive
equilibrium the agents optimally take into account the public signal through
mixing. That is, if a welfare maximizing social planner were to choose α and β
to maximize the probability that the majority decision matches the true state,
which we denote by P (α, β), then they coincide with the equilibrium α∗ and β∗.
Proposition 4. The dually responsive equilibrium in Proposition 3 maximizes
the efficiency of the majority decisions with respect to α and β.
Proof. See Appendix.
A direct implication of Proposition 4 is that providing the committee with
expert information is beneficial as long as the committee members play the sym-
metric mixed strategy equilibrium:
Corollary 4. The mixed strategy equilibrium identified in Proposition 3 outper-
forms individually informative voting and obedient voting.
The corollary holds because individually informative voting is equivalent to
α = β = 1 and obedient voting α = β = 0, and Proposition 4 has just shown that
the mixed strategy equilibrium (α∗ = 1 and β∗ ∈ (0, 1)) is optimal with respect
to the choice of α and β.
Recall that the mixed strategy equilibrium does not exist when the accuracy
of expert information q is above the threshold q̄. In light of Proposition 4, this
means that when q is very high it is not worthwhile to combine both types of
information to maximize P (α, β). The following remark gives us some indication
about the threshold.
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Remark 2. q̄ > PC , that is, the upper bound of the accuracy of expert information
for the mixed strategy equilibrium to exist is higher than the accuracy of sincere
voting without expert information.
Proof. Let β∗(·) be the equilibrium/optimal β as a function of q, and let qC ≡ PC .
By construction we have β∗(q̄) = 0 and β∗(qC) ≥ 0. In fact we have β∗(qC) > 0.
To see this, note β∗(qC) = 0 implies PH(qC) = qC , which is a contradiction since
i) qC > p; ii) from (3.C.5) if q = p then β
∗ = 0 and thus PH(p) = qC ; and iii) by
differentiating (3.D.1) with respect to q we see that PH(q) is strictly increasing.
From (3.C.4) we can check that β∗(q) is strictly decreasing in q. Thus β∗(qC) >
β∗(q̄) = 0 implies q̄ > qC = PC .
In view of Proposition 4, the remark implies that for private signals to be opti-
mally disregarded for efficiency maximization, the public signal has to be strictly
better than the efficiency the private signals can achieve collectively through ma-
jority voting.
3.3.2 Asymmetric strategies
So far we have focused on symmetric strategies and derived a unique dually-
responsive equilibrium as well as the obedient equilibrium. In this subsection we
examine equilibria in asymmetric strategies. As allowing asymmetric strategies
leads to a vast number of possible configurations of equilibria, we focus on i)
asymmetric strategy equilibria where the majority decision is the same as that in
the symmetric obedient equilibrium and ii) asymmetric pure strategy equilibrium
that is unique in a natural set of pure strategy profiles and is optimal in the set
of all strategy profiles. As in the previous subsection, we rule out non-responsive
equilibria where the majority decision is independent of the signals6.
Obedient outcome
The first type of equilibria are a straightforward extension of the obedient equi-
librium in symmetric strategies (Proposition 2) and take the following “hybrid”
form:7
Proposition 5. For n ≥ 5 there exist equilibria where (n+1)/2+1 or more agents
(a supermajority) vote according to the public signal and each of the rest uses an
arbitrary strategy. The decision is obedient: the committee decision coincides with
the public signal with probability 1.
Proof. This directly follows from the feature that, if a supermajority always vote
according to the public signal, no agent is pivotal. We have n ≥ 5 because if
n = 3 then (n+ 1)/2 + 1 members following the public signal corresponds to the
symmetric obedient strategy.
6For a detailed mathematical derivation of the equilibira of this part, as well as the derivation
of the upper bound of expert information accuracy for existance of these equilibria, see Appendix
7By the same token there are equilibria where (n+ 1)/2 + 1 agents vote against the public
signal, but we rule them out as they are outperformed by even by the uninformative equilibrium.
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Note that it is not sufficient for the equilibria to have (n+1)/2 agents following
the public signal, because if it is the case any agent will be pivotal with positive
probability. Clearly Proposition 5 includes a class of payoff equivalent equilibria
in which some agents use pure strategies and the the others randomize:
Definition 9. A hybrid obedient equilibrium is an equilibrium where n ≥ 5 and
(n+ 1)/2 + 1 or more agents (i.e. a supermajority) follow the public signal with
probability 1 and at least one of the rest randomizes arbitrarily.
While the majority decision in the equilibrium is trivial and identical to the
symmetric obedient equilibrium, the hybrid obedient equilibrium will be of sig-
nificant interest when interpreting the experimental results, as we will discuss
later.
Asymmetric pure strategies
Let us now consider asymmetric pure strategies for which the committee decision
is affected by private signals. Let Γ be the set of all (pure, mixed and hybrid)
strategy profiles. Since from Proposition 1 we know that individually informative
voting is not an equilibrium, we need to consider asymmetric strategies to study
responsive equilibrium in pure strategies. In what follows we focus on the strategy
profiles such that the agents vote according to either the public or private signal
with probability 1.
Definition 10. M ⊂ Γ is the set of asymmetric pure strategy strategy profiles in
which m ∈ {1, 2, ..., n− 1} “obedient” agents vote according to the public signal
with probability 1, and n −m “individually informative” agents vote according
to their private signal with probability 1.
In this set of pure strategy profiles, if any agent’s private signal and his public
signal agree, then he votes according to the signals. The two groups (obedient
and individually informative) vote differently when the signals disagree: in such
cases the m “obedient” agents vote according to the public signal, while n −m
“individually informative” agents vote against the public signal. In what follows
we establish the existence of a non-obedient equilibrium in M and its optimality
in Γ. Before describing the equilibrium, it is useful to define the subset of M in
which the committee decision is not obedient.
Definition 11. M̂ ⊂M is the set of pure strategy profiles wherem ∈ {1, 2, ..., (n+
1)/2− 1}.
The following proposition states that, unless the accuracy of the public signal
q is too high relative to the accuracy of each private signal p, there is a unique
equilibrium in M̂ .
Proposition 6. Let






















then m = m∗ is the unique Bayesian Nash equilibrium in the set of strategy profiles
M̂ . If m∗ ≥ (n+ 1)/2, then any m ≥ (n+ 1)/2 in M leads to an equilibrium that
is payoff equivalent to the obedient equilibrium.
Proof. See Appendix.
It remains to examine the efficiency of the asymmetric pure equilibrium in
M̂ . In what follows first we show that if m∗ < (n + 1)/2 then it maximizes the
efficiency with respect to the entire pure strategy profiles Γ. In other words, if a
social planner is to choose m when q is not too large relative to p, then she will
choose m∗. We will then show that the equilibrium outperforms the symmetric
mixed strategy equilibrium identified in Proposition 3.
Proposition 7. If m∗ < (n + 1)/2, then m∗ uniquely maximizes the expected
welfare in Γ.
Proof. See Appendix.
The following corollary is a direct consequence of Proposition 7.
Corollary 5. The asymmetric pure strategy equilibrium with m∗ outperforms the
sincere voting equilibrium in the absence of public information.
The intuition is simple: suppose that only one agent always follows the public
signal and the rest always follow the private signal. The efficiency under this
strategy profile is higher than the efficiency under sincere voting without public
information because one agent following the public signal is equivalent to this
agent having a better signal since q > p. Therefore having optimal/equilibrium
m∗ guarantees that the welfare is higher in the asymmetric pure equilibrium with
public information.
Also Proposition 7 implies the following ranking of multiple equilibria.
Remark 3. The efficiency of equilibria in the voting game with expert information,
when they exist, is ranked as follows:
non-obedient asymmetric pure eqm  symmetric mixed eqm  obedient eqm.
(3.3.1)
The ranking (3.3.1) holds even if q becomes very close to the upper bound in
Proposition 6 from below, because the expected welfare of the asymmetric pure
strategy equilibrium does not converge to that of the obedient equilibrium due to
the discreteness of the number of agents who follow the public (or private) signal.
Figure 3.3.1 provides some comparative statics for the efficiency difference of
the equilibria. It presents the majoritarian outcome accuracy difference between
the symmetric mixed equilibrium and the non-obedient asymmetric pure equi-
librium for an increasing difference in accuracy between expert and individual
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Figure 3.3.1: Difference in majoritarian outcome accuracy between sym-
metric mixed equilibrium and non-obedient asymmetric pure equilib-
rium for an increasing number of voters, p = 0.6 and q ∈
{0.7(blue), 0.75(red), 0.8(yellow), 0.9(green)}.
information (p = 0.6 and q ∈ {0.7, 0.75, 0.8, 0.9}) and an increasing number of
voters. Note that the difference is increasing in the accuracy difference and, as
expected, converges to zero when the size of the committee increases due to the
CJT .
We have also seen that the sincere voting equilibrium in the absence of public
information can be better or worse than the obedient equilibrium, while it is
always less efficient than the symmetric mixed strategy equilibrium (and hence
the non-obedient asymmetric pure strategy equilibrium).8
3.3.3 Quantal Response Equilibria
In the literature on voting experiments, it is customary to use the concept of a
quantal response equilibrium (QRE; McKelvey and Palfrey, 1995). QRE essen-
tially modifies the concept of Nash equilibrium to incorporate realistic limitations
of rational choice model games. In this “statistical perturbation” of the concept
of Nash equilibrium, players have rational expectations and choose responses with
higher expected payoffs with higher probability. As discussed in the introduction
of the present thesis, the concept of QRE has been widely used to analyse game
theoretic data, both field and laboratory, and its predictive power is persistently
strong.
In the context of this model, the parameter λ of the following subsections
captures the idea of “noise”. Note that as λ converges to infinity, we get the sym-
8Let us comment on the upper bound on q for which the symmetric pure strategy equilibrium
in Proposition 3 and the responsive asymmetric pure strategy equilibrium in Proposition 6 exist.
It is easy to check that whether one or both of them exist simultaneously depends on p and n.
Clearly both equilibria exist unless q is too high, but when q is very high, it may be that the
symmetric mixed strategy equilibrium exists and the asymmetric pure strategy does not exist
(, which is the case when both p and n are high) and vice versa.
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metric mixed equilibrium of the game. However, when λ tends to zero, due to the
increase “noise” they are facing, players simply randomise between following their
signal and the expert signal with probability 1/2. We begin the next subsection
by a theoretical simplification: we assume that if their signal coincides with that
of the expert, agents “always” follow the common signal (α = 1). Afterwards,
we relax this assumption(α ∈ (0, 1)). Also, note that throughout the following
section we assume symmetry in agents’ strategies.
Case α = 1
Lets assume that agents always follow the common signal, if the their private
signal coincides with the expert signal. Also, as before we assume that there
is no a priori bias with respect to one of the agenda’s. In other words, an
agents will mix the same way if she has received A and the expert signal is
B as she would if she had received a B and the expert signal was A. Therefore,
α = vi(A,A) = vi(B,B) = 1 and β = vi(B,A) = vi(A,B) for i ∈ {2, 3, ..n}.
Conditional on the state s = A and σE = A, the ex ante probability of each agent
i ∈ {2, 3, ..n} voting for A is rA ≡ p + (1 − p)(1 − β). Also, conditional on the
state s = A and σE = B, the probability of each agent i ∈ {2, 3, ..n} voting for
A is rB ≡ pβ.
Using rA and rB, if agent i = 1 would follow the same mixed strategy, the ex-
pected utility for agent i will be the ex ante probability P (α, β) that the majority
decision matches the state. This can be written as
































First, we calculate the utility choice agent i = 1 faces if all other agents mix
with probability β. If all agents follow the mixed strategy described above and
agent i = 1 follows an obedient strategy when disagreeing with expert information
(OBSD), expected utility is given by:
E[u1(OBSD, β)] =
q(1− p)
q(1− p) + p(1− q)





q(1− p) + p(1− q)
B(n− 1, n+ 1
2
, rB).
If all agents follow the mixed strategy described above and agent i = 1 follows
an individually informative strategy when disagreeing with expert information
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Agent i' s QRE best response Β
Figure 3.3.2: QRE for 1
λ
∈ {0.1(lightblue), 2(red), 5(yellow), 10(green), 25(darkblue), 235(purple)}
and α = 1.
(IISD), expected utility is given by:
E[u1(IISD, β)] =
q(1− p)
q(1− p) + p(1− q)





q(1− p) + p(1− q)
B(n− 1, n+ 1
2
− 1, rB).




exp (λE[u1(IISD, β)]) + exp (λE[u1(OBDD, β)])
.
In Figure 3.3.2 the reader can find a plot of the QRE of the game for q = 0.7,
p = 0.65 and α = 1 for 1
λ
∈ {0.1, 2, 5, 10, 25, 235}. Note that as discussed before,
when λ→ 0, β → 1/2 and when λ→∞, β → β∗.
General case, α ∈ (0, 1)
Now we present the general case, still assuming no a priori bias to agenda’s A and
B: Let α = vi(A,A) = vi(B,B) and β = vi(B,A) = vi(A,B) for i ∈ {2, 3, ..n}.
Conditional on the state s = A and σE = A, the ex ante probability of each agent
i ∈ {2, 3, ..n} voting for A is rA ≡ pα + (1− p)(1− β). Also, conditional on the
state s = A and σE = B, the probability of each agent i ∈ {2, 3, ..n} voting for A
is rB ≡ pβ+(1−p)(1−α). If all agents follow the mixed strategy described above
and agent i = 1 votes for common signal when agreeing with expert information
(FCSA), expected utility is given by:
E[u1(FCSA, α, β)] =
pq
pq + (1− p)(1− q)





pq + (1− p)(1− q)




If all agents follow the mixed strategy described above and agent i = 1 votes
against common signal when disagreeing with expert information (ACSA), ex-
pected utility is given by:
E[u1(ACSA, α, β)] =
pq
pq + (1− p)(1− q)





pq + (1− p)(1− q)
B(n− 1, n+ 1
2
− 1, rB).
As before, if all agents follow the mixed strategy described above and agent
i = 1 follows an obedient strategy when disagreeing with expert information
(OBSD), expected utility is given by:
E[u1(OBSD,α, β)] =
q(1− p)
q(1− p) + p(1− q)




q(1− p) + p(1− q)
B(n− 1, n+ 1
2
, rB).
If all agents follow the mixed strategy described above and agent i = 1 follows
an individually informative strategy when disagreeing with expert information
(IISD), expected utility is given by:
E[u1(IISD, α, β)] =
q(1− p)
q(1− p) + p(1− q)





q(1− p) + p(1− q)
B(n− 1, n+ 1
2
− 1, rB).
Therefore, for a symmetric Quantal Response Equilibrium, α and β should
be such that:
α =
exp (λE[u1(FCSA, α, β)])
exp (λE[u1(ACSA, α, β)]) + exp (λE[u1(FCSA, α, β)])
,
β =
exp (λE[u1(IISD, α, β)])
exp (λE[u1(IISD, α, β)]) + exp (λE[u1(OBDD,α, β)])
.
3.4 Equilibrium Selection
In the previous sections of this chapter, we attempted to map all symmetric
mixed and asymmetric pure equilibria of a majority game of common values with
expert and private information. The multiplicity of equilibria of the game direct
us to use filtering techniques and rule out, at least theoretically, some of the
aforementioned equilibria. Of course, these so called theoretical refinements do
not ensure that the rejected equilibria will not be played in reality.
In this section, we will use two such refinements:
• The first is the elimination of weakly dominated strategies, which is a natural
refinement in the voting literature (Wit (1998)). Under this refinement all
strategies, which produce inferior outcomes for an agent facing any strategy
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profile from the rest of the agents, can be eliminated as unlikely to be chosen
by agents.
• The second is the notion of a perfect equilibrium (Selten (1975)) that essen-
tially filters away all equilibria that do not persist if agents were to make
a small mistake in making their choice or use choose a strategy with a
trembling hand.
3.4.1 Elimination of Weakly Dominated Strategies
It is straightforward to see that this refinement does not consistently filter away
any of the aforementioned equilibria of the game.
Consider the case when the symmetric mixed equilibrium of the game exists.
The monotonicity of the probability to recover the correct state with contradicting
signals P (A,B) with respect to β given Equation 3.D.5 suggests that if all other
agents choose a symmetric mixed strategy with β > β∗, then it is optimal for
an agent to vote what expert information suggests. On the other hand, if all
other agents choose to mix with β < β∗, then it is optimal for an agent to vote
according to her private information. Therefore, neither of the strategies is weakly
dominated, and any of these equilibrium strategies survive the refinement.
This result holds for the pure obedient equilibrium of the game using the same
reasoning. Since q > p and having in mind the case where β > β∗, voting for the
expert signal is not dominated.9
Note that using the same continuity argument as in Wit (1998), we can assume
that if agents were to play a symmetric strategy equilibrium, then it would be
reasonable for the mixed equilibrium to be played where it exists (q ≤ q̄) and
otherwise the obedient equilibrium is the only other candidate (q > q̄).
As far the asymmetric equilibria of the game are concerned, the intuition
is identical if instead of β∗ we use m∗. Indeed, if m > m∗, then any of the
agents following expert information would prefer to vote for their private signal,
whereas if m < m∗ they would prefer to vote according to the expert signal.
Finally, similarly to the obedient case and having in mind the fact that none of
the strategies there is weakly dominated, the hybrid obedient equilibrium of the
game survives the refinement through the exact same process.
3.4.2 Trembling Hand
Unlike the previous refinement, the trembling hand eliminates but only the obe-
dient and the hybrid obedient equilibrium.
First of all, consider the obedient equilibrium and assume that all agents will
make a “mistake” and vote for their private signal with probability ε > 0. That
entails that the probability of being pivotal is now positive, however small ε is.
Since ε < β∗, we know by Proposition 4 that agents in this case will have an
9In the case where q1−q > (
p
1−p )
n and similarly to Wit (1998), when the expert signal is
sufficiently strong to outweigh all private signals, then the equilibrium where all agents vote
contrary to the expert signal does not survive. However, when the expert signal is not sufficiently
strong to outweigh all private signals, or q1−q ≤ (
p
1−p )
n, then this equilibrium survives as well.
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incentive to deviate and vote according to their private signal in order to improve
the aggregate accuracy. Therefore the obedient equilibrium does not survive the
tremble. With a similar argument, the hybrid obedient equilibrium does not
survive the trembling hand refinement as well. Given that the supermajority of
obedient voters have a small but positive probability of voting informatively, then
the members of the minority are not indifferent any more and will prefer not to
randomize.
Secondly, the fact that the symmetric mixed equilibrium and the asymmetric
pure equilibrium are robust with respect to trembles is a direct consequence of
Theorem 3 by McLennan (1998). The intuition behind this result for a symmetric
tremble around β∗ is straightforward again due to the monotonicity of P (A,B)
with respect to β given Equation 3.D.5. In other words, any tremble around β∗,
as long as it is symmetric and small, will not ultimately alter the indifference
condition of the equilibrium. The same result holds for the asymmetric pure








This chapter has studied the effects of a public signal on voting behaviour in com-
mittees of common interest. We have demonstrated that the presence of publicly
observed expert information changes the structure of voting equilibria substan-
tially. In particular, individually informative voting is no longer an equilibrium
when the precision of the public signal is better than each agent’s individual
signal, as in expert opinions presented to the entire committee. If the expert
information is not too accurate, there are three informative equilibria of interest,
namely i) the symmetric mixed strategy equilibrium where each member random-
izes between following the private and public signals should they disagree; ii) the
asymmetric pure strategy equilibrium where a certain number of members always
follow the public signals while the others always follow the private signal; and
iii) a class of equilibria where the committee’s majority decision always follows
the expert information. When the expert information is not too accurate, i) and
ii) are more efficient but iii) can be less efficient than the sincere voting equilib-
rium without expert information. If the expert information is very accurate, then
the only informative equilibrium involves obedient voting, whereby every agent
follows expert information, and this equilibrium is indeed efficient.
To conclude this chapter, let us comment on the way committee members
listen to expert opinions. So far we have assumed that every member hears
expert information before voting, but alternatively an expert could speak to only
selected members of a committee, or a member might privately consult with an
expert for more accurate information. Note that if m∗ members of the committee
listen to expert information, then there is an equilibrium equivalent to the most
efficient equilibrium in Proposition 6, where m∗ members follow the expert signal
and n − m∗ members follow the private signal. While this selective disclosure
does not change the maximum equilibrium efficiency, it eliminates the inefficient
obedient equilibrium since not enough members observe the public signal for the
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obedient outcome. This is a theoretically trivial point: needless to say, if the
agents can coordinate to play the efficient equilibrium, whether all members or
only m∗ of them listen to the expert is irrelevant. However, given that in reality
expert opinions/testimonies are very often heard by all members of a decision
making body, it would be of practical interest to ask whether this may or may




3.A Proof of Proposition 1
Proof. Consider agent i’s strategy in the putative equilibrium where all the other
agents adopt the individually informative strategy. He computes the difference in
the expected payoff between voting for A and B, conditional on his private and
public signals, in the event where he is pivotal. The payoff difference is given by




Pr[σE|s = A]Pr[σi|s = A]Pr[Piv(v−i)|s = A]
− 1
2
Pr[σE|s = B]Pr[σi|s = B]Pr[Piv(v−i)|s = B], (3.A.1)
where the equality follows from the independence of the signals in individually
informative voting. Without loss of generality, let us assume σi = B and σE = A.

















































The inequality holds since q > p. This implies that agent i votes for A despite
her private signal B. Thus individually informative voting is not a Bayesian Nash
equilibrium.
3.B Proof of Lemma 1
Proof. First, note that because of the symmetry of the model with respect to A
and B, we can consider the case of σE = A that of σE = B as two independent
and essentially identical games, where only the labelling of the signal and decision
differs. Thus we let vi(A,A) = vi(B,B) = α and vi(B,A) = vi(A,B) = β.
Without loss of generality, let us assume σE = A to prove the lemma.
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[q(1− p)F (A)− (1− q)pF (B)] . (3.B.4)
Note that (3.B.3) and (3.B.4) incorporate each agent’s Bayesian updating on the
state and the private signals other agents may have received, conditional on his
own signal and the public signal.
In order to have fully mixing equilibrium, namely α∗ ∈ (0, 1) and β∗ ∈ (0, 1),
we must have w(A,A) = 0 and w(B,A) = 0 simultaneously for indifference.
In what follows, we show that w(A,A) > 0 for any α and β, which implies in
equilibrium we must have α∗ = 1 and if mixing occurs it must be only for β,
that is, when the private and public signals disagree. Specifically, we show that
F (A) > F (B), which readily implies w(A,A) > 0 from (3.B.3).














⇔ β(1− β) > α(1− α)
⇔ (α + β − 1)(α− β) > 0. (3.B.5)
To see that (3.B.5) holds we will show that in equilibrium α∗ + β∗ − 1 > 0 and
α∗ − β∗ > 0.
Let us first observe that α∗ + β∗ − 1 > 0. The difference in the difference in
payoffs between voting for A and B is given by





F (B) > 0, (3.B.6)
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since both terms in the right hand side are positive since p, q > 1/2. Thus, given
σE = A, the equilibrium probability of voting for A when σi = A must be strictly
greater than that of voting for A when σi = B, which implies
10
α∗ + β∗ − 1 > 0. (3.B.7)
Second, let us show that α∗ > β∗. We assume instead that α∗ ≤ β∗ in
equilibrium and derives a contradiction. There is no hybrid equilibrium such that
α∗ ∈ (0, 1) and β∗ = 1, because from (3.B.5) and (3.B.7), α∗ ≤ β∗ implies F (A) ≤
F (B) and we may have a fully mixed equilibrium, in which case w(A,A) =
w(B,A) = 0. From (3.B.3) we have













We can see that (3.B.8) and (3.B.9) hold simultaneously if and only if p = 1/2,
which is a contradiction, since p ∈ (1/2, 1]. Thus we conclude that α∗ > β∗ in
any mixed strategy equilibrium equilibrium.
Combining α∗ > β∗ and (3.B.7), we can see that (3.B.5) holds. Thus we have
F (A)−F (B) > 0 and w(A,A) > 0, which implies any mixed strategy equilibrium
has to have a hybrid form, such that α∗ = 1.
3.C Proof of Proposition 3
Proof. From Lemma 1 any mixed strategy equilibrium involves vi(A,A) = vi(B,B) =
1 and vi(A,B) = vi(B,A) = β ∈ (0, 1) for any i ∈ N .
When the state and the public signal match, the probability of each individual
voting correctly for the state is given by
rA ≡ p+ (1− p)(1− β), (3.C.1)
and when the state and the public signal disagree, the probability of each indi-
vidual voting correctly is
rB ≡ (1− p)× 0 + pβ = pβ. (3.C.2)
To have β∗ ∈ (0, 1), we need any agent to be indifference when the two signals
10See Lemma 1 in Wit (1998) for a similar argument.
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disagree:






































⇒ β∗ = 1− A(p, q, n)
p− A(p, q, n)(1− p)
, (3.C.5)











. Thus when β∗ ∈ (0, 1) we obtain a
mixed strategy equilibrium of the hybrid form (α∗ = 1).









. The uniqueness follows from the fact that the left hand side of
(3.C.4) is strictly decreasing in β.
3.D Proof of Proposition 4
Proof. In what follows we will find α = vi(A,A) = vi(B,B) and β = vi(B,A) =
vi(A,B) that maximize the probability of the majority outcome matching the
correct state. Conditional on the state s = A and σE = A, let the ex ante
probability of each agent voting for A be, from (3.C.1), rA ≡ pα+ (1− p)(1−β).
Also from (3.C.2), conditional on the state s = A and σE = B, let the probability
of each agent voting for A be rB ≡ pβ + (1 − p)(1 − α). Using rA and rB, the
ex ante probability P (α, β) that the majority decision matches the state can be
written as
P (α, β) =Pr[M = s|s] = Pr[M = A|s = A]P [A] + Pr[M = B|s = B]P [B]
=Pr[M = A|s = A]1
2
+ Pr[M = B|s = B]1
2
= Pr[M = A|s = A]
=Pr[σE = A|s = A]Pr[M = A, σE = A|s = A]

































































































If (3.D.4) holds, then the derivative with respect to α, (3.D.2), is strictly positive
















⇔ p > 1
2
.
Therefore we have a unique corner solution for α, namely α = 1, which coincides
with the equilibrium α∗ in the hybrid mixed strategy identified in Proposition 3.
Note that the first order condition (3.D.3) and the indifference condition for the
mixed strategy equilibrium (3.C.3) also coincide. Thus β = β∗ satisfies the first
order condition.
It remains to show that the second order condition for the maximization with
respect to β is satisfied. Since P (α,β) is a polynomial it suffices to show that
∂2P (α, β)
∂β2

















2 (p− 2βp2). (3.D.5)
At β = β∗, (3.D.5) reduces to
(1− pβ)(1− 2(1− p)β) > (1− 2pβ)(1− (1− p)β),
which holds since p > 1
2
. Since P (α, β) is a continuously differentiable function
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on a closed interval, the local maximum at {α, β} = {1, β∗} is also the global
maximum.
3.E Proof of Proposition 6
Proof. Let us consider first the m obedient agents, assuming the rest always vote
according to the private signal. In order for them to ignore their private signal
when the two signals disagree, we have to have wobedient(B,A) ≥ 0 for those
agents. If such an agent is pivotal given the strategy profile, among the n −m
individually informative agents, (n−1)/2 of them must have received the private
signal that disagrees with the public signal, while (n−1)/2−(m−1) of them must
have received the private signal that agrees with the public signal. Therefore, for
the obedient agent not to deviate when the two signals he has received disagree,
it has to be that
























⇒ q(1− p)p−(m−1) ≥ (1− q)p(1− p)−(m−1)
⇒ m ≤ ln[q]− ln[1− q]
ln[p]− ln[1− p]
. (3.E.1)
In other words, in order for the obedient agent not to deviate, the number of
obedient agents cannot be too large. Given (3.E.1), if the public and private

















































= wobedient(B,A) ≥ 0.
The strict inequality follows from wobedient(B,A) ≥ 0 and p > 1/2.
Next, let us consider the n − m individually informative agents who always
follow their private signal regardless of the public signal. If an agent in this group
is pivotal, it has to be that (n − 1)/2 of them have received the private signal
that disagrees with the public signal, while (n− 1)/2−m of them have received
the private signal that agrees with the public signal. Therefore, in order for the
individually informative agent not to deviate when the two signals he has received
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disagree, it has to be that
























⇒ q(1− p)p−m < (1− q)p(1− p)−m
⇒ m > ln[q]− ln[1− q]
ln[p]− ln[1− p]
− 1. (3.E.2)
In other words, in order for the individually informative agent not to deviate, the
number of obedient agents cannot be too small. Given (3.E.2), if the public and
private signals agree, the agent indeed votes according to the signals because
















































= wind. informative(B,A) < 0.
The strict inequality follows from wind. informative(B,A) ≥ 0 and p > 1/2.
In equilibrium both (3.E.1) and (3.E.2) have to be satisfied, which gives the
unique m∗ in M̂ as long as m∗ < (n+ 1)/2. If m∗ = (n+ 1)/2 then the majority
decision always coincides with the public signal, and hence any m ≥ (n + 1)/2
in M is an equilibrium. Suppose m∗ > (n + 1)/2. In this case m = (n + 1)/2
is also an equilibrium since none of the “individually informative” agents are
pivotal and no “obedient” agent deviates as (3.E.1) is satisfied, which implies
any m ≥ (n+ 1)/2 in M is an equilibrium.
3.F Proof of Proposition 7
Proof. Nitzan and Paroush (1982) gave the optimal weighted majority rule with
i) non-strategic sincere voting; ii) agents each of whom observes a private signal
with different accuracy; and iii) no public signal. Let us consider the special case
of their setup where the signal of one “expert” agent has the accuracy of q and
those of n − 1 “non-expert” agents have the same accuracy of p ∈ (0, 1), where
q > p. In what follows we show that the optimal rule in their model and the
asymmetric pure strategy equilibrium in M̂ are isomorphic in terms of efficiency.
Theorem 1 in Nitzan and Paroush (1982) implies that, in the unique optimal
majority rule, the expert has ln[q]− ln[1− q] votes, while each non-expert agent
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has ln[p]− ln[1−p] votes.11 Equivalently, dividing the weights by ln[p]− ln[1−p],
the expert should have ln[q]−ln[1−q]
ln[p]−ln[1−p] votes if every non-expert is to have one vote.
Moreover, under this optimal rule, removing the votes of m̄ randomly chosen
non-experts ex ante does not affect the ex ante expected welfare, where m̄ is
defined as the largest integer that satisfies m ≤ ln[q]−ln[1−q]
ln[p]−ln[1−p] (Corollary 1 in Nitzan
and Paroush, 1982). This is because the ex ante influence of their votes on
the expected welfare is cancelled by the increased votes of the expert. It is
straightforward to see that the same efficiency is implemented by the majority
rule where ex ante the expert has m̄ votes, each of n − m̄ non-experts has one
vote, and m̄ non-experts have no vote. Clearly we have m̄ = m∗. Therefore m∗
uniquely maximizes the expected welfare in M .
Moreover, m∗ inM the unique maximizer of welfare in the set of entire strategy
profiles Γ. Note that Nitzan and Paroush (1982) allow p < 1/2 with sincere
voting, which is equivalent to allowing agents to vote against their signal in our
setting where p > 1/2. Also, uninformative voting by any agent clearly reduces
efficiency relative to the optimal weights and thus cannot be part of the optimal
rule. For any mixed strategy profiles, suppose that, without loss of generality,
before observing the two signals, each agent individually decides which alternative
to vote for, conditional on each combination of the two signals, according to his
mixing probability. After these “interim decisions” but before the agents receive
the signals, we can compute the expected welfare for each combination of their
“interim decisions”. The profiles of their “interim decisions” and their expected
welfare coincide with those of the optimal rule only with probability less than 1.
Hence the asymmetric pure strategy equilibrium with m∗ achieves the highest ex
ante expected welfare over the set of all strategy profiles Γ.
3.G Deriving the asymmetric pure equilibrium
Any agent, in equilibrium, will consider the difference in expected utility between
voting for A and B, conditional on her signal, the expert’s signal and the event
that she is pivotal. We define this difference as:




P [σE|s = A]P [σi|s = A]P [piv(v−i)|s = A]
− 1
2
P [σE|s = B]P [σi|s = B]P [piv(v−i)|s = B] (3.G.2)
3.G.1 Obedient Voters
Let us consider first the agents that follow the expert opinion, regardless of their
individual signal. Following (2), they would follow the expert’s opinion, even
when their individual signal suggests otherwise, if w(B,A) ≥ 0. These agents
11Here we allow non-integer votes and the majority decision is the alternative that received
more votes.
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are going to be pivotal when, excluding the rest m− 1 agents that always follow
the expert, n−1
2
agents vote in disagreement with the expert while n−1
2
− (m− 1)
agents vote in agreement with the expert. Therefore, from (2) we have that:
























⇒ q(1− p)p−(m−1) ≥ (1− q)p(1− p)−(m−1)
⇒ m ≤ ln (q)− ln (1− q)
ln (p)− ln (1− p)
.

















































= w(B,A) ≥ 0.
3.G.2 Informative Voters
On the other hand, for the n−m agents that vote informatively, it must be the
case that w(B,A) < 0. These agents are going to be pivotal when, excluding the
rest m agents that always follow the expert, n−1
2
agents vote in disagreement with
the expert while n−1
2
−m agents vote in agreement with the expert. Therefore,
from (2) we have that:
























⇒ q(1− p)p−m < (1− q)p(1− p)−m
⇒ m > ln (q)− ln (1− q)
ln (p)− ln (1− p)
− 1.
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Finally, note that for agents agreeing with the expert, it is the case that:
















































= w(B,A) < 0.
Therefore, for n−1
2
> max (m,m− 1) = m, there exists a unique asymmet-
ric equilibrium, where m∗ agents follow expert information, and the rest vote
according to their individual signal, where
m∗ ∈ N ∩
(
ln (q)− ln (1− q)
ln (p)− ln (1− p)
− 1, ln (q)− ln (1− q)
ln (p)− ln (1− p)
]
. (3.G.3)
3.G.3 Upper bound on q




ln (q)− ln (1− q)
ln (p)− ln (1− p)
− 1,
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Also note that, similarly to the symmetric mixed equilibrium, for the upper














and it is increasing in n.
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Finally note that, relative to the upper bound for the mixed strategy equilib-
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Expert Information and Majority
Decisions: Experiment1
“Dont tell people how to do things, tell them what to do and let them surprise you
with their results.” (George S. Patton)
4.1 Introduction
Motivated by the theoretical results of the previous chapter, i.e. the possibility
that expert information can enhance or diminish the efficiency of equilibrium
committee decisions, we conducted a laboratory experiment to study the effect
of expert information on voting behaviour and majority decisions. Of particular
interest is to see whether voters can play an efficient equilibrium, not least because
the efficient equilibria seem to require sophisticated coordination among voters.
Specifically, we set the accuracies of the signals in such a way that the expert
signal is more accurate than each voter’s private signal but less accurate than
what the aggregation of the private signals can achieve by sincere voting without
the expert signal. Such parameter values seem plausible in that the expert opinion
should be taken into account but should not be decisive on its own. At the same
time, they entail the possibility that expert information may indeed be welfare
reducing because if more than a half of the voters follow the expert obediently.
This chapter reports the results from the experiment. We found that the vot-
ers followed the expert signal much more than they should in the efficient equilib-
ria. Strikingly, the majority decisions followed the expert signal most of the time,
which is consistent with the class of obedient equilibria mentioned above. An-
other interesting finding is the marked heterogeneity in voting behaviour. While
there were voters who consistently followed their private signal and ignored the
public signal, a significant portion of voters followed the expert signal most of
the time. We will argue that the voters’ behaviour in our data can be best de-
scribed as that in an obedient equilibrium where a supermajority (and hence the
decision) always follow the expert signal so that no voter is pivotal.
1This chapter was based on results from the 2013 working paper “Expert Information and
Majority Decisions”, co-authored by Dr. Kohei Kawamura.
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Even if the committees in the laboratory followed expert information most
of the time, this does not necessarily imply that introducing expert information
is harmful, because the voters may not play the (efficiency maximizing) equi-
librium strategy of sincere voting in the absence of expert information. Along
with the treatments with both private and expert information, we also ran con-
trol treatments where the voters received a private signal only, in order to com-
pare the observed efficiency of the committee decisions with and without expert
information. We found that for seven-person committees the difference in the
efficiency between the treatment and the control is insignificant, largely due to
non-equilibrium behaviour (i.e., voting against private information) in the control
treatment which reduced the benchmark efficiency. However, for fifteen-person
committees, those without expert information performed much better than those
with expert information and the difference is significant, suggesting that expert
information may indeed be harmful. This result comes from the relatively high
efficiency achieved by the fifteen-person committees without expert information,
although they also exhibited some non-equilibrium behaviour.
Our theoretical and experimental results suggest that, from the viewpoint
of a social planner who decides whether to and how to provide a committee
with expert information, creating an equilibrium with higher efficiency does not
necessarily mean it is selected among other equilibria, and in particular there
is a possibility that provision of public information may lead to an inefficient
equilibrium being played.2 This concern seems particularly relevant when an
inefficient equilibrium is simple and intuitive to play, like the obedient equilibrium
in our model, while the efficient equilibrium requires subtle coordination. A
natural solution to this problem would be to rule out inefficient equilibria, if
possible. In our model, if the expert information is revealed only to a small subset
of voters, the obedient equilibrium where a supermajority always follow the expert
can be ruled out. Moreover, if the size of the subset is optimally chosen, there will
be a simple and efficient equilibrium, where this subset of the voters receive and
vote according to the expert signal, and the others who do not receive the expert
information vote according to their own private signal. Intuitively, such selective
disclosure prevents an expert from having too much influence. Alternatively, if
an expert opinion is heard by all members, a coordination procedure such as
role assignment (e.g., who should follow the expert information and who should
ignore it) may lead to an efficient equilibrium. A contribution of this chapter
in this regard is to demonstrate that, without coordination device, an efficient
equilibrium may not necessarily be played even in a game of common interest
especially when there is a simple but inefficient equilibrium. Battaglini, Morton,
and Palfrey (2010) and Morton and Tyran (2011) report results from experiments
where voters are asymmetrically informed, to study how the quality of the private
signal affects their decision to abstain, in the spirit of the model of Feddersen
and Pesendorfer (1996).3 The quality of the information each voter has in our
2As in standard models of voting, our model also has equilibria that are implausible from the
view point of application and efficiency, such as uninformative equilibrium where all committee
members vote for a particular option regardless of their private signal, and equilibrium where
all members the vote against the expert signal.
3Bhattacharya, Duffy, and Kim (2013) study a related experimental setup but with costly
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framework also varies according to whether the private and expert signals agree,
in which case they provide strong information about the state; or they disagree,
in which case the uncertainty about the state becomes relatively high. However,
we do not allow voters to abstain, and more importantly our primary interest
is in the combination of private and public information, which is fundamentally
different from private information with different accuracy levels in terms of the
effect on the voters’ strategic choice, not least because the public signal in our
framework represents a perfectly correlated component of the information each
voter has.
Our interest in choices in the laboratory in the presence of multiple equilib-
ria with different efficiency levels is related to the literature on the experiments
for market entry games (e.g., Sundali, Rapoport, and Seale, 1995; Erev and
Rapoport, 1998; Rapoport, Seale, and Winter, 2002; and Duffy and Hopkins,
2005) with a particular emphasis on learning to play an equilibrium. They have
observed that the convergence to an equilibrium, if it occurs, does not necessarily
mean a Pareto efficient equilibrium being played. 4
4.2 Experimental Design
So far we have seen that the introduction of expert information into a committee
leads to multiple responsive equilibria, while ruling out the individually infor-
mative equilibrium. On one hand, we have derived equilibria where such public
information is used to enhance efficiency. They require either mixing or a fixed
number of agents following the public signal regardless of their private signal. On
the other hand, however, there are equilibria where the outcome always follows
the public signal so that the CJT fails and the decision making efficiency may
be reduced relative to the sincere voting equilibrium in the absence of expert
information. Despite the (potentially severe) inefficiency, these equilibria seem
simple to play and require very little coordination among agents.
In order to examine which equilibria best describe how people respond to
expert information in collective decision making, we use a controlled laboratory
experiment to collect data on voting behaviour when voters are given two types of
information, private and public. The experiment was conducted through comput-
ers at the Behavioural Laboratory at the University of Edinburgh.5 We ran four
treatments, each of which had three sessions, in order to vary committee size and
whether or not the subjects receive public information. The variations were in-
troduced across treatments rather than within because, as we will see shortly, we
had to let our subjects play over relatively many periods, in order to ensure that
for each setup the subjects have enough (random) occurrences where the private
and public signals disagree. Each treatment involved either private information
only or both private and public information, and each session consisted of either
voting.
4Kuzmics, Palfrey, and Rogers, 2013 found that in a symmetric repeated game, experimental
subjects achieved efficient equilibrium payoffs through simple strategies while other equilibrium
strategies could also have achieved very similar payoffs.
5The experiment was programmed using z-Tree (Fischbacher, 2007).
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Table 4.2.1: Treatments
Treatment Private signal Public signal Comm. size No. of sessions No. of subjects
1 yes yes 7 3 7× 2× 3 = 42
2 yes yes 15 3 15× 3 = 45
3 yes no 7 3 7× 2× 3 = 42
4 yes no 15 3 15× 3 = 45
two seven-person committees or one fifteen-person committee. The committees
made simple majority decisions for a binary state, namely which box (blue or
yellow) contains a prize randomly placed before the subjects receive their signals
(see Table 4.2.1). The instructions were neutral with respect to the two types
of information: private information was literally referred to as “private infor-
mation” and expert information was referred to as “public information”. After
the instructions were given, the subjects were allowed to proceed to the voting
game only if they gave correct answers to all short-answer questions about the
instructions.
For all treatments, the prior on the state was uniform and independent in
each period, and we set the accuracy of each private signal (blue or yellow) at
p = 0.65 throughout. For the treatments with a public signal (also blue or yellow)
we had q = 0.7. We presented the accuracy of the signals in percentage terms,
which was described by referring to a twenty-sided dice in order to facilitate
the understanding by the subjects who may not necessarily be familiar with
percentage representation of uncertainty.6
The predicted efficiency of seven-person committees with private signals only
is PC(0.65, 7) = 0.8002 and that of fifteen-person committees is PC(0.65, 15) =
0.8868. Thus the accuracy of the public information is above each private sig-
nal but below what the committees can collectively achieve by aggregating their
private information. This implies that the obedient equilibrium is less efficient
than the informative equilibrium without public information. Note that the sym-
metric mixed and asymmetric pure equilibria we saw earlier for committees with
expert information achieve higher efficiency than PC(·, ·) (see Corollaries 4 and 5
), although the margins are small under the parameter values here. Specifically,
the predicted efficiency of seven-person committees with expert information is
0.8027 and 0.8119 in the symmetric pure equilibrium, and the predicted effi-
ciency of fifteen-person committees is 0.8878 in the symmetric mixed equilibrium
and 0.8922 in the asymmetric pure equilibrium.
Note that from the theoretical viewpoint, the subjects in the treatments with
both types of information would have had a non-trivial decision to make when
their private and public signals disagree. Otherwise (when the two signals agree),
they should vote according to these signals in any of the three equilibria we are
concerned with. Since the probability of receiving disagreeing signals is only 0.44
(= 0.7 × 0.35 + 0.3 × 0.65), the voting game was run for sixty periods to make
sure each subject has enough occurrences of disagreement. In every treatment the
6Every subject was given a real twenty-sided dice.
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sixty periods of the respective voting game were preceded by another ten periods
of the voting game with only private signals, in order to increase the complexity
of information in two steps for the subjects in the public information treatments.7
We do not use data from the first ten periods of the treatments without public
signals, but it does not alter our results qualitatively.
After all subjects in a session cast their vote for each period, they were pre-
sented with a feedback screen, which showed the true state, vote counts (how
many voted for blue and yellow respectively) of the committee they belong to,
and payoff for the period.8 The committee membership was fixed throughout each
session.9 This is primarily to encourage, together with the feedback information,
coordination towards an efficient equilibrium.
The actual method for producing the matrix of the signals subjects received
during the experiment is what we have called a Totally Random Version (TRV)
. In the beginning of each round we have a random draw to determine which of
the two states A or B is the correct one with equal probability (50%). In TRV,
each signal, either expert or private, is an independent random draw from the
uniform distribution (s ∼ U [0, 1]). If the number of subjects of the game is n, we
need n+ 1 such draws for each round. For each subject’s private information, if
s < 0.65, then private information for this round will be correct and otherwise
incorrect. For expert (common information) , if s < 0.7, then expert information
for this round will be correct and otherwise incorrect.
Obviously, with TRV disagreements with the expert vary over time. There-
fore, we have to use a large number of rounds to ensure that the number of
disagreements will be enough to enable appropriate statistical analysis for the
results of the experiment. In the Appendix, we explain an alternative method for
producing a matrix for signals for the game with expert information.
4.3 Experimental Results
In this section we present our experimental results. We first discuss the individual
level data to consider the change and heterogeneity of the subjects’ voting be-
haviour in the treatments with expert information. We then examine the majority
decisions in those treatments and contrast them to the equilibrium predictions.
Finally we compare the efficiency of the committee decisions in the treatments
with expert information and that in the treatments without expert information.
7The subjects in the private information treatments played the same game for seventy periods
but they were given a short break after the first ten periods, in order to make the main part
(sixty periods) of all treatments closer.
8The feedback screen did not include the signals of the other agents or who voted for each
colour. This is to capture the idea of private information and anonymous voting, and also to
avoid information overload.
9In treatments for two seven-person committees, the membership was randomly assigned at
the beginning of each session.
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Table 4.3.1: Voting behaviour: subjects’ choice and equilibrium predictions
7-person committees 15-person committees
treatment efficient equilibrium treatment efficient equilibrium
with expert sym. asym. with expert sym. asym.
vote for private when overall 0.3501 0.9381 0.8571 0.3218 0.9745 0.9333
signals disagree first 30 0.3382 0.3074
last 30 0.3624 0.3373
vote for signals overall 0.9488 1 1 0.9521 1 1
in agreement first 30 0.9523 0.9527
last 30 0.9454 0.9615
4.3.1 Voter choices with expert information
Let us first examine voting behaviour in the game with expert information. On
Table 4.3.1 we can observe immediately that, when the private and public signals
disagree, the subjects voted against their private signals much more often than
they would in the efficiency improving symmetric mixed and asymmetric pure
equilibria.
As the informational advantage of the expert information over private in-
formation is not large (70% versus 65%), in the symmetric mixed equilibrium
the agents should vote according to the private signal most of the time when
the signals disagree (93.8% in the seven-person and 97.5% in the fifteen-person
committees, respectively). Also, from Proposition 6 only one agent should be
obedient to the expert in the asymmetric pure equilibrium for both seven- and
fifteen-person voting games, which implies the frequency of voting for the private
signal of 85.7% and 93.3%, respectively.
In the laboratory, by contrast, when the two signals disagreed the subjects
voted against their private signal in favour of the expert signal for the majority of
the time, in both seven-person and fifteen-person committees. The frequency of
following their private signal was only 35.1% in the seven-person committees and
32.2% in the fifteen-person committees. This, together with the high frequency of
voting according to agreeing signals which is close to 100%, implies a significant
overall tendency to follow expert information both individually and collectively.
Before discussing the influence of expert information on the voting outcome,
let us look at the heterogeneity and change in the subjects’ voting behaviour
within sessions. The most striking about the histograms in Figure 4.3.1 is that
for both seven- and fifteen person treatments, when the two signals disagreed, the
highest fraction of the subjects (11 out of 42 in seven-person committees; 13 out of
45 in fifteen-person committees) voted against the private signal always, or almost
always (b < 5%, where b is each subject’s the frequency of voting for the private
signal when the signals disagree). Apart from those extreme “followers” of expert
information, the subjects’ behaviour in terms of b is relatively dispersed, while
the density is still somewhat higher towards the left. At the other extreme there
were some subjects who consistently ignored expert information. Therefore there
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committee size = 15
each voter’s ratio of votes for private signal under disagreement
Figure 4.3.1: Distribution of individual voting behaviour
the private signal as documented in Table 4.3.1 was largely driven by extreme
“followers”.
Figure 4.3.2 depicts the evolution of voting behaviour over periods of disagree-
ment, where based on Figure 4.3.1 the subjects are divided into four behavioural
types (with the bin width of 25%) according to how often they followed the pri-
vate signal under disagreement, b. The number of subjects who belong to each
category is in parentheses the legend of Figure 4.3.2. For example, in the seven-
person (fifteen-person) committee treatment, 19 out of 42 (22 out of 45) subjects
voted for the private signal under disagreement less than 25% of the time. We
computed the ratio of agents who followed the private signal for each of the four
types, according to the order of occurrences of receiving signals that disagreed.10
The thickness of the lines corresponds to the relative size of each quartile. Note
that although the graphs are drawn over 25 periods, not every subject had 25 (or
more) occurrences of disagreement since all signals were generated randomly and
independently. In the seven-person committee treatment all subjects had 19 or
more occurrences of disagreement, and in the fifteen-person committee treatment
all subjects had 22 or more. The shaded areas indicate that not all subjects are
included in computing the average voting behaviour under disagreement.
An interesting feature we observe in Figure 4.3.2 is that most subjects followed
the public signal for the first few occurrences of disagreement. However, soon af-
terwards different types exhibited different voting patterns. In particular, the
“unyielding” type of agents, who followed the private signal most often (> 75%),
quickly developed this distinct characteristic. It is as if there were a small num-
ber of subjects who “learnt” to ignore the public signal, in the face of the vast
10Thus the subjects had the first (second, third, etc.) occurrence of disagreement in different
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 b ≤ 0.25 (19/42)  0.25 < b ≤ 0.5 (11/42)
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period where signals disagree
 b ≤ 0.25 (22/45)  0.25 < b ≤ 0.5 (11/45)
 0.5 < b ≤ 0.75 (8/45)  b > 0.75 (4/45)
committee size = 15
Figure 4.3.2: Change in average voting behaviour under disagreement for each
agent type: b = individual frequency of voting for private signal when signals
disagreed
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Table 4.3.2: Random effects probit: dependent variable = 1 if voted for private
signal under disagreement
7-person comm. (1032 obs.) 15-person comm. (1173 obs.)
Period of disagreement -0.0066 -0.0112 0.0125** 0.0168**
(0.0067) (0.0095) (0.0059) (0.0083)
Expert was correct in last disag. period -0.2342** -0.3595* -0.5165*** -0.3885*
(0.1009) (0.2112) (0.0960) (0.1987)
Period of disagreement × 0.0092 -0.0085
Expert was correct in last disag. period (0.0135) (0.0116)
Constant -0.3557 -0.2986 -0.7486*** -0.8117***
(0.2355) (0.25045) (0.2439) (0.2586)
Log likelihood -483.7402 -483.5117 -533.0635 -532.7938
Note: Standard errors in parentheses.
*** significant at 1% level; ** significant at 5% level; * significant at 10% level
majority of the others already following it. At the other end, the behavioural
pattern of the “obedient” type of agents, who followed the private signal least
often (≤ 25%), was relatively consistent across the occurrences of disagreement,
with occasional voting for the private signal. The subjects who were in-between
(frequency of voting for the private signal between 25% and 75%) started with
voting for the public signal more often in the first few occurrences of disagreement
but thereafter we do not observe a clear change in their voting behaviour over
time. Overall, Figure 4.3.2 highlights the development of marked heterogeneity in
voting behaviour that emerged through relatively early occurrences of disagree-
ment. Moreover, the development does not show any clear sign of convergence
to the strategies in the efficient asymmetric pure equilibrium identified earlier in
Proposition 6.
Figure 4.3.2 suggests that most subjects changed the way they responded to
disagreement as if they randomized. In order to see what potentially influenced
voting behaviour while taking into account significant individual heterogeneity as
observed earlier, we ran random effects probit regressions for the rounds where
the two signals disagreed. Table 4.3.2 shows that the subjects were more likely
to vote for the public signal (and against their own private signal) when the
expert signal was correct (and the private signals was incorrect) in the previous
occurrence of disagreement. Some subjects seem to have linked their choice to
the observational accuracy of the expert signal, at least to some extent.
4.3.2 Committee decisions with expert information
Let us now consider the majority decisions of the committees in relation to the
presence of the public signal, which are summarized in Table 4.3.3. A striking
feature for both treatments is that the decisions followed the expert informa-
tion most of the time (97.8% for the seven-person committees and 100% for the
fifteen-person committees), while the predictions for the two efficient equilibria
suggest only 67-72%. Moreover, the decisions in the laboratory were much more
likely to have margins of two or more than the predictions. Also, when for any
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Table 4.3.3: Majority decisions by committees with expert information
7-person comm. 15-person comm.
treatment with efficient equilibrium treatment with efficient equilibrium
expert (360 obs.) sym. asym. expert (180 obs.) sym. asym.
Decision coincided with public signal 0.9778 0.6654 0.7237 1 0.6731 0.7023
Decisions made with margin ≥ 2 0.8583 0.5958 0.6000 1 0.7993 0.8033
of which followed public signal 1 0.6612 0.8143 1 0.6789 0.7396
decision that had a margin of two or more, the decision followed expert informa-
tion. Those features are again far from the predictions of the efficient equilibria
(see the last two rows of Table 4.3.3). If anything, as we will discuss shortly,
the majority decisions exhibit key aspects of the hybrid obedient equilibrim we
examined earlier.
4.3.3 Relation to equilibrium predictions
In Section 3.3 we considered three responsive equilibria of interest, namely the
symmetric mixed, asymmetric pure, and obedient equilibria. In the literature on
voting experiments, it is customary to use concepts such as quantal response equi-
librium (QRE; McKelvey and Palfrey, 1995) and “equilibrium plus noise” (Blume,
Duffy, and Franco, 2009) to see whether the experimental data on subjects’ ac-
tions can be interpreted as systematic deviation from a particular equilibrium
prediction of interest. As discussed in detail in the following sections, it is very
difficult for the QRE and equilibrium-plus-noise model to generate a sharp pre-
diction for asymmetric equilibria of games with incomplete information like ours.
Meanwhile, our subjects’ voting choices and committee decisions exhibit some
essential properties of the hybrid obedient equilibrium.
Quantal Response Equilibria
To begin with, there are two main reasons why it would be difficult for the QRE
model to produce a sharp prediction for our model. Firstly, the two distinct
choices that subjects face when facing either agreeing or contradicting signals
entail a very different level of sophistication in terms of individual decisions.
However, as we will explain below any calibration under QRE would require an
analogous degree of sophistication in the two choices. This is something that we
have not observed in the data. Secondly, our data exhibit a highly heterogeneous
nature that point out to shift our main focus on asymmetric equilibria.
To discuss these reasons in more detail, under any examination of the predic-
tive power of the QRE model, we would have to calibrate on a triplet {α, β, λ}













Figure 4.3.3: QRE plane for β ∈ [0, 1] and λ = 0.2.
chapter:
α =
exp (λE[u1(FCSA, α, β)])
exp (λE[u1(ACSA, α, β)]) + exp (λE[u1(FCSA, α, β)])
,
β =
exp (λE[u1(IISD, α, β)])
exp (λE[u1(IISD, α, β)]) + exp (λE[u1(OBDD,α, β)])
.
Note that there has to be a unique λ that links agents mixing behaviour under
agreeing (α) and disagreeing (β) signals through this system of equations. As a
first step in order to visualize the relationship between α and β, we can use using
numerical analysis to produce two graphs with a fixed λ = 0.2: one where the
geometric locus of the solutions for α when β ∈ [0, 1] is given as the intersection of
the function on the right hand side of the first equation with the plane f(α) = α
(Figure 4.3.3) and one where the geometric locus of the solutions for β when
α ∈ [0, 1] is given as the intersection of the function on the right hand side of
the second equation with the plane f(β) = β (Figure 4.3.4). Note that the fact
that both geometric loci of solutions are monotone with β and α respectively
guarantees a unique solution of the system of equations above for α and β, under
a fixed λ. Moreover, we already know the monotonicity of the solutions with
respect to λ. Therefore, we know that fixing λ would produce a unique solution
for the two other variables of the triplet {α, β, λ}. In other words, any calibration
under QRE would require an analogous degree of sophistication in the choice
under agreeing and disagreeing signals.
Turning to the experimental data, we can immediately see that the averages













Figure 4.3.4: QRE plane for α ∈ [0, 1] and λ = 0.2.
βobs,15 = 0.3218. However, even for λ → ∞, β = 0.5 is a lower bound for the
choice of β. In other words, even the lowest degree of sophistication would not
justify β < 0.5 through the QRE model. Moreover, using the averages of the
observations αobs,7 = 0.9488 and αobs,15 = 0.9521 via numerical analysis we can
produce the unique triplets of solutions the the QRE system above {α, β, λ} =
{0.945, 0.684, 0.130} and {α, β, λ} = {0.952, 0.739, 0.238} for 7 and 15 agents
respectively. This implies that the level of sophistication that would be required
for the voting behaviour of subjects through the QRE model under agreement
would predict the behaviour under disagreement with an error of +95% and
+130% under the 7 and 15 player game respectively. Therefore, any attempt to
calibrate on the QRE model would fail gravely.
Finally, as shown in Figures 4.3.1 and 4.3.2, our data exhibit a highly heteroge-
neous nature. More specifically, in Figure 4.3.1 we observe that apart from a very
large concentration of obedient voters, all other choices in terms of each voter’s
ratio of votes for their private signal under disagreement are fairly uniformly
distributed. This is unlike any predictions of the QRE model for a tendency
to deviate that is relatively analogous to the distance from the expected utility
benefit of the strategies selected. This observation, augmented by the fairly con-
sistent behaviour through time that is seen in Figure 4.3.2, point out to shift our
main focus on asymmetric equilibria.
Equilibrium plus noise
Following the “equilibrium plus noise” (Blume, Duffy, and Franco, 2009) model
for calibrating our data entails difficulties similar to the ones for QRE mentioned
in the previous section. Apart from the heterogeneity argument that is identical,
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there is an even graver restriction that forbids the use of the equilibrium plus
noise model, even if we assume a different degree of sophistication between the
two decisions under either agreeing on contradicting signals.
More specifically, similarly to Blume, Duffy, and Franco (2009), in case of
agreeing signals, let α(η1) be the observed probability, that is a noisy perturba-
tion between the equilibrium strategy α∗ = 1 and a totally random switching
probability 1
2
, where η1 ∈ [0, 1] is the parameter of estimation via the maximum
likelihood method. In case of disagreeing signals, let β(η2) be the observed prob-
ability, that is a noisy perturbation between the equilibrium strategy β∗ and a
totally random switching probability 1
2
, where η2 ∈ [0, 1]. Then, the model to be
estimated becomes:
α(η1) = 1− η1,
β(η2) = η2β




It is straightforward to observe that, even assuming a different degree of sophis-
tication between the two actions, captured by η1 6= η2, we necessarily have that
β(η2) = η2β







given that β∗ > 1
2
and η2 ∈ [0, 1]. Hence, due to the fact that the equilibrium
β in both 7 and 15 player cases is higher than 1
2
, the equilibrium plus noise
model will necessarily give a prediction that is strictly higher than 1
2
. However,
since the average observed beta on the 7 and 15 player game respectively is
βobs,7 = 0.3501 and βobs,15 = 0.3218, and due to the concentration of observations
as seen in Figure 4.3.1, it would be impossible for the equilibrium plus noise
model to produce any significant predictions.
Therefore, similarly to the previous section all the aforementioned results
concord to focus our analysis on asymmetric equilibria.
Hybrid Obedient Equilibria
Our subjects’ voting choices and committee decisions exhibit some essential prop-
erties of the hybrid obedient equilibrium, where a supermajority ((n + 1)/2 + 1
or more agents) vote according to the expert signal and the other agents’ strate-
gies are arbitrary. The indeterminacy of the minority agents’ strategies makes
it difficult to establish a solid link between the prediction and the data, but in
what follows we argue that the subjects’ behaviour in our data is best construed
as that in the hybrid obedient equilibrium.
First, as we have seen in Table 4.3.3, the committee decisions followed the
expert signal most of the time (97.8% for seven-person committees and 100% for
fifteen-person committees) as in the class of obedient equilibria where the decision
follows the expert signal with probability 1. In the other equilibria, this rate
ranges from 67% to 72%. The difference in the frequency between the predictions
from the two efficient equilibria and the data is statistically significant.
Second, again from Table 4.3.3, most decisions were made with the margin of
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two or more votes (85.8% of the time for seven-person committees and 100% for
fifteen-person committees), which is an essential feature of the hybrid obedient
equilibrium where no voter should be pivotal. The predicted frequency of the
majority decisions having the margin of two or more in the efficient equilibria is
about 60% for seven-person committees and 80% for fifteen-person committees.
Third, more importantly, most (by the seven-person committees) or all (by
the fifteen-person committees) decisions made with the margin of two or more
followed the expert signal, while in the efficient equilibria such decisions do not
have to follow the expert signal (see the last row of Table 4.3.3). Therefore, from
the subjects’ perspective, it might well be that having looked at the feedback
every period, they perceived themselves as playing an obedient equilibrium in
the sense that they anticipated that the decision would (almost) always follow
the expert signal, and moreover they would not be able to influence the outcome
as they would not be pivotal.
Fourth, from the viewpoint of individual voting choices, the marked hetero-
geneity makes symmetric strategies less plausible (Figures 4.3.1 and 4.3.2). Also,
while the asymmetric pure strategy equilibrium requires only one agent to fol-
low the expert in every period, there were on average more (1.8 subjects in the
seven-person committees and 4.3 in the fifteen-person committees) who followed
the expert signal more than 95% of the time. Combined with the fact that the
other subjects also frequently voted for the expert signal in the face of disagree-
ment, the profiles of voting choices seem much closer to those predicted in the
hybrid obedient equilibrium. Indeed, individual voting choices are largely consis-
tent with its prediction, although it must be stressed that the arbitrariness of the
equilibrium voting behaviour of a minority of agents makes it somewhat difficult
to relate the model and data precisely.
Finally, Figure 4.3.2 shows no clear sign of “convergence” to either the effi-
cient symmetric mixed or asymmetric pure equilibria. If anything, although the
randomness of the combination of the two signals makes it very difficult to ob-
serve a long-run trend in the laboratory, from our data the voting pattern seems
to have stabilized after several occurrences of disagreement in the manner closest
to the hybrid obedient equilibrium as we have just discussed.
If we accept that an equilibrium was played (or approximated) and that the
one played was the hybrid obedient equilibrium, then it implies that the subjects
selected a less efficient equilibrium. Note that the efficient equilibria in our model
may require substantive coordination among the agents, especially in the presence
of underlying uncertainty in the state and two signals. The apparent simplicity
of the obedient equilibrium might be the reason why it may have been chosen
despite the inefficiency.
Another possibility is that the subjects may not have been playing any equi-
librium strategies and some or many were following the expert information out
of “irrationality”. Even if this was the case, however, the fact that the obedient
outcome with a supermajority is in equilibrium must have made it “robust” than
otherwise, since even rational players could not do effectively anything to improve
the efficiency.
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Table 4.3.4: Voting behaviour in committees without expert information
7-person committees 15-person committees
treatment without equilibrium treatment without equilibrium
expert (2520 obs.) expert (2700 obs.)
vote for private signal overall 0.8472 1 0.9141 1
first 30 0.8505 0.9111
last 30 0.8437 0.9170
Table 4.3.5: Observed efficiency
7-person comm. (180 obs. each) 15-person comm. (360 obs. each)
w/o expert with expert w/o expert with expert
Observed efficiency 0.7000 0.7389 0.8278 0.6778
Fisher’s exact test for difference not significant (p = 0.2809) significant (p = 0.0000)
Observed efficiency of expert information n/a 0.7222 n/a 0.6778
Hypoth. efficiency with 0.7972 0.8195 0.8778 0.8667
individually informative voting
4.3.4 Efficiency comparison
Since the committee decisions mostly followed the expert signal, their efficiency
is almost (in the case of fifteen person committees, completely) identical to that
of the expert signal. If we posit that the subjects play the hybrid obedient
equilibrium and that those in the treatments without expert information play
the informative equilibrium by following each one’s private signal, then from
(8), in expectation we should observe the efficiency loss of PC(0.65, 7) − 0.7 =
0.1002 (14.3% reduction) for the seven-person committees and PC(0.65, 15) −
0.7 = 0.1868 (26.7% reduction) due to the presence of expert information.
In the laboratory, the subjects in the treatments without expert information
did not necessarily play according to the equilibrium prediction of informative
voting (Table 4.3.4). The deviation is more pronounced in the seven-person com-
mittees than in the fifteen-person committees, which is probably because subjects
tended to deviate after observing the majority decision being wrong and indeed
by construction (conditional on informative voting) the decisions are less likely to
be correct in the seven-person committees (see Appendix for details). Note that,
from each individual’s perspective, one private signal is less informative of the
true state than a pair of private and public signals that agree. We have observed
in Table 4.3.1 that the proportion of votes for the agreeing signals was about
95% in both seven-person and fifteen-person committees, which is higher than
the proportion of votes for the public signal when expert information is absent.
This is consistent with, for example, the result from Morton and Tyran (2011)
who found that the more accurate the information subjects receive, the more
likely it is that they vote according to the information.
Since informative voting achieves the highest efficiency in the voting game
without expert information, any deviation from the equilibrium strategy leads
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to efficiency loss. The first row on Table 4.3.5 records the observed (ex post)
efficiency in the four treatments. We can see that the efficiency of the decisions
by the seven-person committees without expert information was merely 70.0%,
while if they every member voted individually informatively following the equi-
librium strategy, given the actual signal realizations in the treatment, they could
achieve 79.7%. Meanwhile the seven-person committees with expert information
achieved 73.9%, even though they could have achieved higher efficiency (82.0%) if
they had adopted individually informative voting. 11 While the precise compar-
ison of efficiency between the seven-person committees with and without expert
information is difficult due to different signal realizations in each treatment, the
difference in the observed efficiency is not statistically significant.
The last two columns of Table 4.3.5 give us a somewhat clearer picture. In
the fifteen-person committees without expert information, since the agents did
not deviate much from the equilibrium strategy of informative voting, the effi-
ciency loss compared to the hypothetical informative voting was small (82.8%
vs. 87.8%). In the fifteen-person committees with expert information, since all
decisions followed the expert information, the efficiency was exactly the same as
that of the expert signals, which was only 67.8%. Although the exact comparison
is not possible due to different signal realizations in each treatment, the reduction
in efficiency in the treatment with expert information is large (82.8% → 67.8%,
22.1% reduction) and statistically significant.
4.4 Conclusion
In this chapter, we have reported on the laboratory experiment conducted to
see how human subjects react to expert information. In particular we set the
parameter values in such a way that the efficiency of the obedient equilibria (which
is the as the accuracy of the expert signal) is lower than what the agents could
have achieved in the sincere voting equilibrium without expert information. We
found that the subjects followed expert information so frequently that most of the
time the committee decisions were the same as what the expert signal indicated.
This is in sharp contrast to the predictions from the efficient equilibria, where
only a small number of agents should (in expectation) follow the expert signal
and as a result the committee decision and expert signal may not necessarily
coincide. We also found that the subjects’ behaviour was highly heterogeneous.
Moreover the heterogeneity was persistent over many periods and there was no
clear sign of convergence to an efficient equilibrium. Given the outcome and the
heterogeneity in voting behaviour among the subjects, we have argued that their
choices can be best interpreted as those in a hybrid obedient equilibrium, where
a supermajority follow expert information and the rest vote arbitrarily.
We have then contrasted the results to those from the control treatments where
the subjects received private signals only. We found that the efficiency without
11Note that individually informative voting is not an equilibrium strategy in the presence
of expert information. Here we record the hypothetical efficiencies for both seven-person and
fifteen-person committees in order to represent the quality of the realized private signals in each
treatment.
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expert information was significantly higher than the efficiency with expert infor-
mation for fifteen-person committees. One interpretation of this result is that, the
otherwise efficiency improving provision of expert information actually reduced
efficiency, by creating an inefficient equilibrium that is simple to play compared to
the efficient equilibria. The difference in efficiency was not significant for seven-
person committees, largely due to the agents’ frequent non-equilibrium behaviour
in the treatment without expert information, which reduced the efficiency and
made it close to the efficiency of the committee decisions in the treatment with
expert information.
Finally, this chapter offers a potentially relevant “policy” implication. The
optimality of the asymmetric pure strategy equilibrium suggests that it may be
desirable for the expert to speak only to a subset of the members of a committee,
unless his expertise q is overwhelmingly high. The number of members he should
speak to is m∗ as explicitly computed in Proposition 6. In this case, the out-
come of the equilibrium where m∗ members follow the expert and the rest follow
the private signal is identical to the outcome of the asymmetric pure strategy
equilibrium we have seen earlier, but this form of selective information revelation
rules out equilibria that are less efficient, such as the symmetric pure strategy
equilibrium and the obedient equilibrium. Alternatively, if an expert is heard by
all members, there should be some coordination device such as role assignment in
place to make sure that the expert will not have excessive influence on committee
members. The results from our experiment suggest that it may not be adequate
to study an efficient equilibrium especially when it requires subtle coordination





4.A Treatments without Expert Information
We use two treatments without expert information as controls, and those are
also a direct test of the Condorcet jury. As we saw on Table 4.3.4 the fre-
quency of of our subjects voting according to their private signal was 84.7% in
the seven-person committees and 91.4% in the fifteen-person committees. The
main reason why the seven-person committees with expert information performed
better than the seven-person committees without expert information, despite the
fact that the outcome of the former approximated that of the inefficient obe-
dient equilibrium, is that the subjects in the seven-person committees without
expert information did not play according to the equilibrium and efficient strat-
egy often enough. The difference in the frequency between the seven-person
and fifteen-person committees without expert signal also is inconsistent with the
notion of Quantal Response Equilibria, because according to QRE the agents’
non-equilibrium behaviour (mistakes) should be more pronounced when the loss
from a mistake is small, which implies we should expect to see the subjects voting
according to the private information more often in the seven-person committees
than in the fifteen-person committees.
The exact cause of the difference in the voting behaviour is difficult to deter-
mine, but Table 4.A.1 suggests that, at least in the seven-person committees, the
subjects may have been “experimenting” with voting against their private sig-
nal especially after the committee decision in the previous period was incorrect.
This type of experimentation would result in a larger proportion of votes for the
private signal in larger committees, contrary to the prediction from QRE.
4.B Experimental Instructions
Thank you for agreeing to participate in the experiment. The purpose of this
session is to study how people make group decisions. The experiment will last
approximately 55 minutes. Please switch off your mobile phones. From now until
the end of the session, no communication of any nature with any other partici-
pant is allowed. During the experiment we require your complete, undistracted
attention. So we ask that you follow these instructions carefully. If you have any
questions at any point, please raise your hand.
The experiment will be conducted through computer terminals. You can earn
money in this experiment. The amount of money you earn depends on your
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Table 4.A.1: Random effects probit: dependent variable = 1 if voted for private
signal
7-person comm. (2478 obs.) 15-person comm. (2655 obs.)
Period 0.0003 0.0003 0.0002 0.0004 0.0004 0.0005
(0.0022) (0.0022) (0.0022) (0.0025) (0.0025) (0.0025)
Correct group decision in last period 0.1213 0.1129 0.2512** 0.0850 0.0874 0.2259
(0.0793) (0.0800) (0.1260) (0.1115) (0.1118) (0.1711)
Correct signal in last period 0.0615 0.2106 -0.0258 0.1664
(0.0783) (0.1310) (0.0910) (0.2035)
Correct signal in last period × -0.2346 -0.2400
Correct decision in last period (0.1654) (0.2276)
Constant 1.5223*** 1.4914*** 1.4235*** 2.1564*** 2.1697*** 2.0672***
(0.2273) (0.2308) (0.2368) (0.2723) (0.2764) (0.2923)
Log likelihood -800.8878 -800.5792 -799.5695 -584.6741 -584.6338 -584.0777
Note: Standard errors in parenthesis.
*** significant at 1% level; ** significant at 5% level; * significant at 10% level
decisions, the decisions of other participants, and luck. All earnings will be paid
to you immediately after the experiment. During the experiment, your payoff will
be calculated in points. After the experiment, your payoff will be converted into
British Pounds (GBP) according to the following exchange rate: 850 points = 1,
and rounded to the nearest pound. Please remain seated after the experiment.
You will be called up one by one according to your desk number. You will then
receive your earnings and will be asked to sign a receipt.
All participants belong to a single group of fifteen12 until the end of this
experiment.
The experiment has two parts and consists of a total of 70 rounds. The first
part of the experiment has10 rounds, and the second part has 60 rounds.
At the beginning of each round, the computer places a prize in one of two
virtual boxes: a blue box and a yellow box. [SHOW PICTURE ON FRONT
SCREEN] The location of the prize for each round is determined by the computer
via the toss of a fair coin: at the beginning of each round it is equally likely that
the prize is placed in either box. That is, the prize is placed in the blue box 50%
of the time and the prize is placed in the yellow box 50% of the time. You will not
directly see in which box the prize is hidden, but as we will describe later you will
receive some information about it. [SHOW PICTURE ON FRONT SCREEN]
The box that does not contain the prize remains empty.
The group’s task is to choose a colour. In every round, each group member
has two options, either to vote for BLUE or YELLOW. [SHOW PICTURE ON
FRONT SCREEN] The colour that has received the majority of the votes becomes
the group decision for the round. In every round, each member of the group earns:
1. 100 points if the group decision matches the colour of the box that contains
the prize;
12The instructions here are for the treatments with fifteen-person committees and expert
information. The instructions for the other treatments are available on request.
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2. 5 points if the group decision does not match the colour of the box that
contains the prize.
Note that your payoff for each round is determined exclusively by the group
decision. If the group decision is correct, every group member earns 100 points.
If the group decision is incorrect, every group member earns 5 points. The payoff
is independent of how a particular group member voted.
To summarize, each round proceeds as follows: [SHOW PREVIOUS PIC-
TURES IN TURN]
1. the computer places a prize in one of two boxes (blue box or yellow box
with equal chance);
2. each group member receives some information about the location of the
box;
3. each group member votes for BLUE or YELLOW;
4. group decision is the colour that has received most votes;
5. each group member receives earnings according to the group decision and
the actual location of the prize.
Consider the following example. Suppose you and six other member voted for
BLUE and the eight other members voted for YELLOW. This means that the
group decision is YELLOW.
If the prize was indeed placed in the yellow box, then each group member,
including you, earns 100 points. On the other hand, if the prize was placed in
the blue box, each group member, including you, earns 5 points.
The experiment is divided into two parts. Both parts follow what we have
described so far, but they are different in terms of i) the information each group
member receives before voting, and ii) the number of rounds.
Part 1
The first part of the experiment will take place over 10 rounds. In each round,
after the prize is placed in one of the two boxes but before group members vote,
each participant receives a single piece of information about the location of the
prize. We will call this type of information Private Information. Private Informa-
tion will be generated independently and revealed to each participant separately,
and it can be different for different group members. No other participants of
the experiment will see your Private Information. [SHOW SCREEN FOR DE-
CISION]
Private Information is not 100% reliable in predicting the box containing the
prize. Reliability refers to how often Private Information gives the correct colour
of the box.
Specifically, Private Information gives each of you the colour of the box with
the prize 65% of the time, and the colour of the empty box 35% of the time.
The reliability of Private Information can be described as follows:
1. In each round, after the prize is placed in one of the boxes, the computer
rolls a fair 20-sided dice for each group member. A real 20-sided dice is on your
desk to help your understanding.
2.
a. If the result of the dice roll is 1 to 13 (1,2,4,5,6,7,8,9,10,11,12 or 13),
then that member’s Private Information is the colour of the box with the prize.
Note that 13 out of 20 times means 65%.
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b. If the result of the dice roll is 14 to 20 (14,15,16,17,18,19 or 20), then
that member’s Private Information is the colour of the empty box. Note that 7
out of 20 times means 35%.
Private Information is more likely to be correct than incorrect. Also, all
group members receive equally reliable Private Information. However, since it is
generated independently for each member, members in the same group do not
necessarily get the same information. It is possible that your Private Information
is BLUE while other members’ Private Information is YELLOW.
Finally, at the end of each round, you will see the number of votes for BLUE,
the number of votes for YELLOW, and whether the group decision matched the
colour of the box with the prize.
Part 1 will start after a short quiz to check your understanding of the instruc-
tions. [PART 1 COMMENCES]
Part 2
The second part of the experiment will take place over 60 rounds. In each
round, after the prize is placed in one of the two boxes but before group mem-
bers vote, each group member receives two pieces of information, namely Private
Information and Public Information, about the location of the prize. [SHOW
SCREEN FOR DECISION] As before, in each round Private Information will be
generated independently and revealed to each group member separately, and no
other participants of the experiment will see your Private Information. It gives
each of you the colour of the box with the prize 65% of the time, and the colour
of the empty box 35% of the time.
The reliability of Private Information can be described as follows:
1. In each round, after the prize is placed in one of the boxes, the computer
rolls a fair 20-sided dice for each group member.
2.
a. If the result of the dice roll is 1 to 13 (1,2,4,5,6,7,8,9,10,11,12 or 13),
then that member’s Private Information is the colour of the box with the prize.
Note that 13 out of 20 times means 65%.
b. If the result of the dice roll is 14 to 20 (14,15,16,17,18,19 or 20), then
Private Information is the colour of the empty box. Note that 7 out of 20 times
means 35%.
In addition to but independently of Private Information, Public Information
is revealed to all members of your group. In each round all group members get
the same Public Information. It gives you the colour of the box with the prize
70% of the time, and the colour of the empty box 30% of the time.
The reliability of Public Information can be described as follows:
1. In each round, after the prize is placed in one of the boxes, the computer
rolls a fair 20-sided dice (one dice roll for all members of your group), separately
from the dice rolls for Private Information.
2.
a. If the result of the dice roll is 1 to 14 (1,2,4,5,6,7,8,9,10,11,12,13 or
14), then your group’s Public Information is the colour of the box with the prize.
Note that 14 out of 20 times means 70%.
b. If the result of the dice roll is 15 to 20 (15,16,17,18,19 or 20), then
your group’s Public Information is the colour of the empty box. Note that 6 out
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of 20 times means 30%.
Neither Public Information nor Private Information is 100% reliable in pre-
dicting the box with the prize, but both pieces of information are more likely to
be correct than incorrect.
Note that those two pieces of information may not give you the same colour
(it may be that one says BLUE and the other says YELLOW), in which case
only one of them is correct. Public Information is more likely to be correct
than each member’s Private Information. However, it could be that your Private
Information is correct and the Public Information is incorrect. Also, even if both
pieces of information give you the same colour, it may not match the colour of
the box that contains the prize, since neither is 100% reliable.
At the end of each round, you will see the number of votes for BLUE, the
number of votes for YELLOW, and whether the group decision matches the colour
of the box with the prize.
Part 2 will start after a short quiz to check your understanding of the instruc-
tions. [PART 2 COMMENCES]
4.C Random Ranking Version
The actual method used for the experiment is what we have called a Totally
Random Version (TRV) of producing the signal matrix. In the beginning of
each round we have a random draw to determine which of the two states A or
B is the correct one with equal probability (50%). In TRV, each signal, either
expert or private, is an independent random draw from the uniform distribution
(s ∼ U [0, 1]). If the number of subjects of the game is n, we need n + 1 such
draws for each round. For each subject’s private information, if s < 0.65, then
private information for this round will be correct and otherwise incorrect. For
expert (common information) , if s < 0.7, then expert information for this round
will be correct and otherwise incorrect.
Obviously TRV has the disadvantage that disagreements with the expert vary
over time. Therefore, we have to use a large number of rounds to ensure that the
number of disagreements will be enough to enable appropriate statistical analysis
for the results of the experiment. In this section, we will explain an alternative
method we designed for producing a matrix for signals that could be used for the
game with expert information. We call this method Random Ranking Version
RRV). In brief, RRV is a procedure where:
1. we divide the signal matrix in two sections: one where expert information is
mistaken and one where where expert information is correct, fixing expert
information accuracy to a prespecified level,
2. for each section we divide the subjects signals in two section, one where
they can be mistaken and one where can be correct, again fixing private
signal accuracy to another prespecified level,
3. we randomize the ranking of vectors, so that agents make mistakes at ran-
dom occasions and finally
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4. we randomize across rows, so that the expert makes mistake at random
occasions.
This way we end up with an uncorrelated signal matrix, with fixed accura-
cies and a fixed number of disagreements for all subjects. Moreover, using this
method one can have better control for ex-post statistics such as signal correla-
tion, condorcet accuracy etc. Also, it is actually a lot more egalitarian than TRV,
as each subject will have the same realised frequency of correct versus incorrect
signals.
4.C.1 Creating the Signal Matrix using RRV
In this section we will explain in detail to create the signal matrix using RRV
for i = 7 subjects and j = 40 rounds. As explained before, RRV can be seen as
a two stage randomization. RRV can produce exactly 18 disagreements between
each subject’s private information and expert information in only 40 rounds of
the game. In the first stage, we create the signal sequence for all 40 rounds
of the game for each subject. As seen in Figure 4.C.1, we divide the sequence
produced in two substeps. The first substep contains 12 rounds (j ∈ [1, 2, .., 12],
expert signal incorrect, 1 − q = 0.3) and the second substep contains 28 rounds
(j ∈ [13, 14, .., 40] ,expert signal correct, q = 0.7). For each substep , we fix the
number of correct or incorrect signals for the relevant subject. In the substep
where the expert signal is incorrect, each subject i gets 8 correct and 4 incorrect
signals (pmisij = 0.6667) and the substep when the expert signal is correct, each
subject gets 18 correct and 10 incorrect signals (pcorij = 0.6428). Note that the











Then we randomize the sequence of rounds j ∈ [1, 2, .., 12] and j ∈ [13, 14, .., 40]
separately. We do this by producing an independent random draw from the uni-
form distribution (s ∼ U [0, 1]) for each round and then rank in increasing or
decreasing order. we then aggregate all sequences of signals in matrix where each
row represents a single round of the game and each column represents the signal
sequence for agents i ∈ [1, 2, .., 7]. The process produces a 40 × 8 matrix as in
Figure 4.C.2, where the first column represents the sequence of expert signals.
In this stage, the matrix contains zeros for rounds j ∈ [1, 2, .., 12] and ones for
rounds j ∈ [13, 14, .., 40].
The second stage is straightforward. For each row vector, we produce an
independent random draw from the uniform distribution (s N [0, 1]) for each round
and then again rank in increasing or decreasing order, ending up with the final
signal matrix in Figure 4.C.3.
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4.C.2 RRV results
As in TRV, each iteration of the following process will produce a signal ma-
trix where the accuracy of the condorcet winner varies. Hence, we can repeat
the process above until we get a desirable accuracy for the condorcet winner as
well. Given the procedural strucure, we always produce typical sequences of in-
dependent signals. Therefore, repeating the algorithm will not tamper with the
aggregate ex-post correlation between the expert and individual signals. If the
number of rounds is sufficienly large, we can replicate sequences of signals of any
accuracy with the correlation between them being always close or exactly equal
to zero. The only correlation that will appear will be due to a very small num-
ber of rounds. In that case, due to integer divisions, the accuracy of the private
signals conditional on the expert being correct or incorrect will not be exactly
equal. However, this effect vanishes almost immediately. In our case with only
40 rounds, we get pmisij = 0.6667 < 0.65 < p
cor
ij = 0.6428 that produces a Pearson
product moment correlation coefficient between the expert signals sequence and
each subjects private signal sequence equal to −0.02.13 With 50 rounds it would
be exactly zero.
The main drawback of this method is that is very hard to produce instructions
simple enough for the game that do not involve some undisclosed information to
the subjects in terms of the method involved.14 Given the spirit of the current
experimental literature in economics, we preferred to use TRV instead of RRV.
Note that, RRV produces only typical sequences of signals. Hence, while the
two methods are different and apart from the fact that RRV establishes a fixed
number of disagreements, the two methods produce absolutely indistinguishable
results. Therefore, the instructions we have already used in the game would work
just the same.
13Note that with Student’s t-distribution, for 40 observations, r is between ±0.07 with a
probability of 99.90%.
14 Although this would be highly improbably, a subject with a mistaken understanding of
probabilistic independence could actually vote “better” by counting how many mistaken signals




SUBJECT ACCURACY RAND RANK SIGNALS R-SIGNALS
0.650000 1 0.457688 7 0 1
2 0.515023 6 0 1
3 0.675018 3 0 0
4 0.251926 9 0 1
5 0.990348 1 1 1
6 0.560245 5 1 0
7 0.233638 10 1 0
8 0.287746 8 1 1
9 0.63318 4 1 0
10 0.700687 2 1 1
11 0.147882 11 1 1
12 0.038221 12 1 1
0.642857143
RAND RANK SIGNALS R-SIGNALS
1 0.408388 16 0 1
2 0.578107 13 0 1
3 0.164701 24 0 0
4 0.962066 3 0 0
5 0.803561 7 0 1
6 0.319364 20 0 1
7 0.320859 19 0 0
8 0.45315 15 0 1
9 0.523134 14 0 1
10 0.956526 4 0 1
11 0.219594 23 1 1
12 0.980991 1 1 1
13 0.691924 11 1 0
14 0.357667 18 1 0
15 0.862879 6 1 0
16 0.047436 27 1 0
17 0.285808 22 1 1
18 0.965626 2 1 1
19 0.368309 17 1 0
20 0.950191 5 1 0
21 0.758465 10 1 1
22 0.121948 26 1 1
23 0.763739 9 1 1
24 0.623426 12 1 0
25 0.29402 21 1 1
26 0.125912 25 1 1
27 0.78456 8 1 1
28 0.018569 28 1 1
Figure 4.C.1: RRV: creating private signal vectors.
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Accuracy 0.7 0.65 0.65 0.65 0.65 0.65 0.65 0.65
EXPERT SUB 1 SUB 2 SUB 3 SUB 4 SUB 5 SUB 6 SUB 7
1 0.608503 21 0 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
2 0.855309 7 0 1 0 1 0 0 1 1
3 0.081699 38 0 0 1 1 1 0 0 0
4 0.803419 10 0 1 1 0 1 1 1 1
5 0.706264 13 0 1 1 1 0 1 1 1
6 0.603749 22 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 1
7 0.091757 37 0 0 1 0 1 1 0 0
8 0.969318 3 0 1 0 0 1 1 1 1
9 0.42136 26 0 0 0 1 1 1 0 0
10 0.568146 23 0 1 1 1 1 1 1 0
11 0.263107 32 0 1 1 0 0 0 1 1
12 0.982216 1 0 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
13 0.562446 24 1 1 0 1 1 1 0 1
14 0.663179 17 1 1 1 0 0 1 1 1
15 0.906701 5 1 0 1 1 1 1 0 1
16 0.982069 2 1 0 1 1 0 1 0 1
17 0.373804 29 1 1 0 1 0 0 1 0
18 0.198957 34 1 1 0 1 1 1 1 1
19 0.268784 31 1 0 1 1 1 0 1 1
20 0.167653 35 1 1 0 1 1 0 1 1
21 0.652608 19 1 1 0 0 0 1 1 0
22 0.402205 27 1 1 1 0 1 0 0 0
23 0.7797 11 1 1 0 0 0 1 0 0
24 0.001801 40 1 1 1 0 1 1 1 0
25 0.812081 8 1 0 1 0 1 0 0 1
26 0.37825 28 1 0 1 1 0 1 1 0
27 0.118917 36 1 0 1 1 1 0 1 0
28 0.759061 12 1 0 1 0 1 1 1 0
29 0.67723 15 1 1 0 1 1 0 0 1
30 0.663148 18 1 1 1 1 0 1 0 1
31 0.617556 20 1 0 1 0 1 1 0 1
32 0.806 9 1 0 1 1 0 1 1 1
33 0.691901 14 1 1 1 0 1 0 1 1
34 0.560519 25 1 1 0 1 1 0 1 1
35 0.232881 33 1 1 0 0 0 1 0 1
36 0.061305 39 1 0 1 1 1 0 1 1
37 0.940788 4 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
38 0.856729 6 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
39 0.296331 30 1 1 1 1 0 1 1 0
40 0.665132 16 1 1 0 1 1 1 1 0
Figure 4.C.2: RRV: reshuffling private signals.
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Accuracy 0.7 0.65 0.65 0.65 0.65 0.65 0.65 0.65
Disagreements 18 18 18 18 18 18 18
EXP SUB 1 SUB 2 SUB 3 SUB 4 SUB 5 SUB 6 SUB 7
ROUND 01 1 0 1 1 1 1 0 0
ROUND 02 0 1 0 1 0 0 1 1
ROUND 03 1 1 1 0 0 1 0 1
ROUND 04 1 0 0 0 1 0 1 0
ROUND 05 1 1 1 0 0 1 0 0
ROUND 06 1 1 0 1 1 1 1 1
ROUND 07 1 0 1 1 1 1 1 1
ROUND 08 1 1 1 1 0 1 1 0
ROUND 09 0 0 1 1 1 0 0 0
ROUND 10 1 1 0 1 0 0 1 1
ROUND 11 1 0 1 1 1 1 1 0
ROUND 12 0 0 1 0 1 1 0 1
ROUND 13 1 0 1 0 0 1 0 0
ROUND 14 0 0 1 0 1 1 0 1
ROUND 15 1 1 0 1 1 1 1 1
ROUND 16 1 0 1 0 1 0 1 1
ROUND 17 0 1 0 1 1 0 1 1
ROUND 18 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 0
ROUND 19 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
ROUND 20 1 1 0 0 0 1 1 1
ROUND 21 0 1 1 1 1 0 1 1
ROUND 22 1 0 1 0 0 0 1 1
ROUND 23 1 1 0 1 1 0 0 1
ROUND 24 1 1 1 1 1 0 0 1
ROUND 25 0 1 1 1 1 1 1 0
ROUND 26 0 1 1 1 1 1 1 0
ROUND 27 1 1 0 1 1 1 0 1
ROUND 28 1 0 1 0 0 1 1 1
ROUND 29 1 0 1 1 1 1 1 1
ROUND 30 0 1 0 1 1 1 1 1
ROUND 31 1 1 1 0 1 0 0 1
ROUND 32 1 1 0 1 1 0 1 1
ROUND 33 0 1 0 1 0 1 1 1
ROUND 34 0 0 1 0 0 1 0 1
ROUND 35 1 1 1 1 1 0 1 0
ROUND 36 1 0 1 0 0 0 0 1
ROUND 37 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 0
ROUND 38 1 1 0 1 0 1 0 0
ROUND 39 1 1 0 1 1 1 1 1
ROUND 40 0 1 1 0 0 1 1 0




“Time is the longest distance between two places.” (Tennessee Williams)
5.1 Introduction
There is a significant gap between theory and empirical evidence about policies
to reduce crime rates. The majority of the theoretical analyses predict a sharp
decrease in crime rates when there are significant improvements in the economic
conditions, such as a fall in unemployment and poverty rates or when legal market
income has a significant increase. A similar prognosis is established in the case of
a substantial increase in the probability of punishment. However, a predominant
part of the empirical literature in the economics of crime observe a lower than
expected effect on crime rates from exogenous variations in economic variables.2
This chapter argues that a possible reason for this is the fact that the current
literature of economics of crime overlooks a likely hysteresis effect in the crim-
inal behaviour, a situation where positive exogenous variations in the relevant
economic variables have a different effect from negative variations.3 A relevant
consequence of hysteresis in criminal behaviour is the fact that social policies to
reduce crime will have a more important impact on potential criminals than on
existing criminals.
We develop the first simple model that explicitly characterises the hysteresis
effect in criminal behaviour. In every period, agents choose to engage in criminal
activities by doing a cost-benefit analysis. They weigh between the positive effects
of learning by doing, any intrinsic sunk costs of a criminal career and the expected
loss if they are caught. Agent are myopic, in the sense that they are only interested
in the gains and losses of the current period. According to Akerlof (1991), ignoring
this behavioural pathology, any economic theory of crime would be deficient and
misleading.
When the probability of crime deterrence decreases, some law abiding agents
will find it more beneficial to enter a criminal career. However, if the probability of
1This chapter was based on the 2013 working paper “Hysteresis in Crime”, co-authored by
Dr. Andre Loureiro.
2As show Mocan and Bali (2010) and Mustard (2010).
3Hysteresis was a term coined by the Scottish engineer James Ewing in 1881 to describe the
retentiveness phenomenon intrinsic to ferromagnetic materials.
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crime deterrence returns to the initial level, a subset of these agents will continue
in their career in crime. Agents that have engaged in criminal behaviour, either
because of increased revenues from learning by doing or because they have paid
the sunk cost of a criminal career, under the same probability of deterrence as in
the first period, will find it more beneficial to remain in a criminal career than
return to being law abiding. Only in the situation when punishment is extremely
severe the effect of hysteresis disappears.
We show that, when agent’s crime choice exhibits weak hysteresis individually,
crime rate in a society consisted from a continuum of agents with intrinsic costs
that follow any distribution will exhibit strong hysteresis. Furthermore, we find a
relationship between the increase in crime rate when the probability of deterrence
returns to the initial level and the distribution of agents’ intrinsic costs.
Since the seminal paper of Becker (1968), economists consider formally the
possible effects of socioeconomic variables on criminal behaviour. The standard
fully rational crime decision model establishes that an individual periodically faces
a decision whether to commit a illicit act or not, based on the expected return of
the criminal market and associated probability and severity of punishment when
compared to the expected stream of legal income. Just recently the economics
of crime has formally considered the inherent intertemporal nature of criminal
choice.4 McCrary (2010) highlights the importance of considering a dynamic
setting in order to properly describe the choice of a potential criminal. Burdett,
Lagos, and Wright (2003, 2004) develop an on-the-job search model to analyse
the interrelations between crime, unemployment and inequality. The authors find
multiple equilibria, which suggest there is a hysteresis process in crime decisions.
The result helps to understand why higher levels of welfare benefits may lead
to higher crime rates as higher taxes may discourage some individuals to work.
Other relevant articles with dynamic settings are Imrohoroglu, Merlo, and Rupert
(2004), Imai and Krishna (2004) Engelhardt, Rocheteau, and Rupert (2008),
Sickles and Williams (2008) and Engelhardt (2010). Nevertheless, a ubiquitous
assumption in the dynamic models to describe the crime decision is that once the
illicit option is chosen, the probabilities of an individual choosing the possible
alternatives remain unaltered in the following period.
5.2 Hysteresis
Hysteresis has been a phenomenon identified in economic contexts like foreign
investment (Dixit (1989, 1992)) and unemployment (Blanchard and Summers
(1987) and Røed (2002)).5 Cross (1993) and Amable, Henry, Lordon, and Topol
(1994) formally define hysteresis in the economic context, showing the difference
between its weak and strong versions. It is pointed out the usual improper use of
the word in economics to describe persistence stemming from unit root for discrete
processes or zero eigenvalue for linear dynamic systems. Unlike unit/zero root
4See McCrary (2010) for a extensive survey on dynamic models in the economics of crime
literature.















Figure 5.2.1: Strong Hysteresis: Decrease in π followed by a increase to its original
level
processes, both types of hysteresis display path dependence, asymmetric cycles
and the remanence property. In the context of crime, remanence corresponds to
crime rates not going back to its original value when the probability of punishment
or the average legal wage is transitorily changed.
5.2.1 Weak versus Strong Hysteresis
Weak hysteresis is a phenomenon that occurs at the individual level only if specific
threshold levels are reached. The aggregation of homogeneous agents subject to
hysteresis also displays the weak hysteresis effect and the pattern of hysteresis
is similar to the micro level. However, with heterogeneous agents the aggregate
variation is reinforced generating a strong hysteresis effect. At every level of
the input variable, positive variations result in different effects on the output
variable when compared to effect from negative variations. Furthermore, unlike
the situation of weak hysteresis, the amplitude of the remanence will depend on
the magnitude of the shock.
It is also important to contrast both types of hysteresis with unit root pro-
cesses. In a system with hysteresis, the current behaviour depends on the domi-
nant extremum of past shocks, whereas in a system with unit root, all past shocks
matter. That implies that hysteresis is associated to local structural stability,
whereas unit root processes are associated to global structural stability.
Amable, Henry, Lordon, and Topol (1994) let clear that a shock exerted on a
state variable in a unit root process will lead to a new steady state, but will keep
the number of equilibria and the its respective locus unchanged. If crime rates
are unit root processes, two opposite shocks with the same magnitude will leave
the crime rate unaffected, whereas in a hysteric system will lead the crime rate
to a new equilibrium.
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5.2.2 Extrinsic versus Intrinsic Hysteresis
We claim that there are two types of sources of hysteresis in crime: 1. External
to the individuals (extrinsic). Weak hysteresis with this source has recently been
considered in the literature by introducing social stigma into the labour market:
Lower wage offers Imrohoroglu, Merlo, and Rupert (2004); higher duration in un-
employment Engelhardt (2010); social capital depreciation Sickles and Williams
(2008). Hysteresis would only be a result in this context in the situations where
the criminal is caught and convicted and/or this fact is known by the others indi-
viduals in his social life. Nevertheless, data on countries like the US and the UK
show that the punishment for the majority of committed crimes do not involve
incarceration and the apprehension rate is very low.6
2. Internal to the individuals (intrinsic). The claim in this chapter is that
hysteresis could also occur as a result of sources internal to the individuals. As
it will be shown in the following sections, sunk moral cost (fallacy) and learning
in crime can lock individuals in the criminal career. Internal sources are crucial
to an explicit characterisation of strong hysteresis in criminal choice.
This chapter argues that stigma in the labour market is only one of the sources
of hysteresis in criminal behaviour. An important source of hysteresis stems from
internal sources to the individual. To date, there has been no formal model or
empirical study on this type of hysteresis in criminal behaviour.
6In some cities of the US and the UK, the clearance rate - crimes with a charge being laid
divided by the total number of crimes recorded - is as low as 5%. Nationwide the fraction of
cleared crimes varies between 1/5 and 1/4. See FBI’s Uniform Crime Reporting (UCR) website
for data on the US and the Home Office Statistical Bulletin for information about clearance




There is a [0, 1] continuum of ex ante homogeneous7 risk-neutral infinitely-lived
individuals that decide whether to commit a crime or not. The wage of individuals
abiding by the law in every period is fixed and equal to w. Committing a crime
can increase utility by the illicit gain g, but it also entails a moral (or intrinsic)
cost m and an exogenous probability π8 of facing a punishment s (sanction). The
trade-off between the time spent in legal and criminal activities is captured by a
reduction in w by γ ∈ [0, 1].9
Every criminal act entails an intrinsic cost m which is a burden irrespective
of whether the punishment occurs or not. This cost can have at least two non-
mutually exclusive interpretations: 1. A moral cost associated with an illicit
activity, either a disutility because the individuals feel guilt about the harm
caused to the victim by the act (internal) or the disapproval of their peers (social).
2. The actual cost of a criminal act (entry fee or criminal technology/inputs)
which is decreasing with the number of crimes committed in the past (individual
learning) and/or with the number/strength of links in a criminal network (social
learning).
The expected utility of crime (EUC) is then given by:
EUC = (g + γw −m− s)π︸ ︷︷ ︸
caught
+ (g + γw −m)(1− π)︸ ︷︷ ︸
get away with it
= g + γw −m− sπ
(5.3.1)
Agents are myopic; their choice to engage in criminal activities depends only
on the expected gain of the current period. As explained in the introduction,
the best interpretation of this behaviour concerts with the idea of Akerlof (1991)
with respect to criminal behaviour: agents are not interested in any future costs
of benefits of their actions today. We argue incorporating the expected utility
of future periods and using a discount rate would only magnify the effect of
hysteresis in criminal behaviour.
At every period t, agents choose to engage in criminal activity φ = 1 or not
φ = 0. An agent will choose to engage in criminal activity if the expected gains
of committing in crime outweigh the income without crime. This decision is
determined by Maxφ{w,EUC} boils down to:
φ =
{
1 if g − (1− γ)w −m− sπ > 0
0 otherwise
(5.3.2)
7The assumption of homogeneity will relaxed afterwards and is assumed to show that the
results are not driven by ex ante heterogeneity.
8The probability of punishment (fine, prison, etc) is conditional on conviction, which is itself
conditional on being caught/arrested. Here it is assumed that being caught implies conviction
and punishment.
9(1− γ) can be interpreted as the depreciation of the ability to earn w when and individual
is engaged in crime. This reduction in w reflects stigma in the labour market and/or less time













Figure 5.3.1: Crime Rates for Homogenous Agents
Notice from equation 5.3.2 that if there is no conflict between legal and crim-
inal activities (γ = 1) the crime decision will not depend on w. Conversely, if
γ = 0, crime and no crime are two mutually exclusive activities and consequently
different states. That implies that γ is closer to 0 for more serious crimes and
closer to 1 for petty crimes.
It should also be noted that in the extreme case where π = 0 and there is no
opportunity cost (γ = 1), crime only happens if the gain associated to the act is
strictly higher than the intrinsic cost: g > m.
Definition 12. For a given combination (g,m,w, s), there is a unique π, the
deterrent threshold of punishment, that will deter all individuals from crime:
π̄D =
g − (1− γ)w −m
s
(5.3.3)
Definition 13. For a given combination (g,m, π, s), there is a unique w, the





Under homogeneity of the agents and assuming that each criminal commits
only one type of crime per period 10, the crime rates can be depicted for respec-
tively a given π̄D and w̄D.
10This a reasonable assumption for a sufficiently short period. In the case of a longer period,
the crime rate is obtained by also taking into account the distribution of the number of crimes
each criminal commits per period. A simple formulation is to assume that the number of crimes
of each criminal is given by a uniform probability mass function. If an additional assumption
that all individuals commit the same number of crimes q > 1 is made, the crime rate can be
obtained simply by multiplying the fraction of offenders by q. Note that in that case the crime
rate can be greater than one.
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5.3.2 Crime Rates with Heterogeneous Agents
Heterogeneity allows for a more realistic description of the relationship between
crime and its deterrents as it allows crime rates to be a value different from 0
and 1.11 We will begin by describing the case where criminal history does not



















Figure 5.3.2: Crime Rates for Heterogeneous Agents (k = 2)
Let the individuals vary with respect to their moral cost mj, j = {1, ..., K}.
(K types). For K=2, m is either mL or mH with probability (α, 1 − α). For








. Similarly, for a given combination (g,mj, π, s),







For a continuum of types, mj can be represented by a distribution f(m). The
simplest non-trivial case is when the fraction of each type is equally likely and
m follows a uniform distribution: m ∼ U(mmin,mmax). For a given positive
(negative) variation in π there is a negative (positive) variation in the crime rate
correspondent to the fraction of the population with the level of m.12
The values of mmin and mmax can be normalized so that π̄
D ∼ U(0, 1): πDmin =
0 = g−(1−γ)w−mmax
s




mmin = g − (1− γ)w − s.
That implies that in terms of π, m has pdf given by:13
11What follows is based on exogenous ex ante heterogeneity. An analysis with ex ante ho-
mogeneity, but ex post heterogeneity will lead to similar results. It can be carried out if we
assume that individuals instead of observing the probability of punishment, they only observe a
noisy signal correlated to the true probability of punishment and update their priors according
to previous experience.
12Notice that if the highest level of m is sufficiently high, c < 1 even if π = 0.
13The same result is obtained by applying the theorem of inverse transformation of random





, mmin ≤ m ≤ mmin + s. (5.3.5)
Because π̄D has pdf given by: fπ̄D(π̄
D) = 1, 0 ≤ π̄D ≤ 1, for a given π,









dπ̄D = 1− π (5.3.6)
The first integral in equation 5.3.6 corresponds to the aggregation of all indi-
viduals with moral cost below the moral cost associated to the prevailing proba-
bility of punishment π. That is equivalent to the deterrence probability of pun-
ishment π̄D being greater than π, given by the second integral of the equation.
Similarly, for a given positive (negative) variation in w, there is a negative
(positive) variation in the crime rate correspondent to the fraction of the popu-




, 0 ≤ w̄D ≤ w̄max, for a given w, crime rate is given
by:
c(w) = 1− w
w̄max
(5.3.7)
Equation 5.3.7 corresponds to the aggregation of all individuals with moral
cost below the one associated to the prevailing legal wage w, or equivalently, the
aggregation of all individuals with reservation wage of crime w̄D greater than w.
The crime rates in terms of probability of punishment π and legal wage w are











Figure 5.3.3: Crime Rates for a Continuum of Heterogeneous Agents - Uniform
A more realistic representation of the distribution of the intrinsic cost would
relax the assumption of equally likely values of m. For simplicity, assume mmin =
0, so that fm(m) has a support on the [0,mmax] interval. Crime rate in terms of
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= Fm(g − (1− γ)w − sπ)
(5.3.8)
As the cdf Fm in non-decreasing, equation 5.3.8 in a non-linear decreasing
function on π. This is also true to w, as it can be analogously shown. Figures
5.3.4a and 5.3.4b depict these relationships for a log-normal distribution.14
Notice that for extreme values high values of π and w, crime rates are lower
than the case that the intrinsic cost has a uniform distribution. Similarly, extreme











Figure 5.3.4: Crime Rates for a Continuum of Heterogeneous Agents - Log-
normal;
5.4 Weak Hysteresis in Crime Decision






All variables associated with the crime decision should be affected by criminal
history. The intrinsic cost m and the opportunity cost of crime given by (1−γ)w
are unambiguously increasing in ht as was discussed in previous sections. The
gain from crime g is increasing in ht, as crime experience and networking allows a
14Which has support [0,∞). For a sufficiently small σ2, the distribution is relatively sym-
metric.
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better targeting at loot with higher values. The severity of punishment s is also
increasing in ht, as most countries impose heftier sanctions for individuals with
a criminal past. The effect of ht on the probability of punishment π depends on
whether the learning process dominates the higher number of traces left by the
criminal acts.
To simplify the analysis, assume that the variables above only depend whether
an individual has ever committed a crime or not. Define the binary variable
h = 1[ht−1 ≥ 1], where 1[·] is an indicator function. This assumption will be
subsequently relaxed.
As all variables above, apart from s and π, increase the probability of crime
given h = 1, the positive effect of crime history on crime choice (including any
reduction in π through learning) can be encapsulated by m. The negative effect
of h on crime choice (including any increase in π given the higher number of
traces) is subsumed in s. A simple linear specification15 is then given by:
mt = m̄− m̃h (5.4.2)
st = s̄+ s̃h (5.4.3)
Using the equations above, equations 5.3.1 and 5.3.2 can be rewritten respec-
tively as:




1 if g − (1− γ)w − m̄− s̄π + (m̃− s̃π)h > 0
0 otherwise
(5.4.5)
Solving equation 5.4.5 for π yields the deterrent threshold of punishment π̄D:
π̄D =
g − (1− γ)w − m̄+ m̃h
s̄+ s̃h
(5.4.6)
And the reservation wage of crime w̄D:
w̄D =
g − m̄− s̄π + (m̃− s̃π)h
1− γ
(5.4.7)
Then equation 5.4.5 can be rewritten as:
φt(π) =
{






1 if w < w̄D
0 otherwise
(5.4.9)
15A exponential specification (m̄e−m̃h and s̄es̃h) will lead to similar results.
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Therefore, the deterrent threshold of punishment and the crime reservation
wages are functions of the criminal history.
It is easy to see from equations 5.4.6 and 5.4.7 and that π̄D and w̄D are
increasing in criminal history h if and only if m̃ > s̃π. This condition implies that,
if the gains from criminal history are higher than the expected cost of deterrence,
then criminal history will have a positive effect, both on the deterrent threshold
of punishment and the reservation wage. This is a reasonable assumption, as only
the convicted past crimes should increase the severity of punishment, whereas all
past crimes should affect the intrinsic cost of crime.16 We consider the simplest
situation where this is true by setting s̃ = 0. Additionally, the focus of the
analysis in this section will be on the probability of punishment π. The results
for w are similar.
Define ḡ ≡ g−m̄−(1−γ)w. Note that regardless individuals have committed
crime in the past, they will always commit a crime in period t if π < ḡ
s
(entry











, the decision is conditional on the crime
choice in the previous period.




1 if π < ḡ
s















1 if π < ḡ
s
0 if π ≥ ḡ
s
(5.4.11)
Equations 5.4.10 and 5.4.11 together represent a relay function, where the
choice in period t is state-dependent.
At this point it is clear that there are two main aspects that determine the
degree hysteresis in crime decision. One is the degree of memory in the criminal
history and the other is the size of m̃ relative to the severity of punishment. In
the extreme cases where m̃ is very high or all criminal history matters, there is a
ratchet effect, where criminals are locked in crime.
It is useful to have a new notation for the different levels of deterrent thresholds
of punishment π̄D. Denote the entry threshold by π̄E and the threshold that
individuals leave the criminal career by π̄L. Therefore π̄E = ḡ
s





If individuals are homogeneous the aggregation of individual crime decision
into crime rates is trivial. The relationship between π and crime rates is depicted
in figure 5.4.1.
It is clear that hysteresis is a phenomenon that occurs at the individual level
only if specific threshold levels are reached. Hysteresis does not happen if in-
dividuals face probability of punishment and legal wages far from the critical
16The case when m̃ < s̃π would imply that criminal history will have a positive effect in the
deterrent threshold of punishment and the crime reservation wages. With this assumption, this













Figure 5.4.1: Crime Rates for Homogeneous Agents
thresholds. That is one of the main characteristics of weak hysteresis.
5.4.1 Weak Hysteresis versus Unit Root Process
If criminal history in the last T periods matter, the exit deterrent threshold of










and the range of the relay function will have T + 1 partitions.
The deterrent threshold of punishment can return to the original level π̄E = ḡ
s
if individuals do not commit crimes for T periods.
It is important to contrast the history dependence that stems from this relay
function with history dependence that emerges from a unit root in a discrete
process.
If all criminal history is relevant, the deterrent threshold of punishment is










Note that equation 5.4.13 is the steady state level of π̄Lt following an AR(1)











17Another way to see this is to notice that equation 5.4.13 is a MA(∞), which is equivalent
to an AR(1).
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As a unit root process has a impulse-response function constant and equal
to one, any temporary shock has a permanent effect. A shock in this setting is
extremely simple and corresponds to m̃
s




Unlike this unit root discrete process, where current behaviour depends weakly
on all past shocks, in a hysteric process, current behaviour strongly depends only
on non-dominated extrema of past shocks.
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5.5 Heterogeneous Agents and Strong Hystere-
sis
For 2 types of agents, the different exit and entry thresholds occur in both levels



























Figure 5.5.1: Crime Rates for Heterogeneous Agents (k = 2)
For a continuum of heterogeneous agents, we proceed as in section 5.3, where
the intrinsic cost of crime follows a uniform distribution, but with the bounds
taking into account the reduced intrinsic costs for individuals with criminal his-
tory.
We formally define some concepts related to hysteresis in crime rates in terms
of the probability of punishment π and summarize the results in two propositions.
Definition 14. Let Ω be the criminal remanence, the increase in the crime rate
when π returns to its original level π0.
Definition 15. Let πC be the coercive probability of punishment, the level of π
necessary to return the crime rate to its original level.
Definition 16. Let ξ = πC − π0 be the coercive force necessary to return the
crime rate to its original level.
Definition 17. Let H(πT ) be the maximum historical crime rate in the last T
periods:
H(πT ) = max{c(πt−T ), ..., c(πt−1)}.
Consider the situation set choice of the policy maker deciding the level of the
probability of punishment is simply: {πH , πL}, with πH > πL.
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Proposition 8. Strong Hysteresis If individuals are heterogeneous with respect
to their initial intrinsic cost of crime m̄ and the intrinsic cost of crime evolves
according to equation 5.4.2, for any two levels of probability of punishment πL <
πH ∈ [0, 1], an exogenous reduction in π from πH to πL (∆−π) will increase
crime by ∆+c. If it is followed by an exogenous increase in π from πL to πH
(∆+π = −∆−π), it will decrease crime by ∆−c = −∆+c+ Ω, where
Ω = Fm̄(g − (1− γ)w − s̃π + m̃ H(πL))− Fm̄(g − (1− γ)w − s̃π + m̃ H(πH)).18
Proof. For a given distribution of initial intrinsic cost of crime, m̄ ∼ F (m̄), crime




dFm̄ = Fm̄(m̄(π))− Fm̄(m̄min) (5.5.1)
Using equation 5.4.6 and definition 17 in the previous equation yields:
c(π) = Fm̄(g − (1− γ)w − sπ + m̃H(π)) (5.5.2)
Since Fm̄ is an non-decreasing function and H(π
L) > H(πH), we have that,
for any x,
Ω = Fm̄(x+ m̃H(π
L))− Fm̄(x+ m̃H(πH)) ≥ 0 (5.5.3)
and
Ω = Fm̄(g−(1−γ)w−s̃π+m̃H(πL))−Fm̄(g−(1−γ)w−s̃π+m̃H(πH)) (5.5.4)
Proposition 9. If the level of severity s is sufficiently high, both the criminal
remanence Ω→ 0 and the coercive force ξ → 0 .
Proof. This is a direct result of equations 5.5.3 and 5.5.4, the fact that Fm is
CDF.
As an example, assume m follows a log-normal distribution and plug its CDF








ln(g − (1− γ)w − sπ)− µ√
2σ2
] (5.5.5)







From the equation 5.4.2 describing the effect of criminal history on intrinsic
cost m, it is clear that the mean and the variance of m can be written respectively
as:
18Proof of this theorem arose from joint work with Vasileios Vlaseros.
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E(m) = E(m̄)− m̃E(h) (5.5.6)
var(m) = var(m̄) + m̃2var(h)− 2m̃cov(m̄, h) (5.5.7)
As cov(m̄, h) < 0, it is clear that a higher proportion of individuals with
criminal record decreases the mean and increases the variance of m. That is
translated in a shift of fm(m) to the left. That implies that the curve given by
equation 5.5.5 is displaced to the right, as show figure 5.5.2a. A similar analysis




















Figure 5.5.2: Crime Rates for different levels of π and w
The thick lines illustrate the full variation of π or w between 0 and 1 in both
directions. If π is exogenously reduced from π0 to π1, crime rate goes up from c0
to c1. If π is restored to its original value π0, crime rate falls to c2 = c0 + Ω. Only
if π is increased to π2 will make the crime rate to return to its original level c0. A
similar explanation applies to variations in w. For this smaller range of variation
in π or w, there is a smaller loop inside the one plotted in both figures.
It is also clear from the figure 5.5.2 that ex ante heterogeneity leads to hys-




This chapter explores a simple model where agents choose a career in crime by
weighing between the positive effects of learning, any intrinsic sunk costs of a
criminal career and the expected loss if they are caught. When the probability
of crime deterrence decreases or there is a fall in the real income obtained in the
labour market, some agents will find it more beneficial to enter a criminal career.
If the original conditions are subsequently restored, a subset of these agents will
continue in their career in crime. When crime choice exhibits weak hysteresis at
the individual level, crime rate in a society consisted from a continuum of agents
that follows any distribution will exhibit strong hysteresis. Furthermore, we find
the link between the increase in crime rate when the probability of deterrence
returns to the initial level and the distribution of agents’ intrinsic costs. Finally,
the effect of hysteresis disappears when the severity of punishment is extremely
high.
We argue that our theoretical findings corroborate the argument that policy
makers should be more inclined to set pre-emptive policies rather than mitigating
measures. Any variation on the crime rate will result in an accumulated hidden
cost, exactly because of the phenomenon of hysteresis.
The existence of hysteresis in crime has at least two direct implications. The
first one regards the policies to reduce crime rates. If hysteresis has a relevant
effect in criminal decision, policies to reduce crime should be focused on crime
prevention rather than mitigation. The second one is relevant to any future
empirical analyses of the impact of policies to reduce crimes. The asymmetric
nature of positive and negative shocks on crime rates must be taken into account




Akerlof, G. A. (1991): “Procrastination and Obedience,” The American Eco-
nomic Review, 81(2), 1–19.
Ali, S., and N. Kartik (2012): “Herding with collective preferences,” Eco-
nomic Theory, 51(3), 601–626.
Ali, S. N., J. K. Goeree, N. Kartik, and T. R. Palfrey (2008): “Informa-
tion Aggregation in Standing and Ad Hoc Committees,” American Economic
Review, 98(2), 181–186.
Amable, B., J. Henry, F. Lordon, and R. Topol (1994): “Strong hystere-
sis versus zero-root dynamics,” Economics Letters, 44(1), 43–47.
Aragones, E., and T. R. Palfrey (2004): “The Effect of Candidate Quality
on Electoral Equilibrium: An Experimental Study,” The American Political
Science Review, 98(1), pp. 77–90.
Austen-Smith, D., and J. S. Banks (1996): “Information Aggregation, Ratio-
nality, and the Condorcet Jury Theorem,” American Political Science Review,
90(1), pp. 34–45.
Austen-Smith, D., and T. Feddersen (2005): “Deliberation and Voting
Rules,” in Social Choice and Strategic Decisions, ed. by D. Austen-Smith, and
J. Duggan, Studies in Choice and Welfare, pp. 269–316. Springer Berlin Hei-
delberg.
Banerjee, A., and R. Somanathan (2001): “A Simple Model of Voice,”
Quarterly Journal of Economics, 116(1), 189–227.
Banerjee, A. V. (1992): “A Simple Model of Herd Behavior,” Quarterly Jour-
nal of Economics, 107(3), 797–817.
Bassi, A., R. B. Morton, and K. C. Williams (2011): “The Effects of
Identities, Incentives, and Information on Voting,” The Journal of Politics, 73,
558–571.
Battaglini, M., R. Morton, and T. Palfrey (2007): “Efficiency, Equity,
and Timing of Voting Mechanisms,” The American Political Science Review,
101(3), pp. 409–424.
141
Battaglini, M., R. B. Morton, and T. R. Palfrey (2010): “The Swing
Voter’s Curse in the Laboratory,” Review of Economic Studies, 77(1), 61–89.
Becker, G. S. (1968): “Crime and Punishment: An Economic Approach,”
Journal of Political Economy, 76, 169–217.
Ben-Yashar, R., and I. Milchtaich (2007): “First and Second Best Voting
Rules in Committees,” Social Choice and Welfare, 29(3), 453–486.
Ben-Yashar, R., and J. Paroush (2000): “A Nonasymptotic Condorcet Jury
Theorem,” Social Choice and Welfare, 17(2), 189–199.
Berend, D., and L. Sapir (2007): “Monotonicity in Condorcets Jury Theorem
with Dependent Voters,” Social Choice and Welfare, 28(3), 507–528.
Berg, S. (1993): “Condorcet’s Jury Theorem, Dependency Among Jurors,”
Social Choice and Welfare, 10(1), 87–95.
Bhattacharya, S., J. Duffy, and S.-T. Kim (2013): “Compulsory versus
Voluntary Voting: An Experimental Study,” Discussion paper, Working Paper.
(2014): “Compulsory versus Voluntary Voting: An Experimental
Study,” Games and Economic Behavior, 84(0), 111 – 131.
Bikhchandani, S., D. Hirshleifer, and I. Welch (1992): “A Theory of
Fads, Fashion, Custom, and Cultural Change as Informational Cascades,”
Journal of Political Economy, 100(5), pp. 992–1026.
Blais, A., S. Labb-St-Vincent, J.-F. Laslier, N. Sauger, and K. V. d.
Straeten (2011): “Strategic Vote Choice in One-round and Two-round Elec-
tions: An Experimental Study,” Political Research Quarterly, 64(3), pp. 637–
645.
Blais, A., and R. Young (1999): “Why Do People Vote? An Experiment in
Rationality,” Public Choice, 99(1/2), pp. 39–55.
Blanchard, O., and L. Summers (1987): “Hysteresis in unemployment,”
European Economic Review, 31(1-2), 288–295.
Blume, A., J. Duffy, and A. M. Franco (2009): “Decentralized organiza-
tional learning: an experimental investigation,” American Economic Review,
pp. 1178–1205.
Burdett, K., R. Lagos, and R. Wright (2003): “Crime, Inequality, and
Unemployment,” The American Economic Review, 93(5), 1764–1777.
(2004): “An On-The-Job Search Model of Crime, Inequality, and Un-
employment,” International Economic Review, 45(3), 681–706.
Cai, H. (2009): “Costly Participation and Heterogeneous Preferences in Infor-
mational Committees,” The RAND Journal of Economics, 40(1), pp. 173–189.
142
Carter, J. R., and S. D. Guerette (1992): “An Experimental Study of
Expressive Voting,” Public Choice, 73(3), pp. 251–260.
Casella, A., A. Gelman, and T. R. Palfrey (2003): “An Experimental
Study of Storable Votes,” Discussion Papers 0304-01, Columbia University,
Department of Economics.
Casella, A., A. Llorente-Saguer, and T. R. Palfrey (2012): “Compet-
itive Equilibrium in Markets for Votes,” Journal of Political Economy, 120(4),
pp. 593–658.
Che, Y.-K., and N. Kartik (2009): “Opinions as Incentives,” Journal of
Political Economy, 117(5), 815–860.
Chwe, M. (2008): “A Robust and Optimal Anonymous Procedure for Con-
dorcets Model,” Discussion Paper, UCLA Department of Political Science.
Collier, K., P. C. Ordeshook, and K. Williams (1989): “The Rationally
Uninformed Electorate: Some Experimental Evidence,” Public Choice, 60(1),
pp. 3–29.
Coronel, J. C., M. C. Duff, D. E. Warren, K. D. Federmeier, B. D.
Gonsalves, D. Tranel, and N. J. Cohen (2012): “Remembering and
Voting: Theory and Evidence from Amnesic Patients,” American Journal of
Political Science, 56(4), pp. 837–848.
Coughlan, P. J. (2000): “In Defense of Unanimous Jury Verdicts: Mistrials,
Communication, and Strategic Voting,” American Political Science Review, pp.
375–393.
Cross, R. (1993): “On the foundations of hysteresis in economic systems,”
Economics and Philosophy, 9(01), 53–74.
Dekel, E., and M. Piccione (2000): “Sequential Voting Procedures in Sym-
metric Binary Elections,” Journal of Political Economy, 108(1), pp. 34–55.
Dixit, A. (1989): “Entry and exit decisions under uncertainty,” Journal of po-
litical Economy, pp. 620–638.
(1992): “Investment and hysteresis,” The Journal of Economic Perspec-
tives, pp. 107–132.
Duffy, J., and E. Hopkins (2005): “Learning, Information, and Sorting in
Market Entry Games: Theory and Evidence,” Games and Economic behavior,
51(1), 31–62.
Duffy, J., and M. Tavits (2008): “Beliefs and Voting Decisions: A Test of the
Pivotal Voter Model,” American Journal of Political Science, 52(3), 603–618.
Duggan, J., and C. Martinelli (2001): “A Bayesian Model of Voting in
Juries,” Games and Economic Behavior, 37(2), 259 – 294.
143
Eckel, C., and C. A. Holt (1989): “Strategic Voting in Agenda-Controlled
Committee Experiments,” The American Economic Review, 79(4), pp. 763–
773.
Engelhardt, B. (2010): “The Effect of Employment Frictions on Crime,” Jour-
nal of Labor Economics, 28(3), 677–718.
Engelhardt, B., G. Rocheteau, and P. Rupert (2008): “Crime and the
labor market: A search model with optimal contracts,” Journal of Public Eco-
nomics, 92(10-11), 1876 – 1891.
Erev, I., and A. Rapoport (1998): “Coordination ’Magic’ and Reinforcement
Learning in a Market Entry Game,” Games and Economic Behavior, 23(2), 146
– 175.
Feddersen, T., and W. Pesendorfer (1998): “Convicting the Innocent: The
Inferiority of Unanimous Jury Verdicts under Strategic Voting,” The American
Political Science Review, 92(1), pp. 23–35.
Feddersen, T. J. (2004): “Rational Choice Theory and the Paradox of Not
Voting,” Journal of Economic Perspectives, 18(1), 99–112.
Feddersen, T. J., and W. Pesendorfer (1996): “The Swing Voter’s Curse,”
American Economic Review, 86(3), pp. 408–424.
Finkel, S. E., and E. N. Muller (1998): “Rational Choice and the Dynamics
of Collective Political Action: Evaluating Alternative Models with Panel Data,”
American Political Science Review, 92(1), pp. 37–49.
Finkel, S. E., E. N. Muller, and K.-D. Opp (1989): “Personal Influence,
Collective Rationality, and Mass Political Action,” American Political Science
Review, 83(3), pp. 885–903.
Fiorina, M. P., and C. R. Plott (1978): “Committee Decisions under Ma-
jority Rule: An Experimental Study,” The American Political Science Review,
72(2), pp. 575–598.
Fischbacher, U. (2007): “z-Tree: Zurich Toolbox for Ready-made Economic
Experiments,” Experimental Economics, 10(2), 171–178.
Forsythe, R., R. Myerson, T. Rietz, and R. Weber (1993): “An Exper-
iment on Coordination in Multi-candidate Elections: The Importance of Polls
and Election Histories,” Social Choice and Welfare, 10(3), 223–247.
Forsythe, R. E., R. B. Myerson, T. Rietz, and R. J. Weber (1991):
“An Experimental Study of Voting Rules and Polls in Three- Way Elections,”
Working papers, University of Iowa, Department of Economics.
Francisco, R. A. (1996): “Coercion and Protest: An Empirical Test in Two
Democratic States,” American Journal of Political Science, 40(4), pp. 1179–
1204.
144
Frchette, G. R., J. H. Kagel, and S. F. Lehrer (2003): “Bargaining in
Legislatures: An Experimental Investigation of Open versus Closed Amend-
ment Rules,” The American Political Science Review, 97(2), pp. 221–232.
Gerardi, D. (2000): “Jury Verdicts and Preference Diversity,” The American
Political Science Review, 94(2), pp. 395–406.
Gerardi, D., and L. Yariv (2007): “Deliberative Voting,” Journal of Eco-
nomic Theory, 134(1), 317–338.
(2008): “Information Acquisition in Committees,” Games and Economic
Behavior, 62(2), 436 – 459.
Gersbach, H. (1995): “Information Efficiency and Majority Decisions,” Social
Choice and Welfare, 12(4), 363–370.
Gershkov, A., and B. Szentes (2009): “Optimal Voting Schemes with Costly
Information Acquisition,” Journal of Economic Theory, 144(1), 36 – 68.
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